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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I examine the health, welfare, and distributional implications
of the society’s institutions and public policies in three separate chapters.
In the first chapter, I show that exposure to Muslim religious fasting month
during gestation results in significant decline in the body height. In the sec-
ond chapter, I examine the welfare, fiscal, and environmental consequences
of a structural change in the public policy that substitute indirect energy
and food subsidies – price subsidies – with direct cash transfers to house-
hold. Finally, in the third chapter, I measure the distributional effects of
several countrywide welfare programs in interaction with economic growth
and households’ characteristics. In the followings, I have provided summaries
of each chapter.
In the first chapter, to estimate the effect of nutritional disorder during
pregnancy on children’s height, I use Demographic and Health Survey data
from numerous developing countries that include children’s exact birth dates
and employ exposure to the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan as a natu-
ral experiment. I find that Ramadan-induced prenatal nutritional disorder
causes a 3.5 to 10.5 millimeter decrease in the height of Muslim boys at ages
3 and 4. I identify no effect on females including children and children’s
mothers. I also show that exposure to Ramadan becomes significant when
it occurs for more than 10 days, there is no intergenerational transmission
from mothers to children, and latitude does not influence the effect. The ro-
bustness tests show that the results are not driven by selection into fertility,
seasonality, or observations from a specific country.
In the second paper, I use the 1987-2010 Household Budget Surveys from
the Statistical Center of Iran consisting of 273,879 observations, coupled
with the price data from the Central Bank of Iran, to estimate the structure
of demand for goods and services in urban areas of Iran. The estimation
procedure assumes a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS)
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introduced by Banks et al. (1997). It uses the estimated demand system to
study the implications of the removal of the massive subsidies on energy and
basic foodstuff that were in place in Iran up to 2010. I examine the economy’s
consumption patterns, income distribution, private and social welfare, and
the environment.
The third chapter employs quantile regression method and household ex-
penditure surveys to assess the general equilibrium effects of public spending
and social protection programs on household expenditure distribution in Iran.
The approach captures the broad consequences of programs, taking into ac-
count their direct and indirect effects through price changes, interpersonal
transfers, demonstration effects, and the like. I also control for and assess
the role of household characteristics and geographic and time fixed effects.
The case of Iran is interesting and important because in recent decades the
country has experimented with new institutional arrangements to address
poverty and has been relatively successful in this regard, as the findings con-
firm. This study covers the 1993-2006 period. For policy analysis I focus on
1998-2005, the so-called reform period in Iran. I find that growth has been
unequalizing, but changes in education, government spending, and a unique
agency established after the revolution of 1979 to provide social safety net
have counteracted with that effect and raised the incomes of the bottom half
of the population faster than the rest. The upper end of the distribution has
also benefited somewhat, leaving those in the 50 to 85 percentiles behind.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF NUTRITIONAL
DISORDER DURING PREGNANCY ON
HEIGHT: RAMADAN AS A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT
1.1 Introduction
Height is the most revealing indicator of nutrition at early life, and predicts
morbidity and mortality in adulthood (Waaler 1984, Fogel 1994).1 It is, thus,
not surprising that height predicts economic outcomes such as occupation,
wage, and income (Case and Paxton 2006, Mankiw and Weinzierl 2010). This
is why economic historians use height as a marker of society’s health and
standard of living (Strauss and Thomas 1998, Steckel 2004). A large body
of literature is devoted to evaluating the effect of malnutrition in childhood
and birth year on height (Duflo 2000, Bozzoli et al. 2007, Banerjee et al.
2007, Bundervoet et al. 2009, Akresh et al. 2011, Akresh et al. 2012).
However, studies that focus on the fetal life and examine the effect of fetal
malnutrition on height are rare and often involve sizable measurement errors
(Brainerd and Menon 2012, Rosales 2013).2
In this study, I focus on the fetal life and explore how nutritional disorder
in utero affects height by using the exact birth dates of children under 5 years
and exploiting the calendric nature of the incidence of the nutritional disorder
shocks stemming from exposure to the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.3
As such, I can account for the detailed timing of nutritional disorder in utero.
My econometric identification strategy, then, employs variations in timing of
1In this study, I provide evidence that the reason for the strong correlations of the
rates of morbidity and mortality in adulthood with height can be the fact that the critical
windows of development of vital organs overlap with the critical windows of growth in
height.
2The major source of measurement errors in height studies, including those that focus
on the fetal life, is the lack of information on individuals’ exact birth date. In this study,
I show that it can lead to considerable overestimation or underestimation of results.
3Ramadan is a month during which Muslims past the age of duty - 9 lunar years for
women and 15 lunar years for men - are obligated to fast, i.e. abstain from eating, drinking,
smoking, and sexual activities during daylight hours.
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exposure to Ramadan during gestation and religion to identify the height
effect. I test the validity of the identification assumption that timing of
exposure to Ramadan is not driven by observable characteristics of children
and households and estimate difference-in-difference regressions. My large
data set that includes 80 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 35
countries and covers 27 birth cohorts allows for isolating Ramadan effects
from seasonal effects.4,5
A major contribution of this study is proposing height as a highly infor-
mative connection between fetal environment and adulthood and old age
diseases. The literature that seeks for the developmental origins of aﬄiction
in adulthood commonly views birth weight as the premium sign of devel-
opmental modifications in response to malnutrition in utero and the main
medium to chronic diseases in adulthood (Barker 1999). In this study, I ar-
gue that height is more informative than birth weight because a fetus’s weight
gain largely occurs during the last weeks of gestation, which are the least im-
portant episodes of gestation from developmental point of view. However, a
fetus grows in height during the entirety of gestation and the critical windows
of growth in height overlap with the critical windows of development of vital
organs such as the heart, kidney, and brain.6 In line with this argument,
my estimations show that nutritional disorder during the critical windows of
growth in height has, in fact, greater impact on children’s height.
This work also contributes to the literature of height studies in several
ways. First, by using children’s exact birth dates and calendric nature of
Ramadan, it draws clear lines between prenatal and postnatal nutritional
disorder and avoids the pertinent measurement errors. It also differentiates
4These 35 countries all have a sizable Muslim population (i.e. more than 10% Muslim
population according to the World Bank data) with DHS samples containing the required
information (namely, children’s exact day, month, and year of birth, exact day, month and
year of height measurement, children’s mothers’ religion, children’s mothers’ height, and
households’ socioeconomic characteristics).
5Since Ramadan is a month in the lunar calendar, its occurrence changes according to
the commonly used solar calendars, e.g. western Gregorian calendar and Iranian calendar,
such that it comes earlier each year, by about 11 days. Because of the slow forward shift of
Ramadan through common solar calendars, the full rotation of Ramadan takes about 32
years. As a result, it is necessary to have numerous birth years in order to detach seasonal
effects from Ramadan effect on height. Having 27 birth years in the data set decreases
this concern substantially. Additionally, this study runs specific tests and rules out the
influence of seasonality.
6It is also noteworthy that there is only a weak relationship between birth weight and
height (Scott et al. 1982, Martorell et al. 1994, Roseboom et al. 2000, Eriksson 2006).
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between nutritional disorder during months of gestation. Subsequently, this
work analyzes height effects by detailed timing of nutritional disorder ac-
cording to the growth dynamic of a fetus. Second, by using exposure to
Ramadan, this work employs a direct measure for fetal nutritional disorder,
while commonly used measures, i.e. natural or human disasters, are indi-
rect measures of fetal nutritional disorder. Therefore, this study estimates
height effects that are less polluted with potential unobservable factors or
the influence of other shocks. Third, in this work, a clear separation of the
treatment and control groups of individuals, in terms of exposure to Ra-
madan environment, has become possible by using information on mothers’
religion and children’s exact birth date. However, it is difficult to define
sharp boundaries across time and space for natural and human disasters.7
Fourth, this work documents gender differences in carrying height effect of
nutritional disorder in utero. Fifth, this work estimates age-specific height
effects of nutritional disorder in utero in order to show the cumulative nature
of height development.
This work substantially contributes to the literature of Ramadan studies
as well.8 First, this work extends Ramadan studies to a variety of developing
countries, whereas existing Ramadan studies rely on limited data.9 There-
fore, this work presents a more accurate picture of the effect of Ramadan on
health.10 Second, this work investigates aspects of Ramadan that have not
been studied yet. Most important, this is the first study that demonstrates
the effects of exposure to Ramadan on height. In addition, it investigates how
a change in the intensity of exposure alters the effects, how the effects can
be transmitted from mothers to children, and how dispersion across latitudes
7My data does not tell if a mother fasted during pregnancy, but I can determine when
her pregnancy collided with Ramadan. Thus, I can certainly tell if she was exposed to a
fasting environment during pregnancy.
8This work is not the first to use Ramadan as a means of shedding light on the rela-
tionship between prenatal nutritional disorder and postnatal outcomes. Existing Ramadan
literature shows the evidence of an association of exposure to Ramadan in utero with low
birth weight, negative educational performance, unfortunate labor market outcomes, and
predisposition to old age disabilities (Almond and Mazumder 2011, van Ewijk 2011, Al-
mond et al. 2012, Majid 2012).
9Ramadan studies acquire data either from Muslims living in the U.S. and U.K. or
from Muslims in Indonesia, Uganda, and Iraq.
10In fact, the magnitude of similar effects can be considerably larger in the context
of developing countries. For example, while Almond and Mazumder (2011) measure an
average of 40 grams decrease in birth weight of the exposed newborn Muslims in Michigan,
Majid (2012)’s measurement of the same effect in Indonesia amounts to 270 grams.
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changes the severity of the effects.
I identify the first signs of the height effects of Ramadan-induced nutri-
tional disorder in utero at age 2. The effects become stronger and more
significant thereafter. To be more specific, I find that a full 30-day exposure
to Ramadan during gestation regardless of its timing leads to an average
4mm-5.5mm decline in the height of 3 and 4 year-old Muslim boys when
compared to the non-exposed Muslim boys and non-Muslim boys. If the
height effect is decomposed to months of gestation, the peaks of the effects
coincide with the crucial windows of fetal development in length. The largest
effects are traced to months 3 and 4, when pre-bone cartilage models and
the primary ossification centers form, and months 5 to 7, when bone cells
develop at their highest rates. For example, if Ramadan exactly coincides
with any of the crucial months in utero, then the subsequent height decline
amounts to 7.5mm-10.5mm for a 4 year-old Muslim boy. The height effects
of exposure to Ramadan in utero are found in male and not female children.
I also find no effect on the height of the children’s mothers. In addition, I
find no sign of intergenerational transfer of Ramadan-induced height decline
from mothers to children in accordance with the finding that female children
and mothers bear no height effect from exposure to Ramadan.
In addition, I find that the height effects appears after 10 days of exposure,
but the size of the marginal effects decline afterwards. Also, no significant
impact of latitude on the results is detected. These two pieces of evidence
suggest that Ramadan effects are probably not driven by intense fasting
of pregnant women. Although some Muslim women may fast in part during
pregnancy, the fasting environment during Ramadan in Muslim communities,
which provokes dietary and sleep disorders, is probably the main driving force
of the effects.
This study has enormous policy implications. I study the decisions that
people make to basically be malnourished or collectively create an environ-
ment that generates persistent dietary disorder for pregnant women. I show
that these conditions can have long-term negative health impacts for a fetus.
These conditions, which can be recreated by persistent mill-skipping, neglect-
ing minor chronic diseases, getting into weight-loss plans, or taking diet pills
during pregnancy, can be changed since they are originated from people’s
decisions. Thus, from policy-making point of view, this study highlights the
importance of providing information to the public about the specific risks of
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maternal dietary disorder during pregnancy. Therefore, this study is differ-
ent than the other works that look at disasters, such as wars, famines, or
epidemics that are essentially unpredictable or out of human’s control.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, the related
biological and economic background is presented. In Section 1.3, the data
and econometric models are introduced. In Section 1.4, the main results
are presented. How children’s height is influenced by nutritional disorder in
utero and how the sexes are different in bearing the effect are conferred in
this section. In Section 1.5, further investigations about the Ramadan effect,
such as intensity, intergenerational transmission, latitude, and reversibility
are discussed. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Height as an indicator of health, well-being, and success
There is a well-established inverse relationship between height and morbidity
and mortality rates, observed by Waaler (1984) and its further interactions
(Barker et al. 1990, Fogel et al. 1993, Smith et al. 2000, Jousilahti et al.
2000, Song et al. 2003, Carslake et al. 2013). Economic historians con-
sider height to be the best examiner of prosperity and economic development
(Steckel 1995, 2004).11 Height is also a known predictor of individual level
productivity and success (Fogel 1987).
The literature that connects height to labor market status dates back to
Gowin (1919). Case and Paxton (2006) show that the positive correlation
between height and income still holds in the U.S. and the U.K. such that a
one-inch increase in the height of American and British men is associated with
a 2.4% and 1.5% increase in their earnings, respectively.12 The connection
between height and labor market outcomes has been reported in developing
countries as well (Haddad and Bouis 1991, Strauss and Thomas 1998).13 In
11Economic historians rely on size distributions of calories to explain secular trends in
malnutrition, morbidity, mortality, and economic growth (Fogel 1994, Fogel and Floud
1994).
12For the U.S., they use data from 1986 to 1994. For the U.K., data of the 1970s cohort
is used.
13Several hypotheses are proposed and tested to explain the relationship. Humphreys
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a more recent study Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) uphold the correlation of
height and wage in the U.S. and suggest an income tax credit for taxpayers
who are short in height.14
1.2.2 Determinants of height
Heredity accounts for about 80% of the determining factors for height (Sil-
ventoinen 2003). Nevertheless, the differences across groups and populations
are predominantly attributable to environmental elements. Hence, genetic
differences cancel out in intra-population and most cross-population com-
parisons (Steckel 1995, Beard and Blaser 2002).15 Environmental determi-
nants of height, i.e. nutrition and diseases, are most influential at the early
ages of life. The significant role of net nutritional intake during infancy
and childhood in shaping height is extensively documented in biologists and
economists (Duflo 2000, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001, Crimmins and Finch
2006, and Bozzoli et al. 2007, Bundervoet et al. 2009).16
It is possible that the fetal environment also has a role in determining a
person’s height. Recently, studies of the long-term effects of shocks to the
fetal environment are framed under the fetal origins hypothesis.17 Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, if the fetus encounters difficult conditions, then it
et al. (1985), Abbott et al. (1998), and Case and Paxton (2006) connect height to cognitive
abilities. Blane et al. (1999) and Bielicki and Szklarska (2000) explain it by social mobility.
And, Freedman (1979) and Young and French (1996) use self-esteem induced by height to
explain it.
14In a follow-up study, I document the effect of Ramadan nutritional shocks during
gestation on adults’ income and working hours in Nigeria and show that height can serve
as a physiological medium of the fetal shocks to adulthood (Caruso and Karimi 2014).
15Whereas genetics are a critical determinant of height, different nations’ secular height
increases since the mid nineteenth-century occurred so rapidly that they cannot be at-
tributed to long-run natural selective factors (Floud et al. 1990, Beard and Blaser 2002).
Floud et al. (1990) illustrate that the average height at conscription age in Denmark,
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden has increased by more than 10cm from the 1860s to
1980s (page 25). They document a similar trend in Britain by extending it to the 1740s
(page 289). The elevation of height is particularly striking in the Netherlands, which was
counted among the European countries with the shortest people in the nineteenth-century,
from about 165cm to 180cm. Beard and Blaser (2002) present recent data from 11 Eu-
ropean countries and show 3cm to 6cm increases in the average height at the same age,
from the years 1960 to 1990.
16The correlation between height at adulthood and at age 2 is about 80% (Schmidt et al.
1995).
17Sustained interest in the fetal environment, from early supportive studies (Ebbs et al.
1941, Burke et al. 1943), to the discouraging perfect parasite hypothesis (Darby et al.
1953, Thomson 1958, 1959), sparked to renewed attention from Barker et al. (1990).
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strategically adapts its development to increase its chance of survival both in
utero and after birth. In other words, the fetus expects a challenging post-
natal life and conducts predictive adaptive responses (Gluckman and Hanson
2005). The survival-oriented modifications, however, might negatively affect
some organs. For example, the likelihood of suffering from heart disease, di-
abetes, and obesity in adulthood is higher for starved fetuses (Barker 1998a,
1998b). Depending on the timing of in utero shocks, the adaptive responses
will be different and their postnatal health consequences vary accordingly,
highlighting the evolutionary concept of critical windows of development.
There is a broad range of literature that addresses the effects of malnutri-
tion in utero on adults’ diseases using different types of shocks.18 Height has
also been subjected to similar analyses.19 Banerjee et al. (2007) use the re-
gional variations in the timing of 1863-1890 pest attacks to French vineyards
to identify the long-term height effects of the resultant income shocks. They
find that an affected 20 year-old man is about 6mm to 10mm shorter than
an unaffected man. Cutler et al. (2007) use America’s Dust Bowl and find
no significant height effect caused by the income shocks. Maccini and Yang
(2009) use district level and seasonal variations in rainfalls in rural Indonesia
to measure the effect of weather shocks at early life on height, among other
outcomes. They find that 20% more rainfall at the year and location of birth
is associated with 5.7mm height increase in women. Meng and Qian (2009)
employ variations in the regional intensity of China’s 1959-1961 famine at
early life and find that birth during the famine is associated with a 27mm
decrease in adults’ height. Dercon and Porter (2010) use the 1984 Ethiopian
famine to find that children who were exposed to the peak of the famine
are shorter than the non-exposed children by 30mm. Akresh et al. (2011)
use crop failures and civil wars in Rwanda at 1980s and 1990s to show that
18A long list of medical problems are examined using the 1944-1945 Dutch famine
(Neugebauer et al. 1999, Roseboom et al. 2000, Painter et al. 2005, Roseboom et al.
2006, Heijmans et al. 2008), influenza epidemic of 1918 (Almond and Mazumder 2005,
Almond 2006), Chernobyl radioactive fallout (Almond et al. 2007), the siege of Leningrad
(Stanner et al. 1997), income shocks (Cutler et al. 2007), and religious customs (Almond
and Mazumder 2011, van Ewijk 2011).
19The early studies of the effect of in utero shocks on height are simple tabulations or
graphs that compare mean height of the exposed and the non-exposed individuals to the
shocks (Volaoras 1970, Zena et al. 1975, Susser and Stein 1994 , Stanner et al. 1997).
However, on account of increased data availability in recent years, a growing body of
literature analyses the height effects of in utero malnutrition using detailed background
information and meticulous identification strategies.
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birth during crop failures is associated with significant height decreases for
women. Birth during the civil wars results in height decrease for both men
and women. These studies, however, do not distinguish between prenatal
and postnatal periods since they compare the height of individuals who were
born in shock areas to that of individuals in comparison groups.
There are few recent studies that attempt to distinguish between prenatal
and postnatal shocks. Akresh et al. (2012) examine the effects of exposure
to 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war in utero, at ages 0-3, at ages 4-6, at ages
7-12, and at ages 13-16 on women’s height. They find no effect of in utero
exposure to the civil war, but exposure at early childhood is associated with
a 7.5mm decrease in height. Brainerd and Menon (2012) use variations in the
concentrations of agrichemical fertilizers by season and area in rural India
and document the negative effect of exposure to contaminated water in the
month of conception on children’s height. Rosales (2013) uses data from
Ecuador and examines the height effect of exposure to 1997-1998 El Nino
floods during gestation and finds that one additional month of exposure to
the floods decreased the height-for-age of 5 to 7 year-old children by 0.03
standard deviations. The effect is significant only for the third trimester of
gestation.
The studies that are mainly focused on in utero environment suffer from
several problems. First, they contain a measurement error originated from a
lack of information about individuals’ exact birth date. Since only year and
month of birth are available to the authors of the papers, they cannot draw
clear lines between the preconception month and the first month of gestation,
between trimesters of gestation, or between the last month of gestation and
the first month after birth. Thus, such studies cannot analyze the effect
of exposure by months of gestation. As such, they cannot offer a detailed
examination of the effect of malnutrition in utero based on the timing of
fetal growth. Second, such studies do not employ “direct” measures of early
life malnutrition and assume it is induced indirectly by the shocks, i.e. civil
war, chemicals, and floods. Notably, the involvement of unobservable factors
can potentially distort the connection between the shocks and nutritional
insufficiency.20 Third, the the studies often contain a measurement error
20For example, access to a network of relatives, friends, or tribe members that can
provide support for some affected households but not others is usually an unobservable
factor.
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stemming from the fact that a sharp definition of the boundaries of the
shocks across time and space is difficult. Fourth, they do not study gender
differences in the carrying height effect of malnutrition in utero.
1.2.3 Ramadan as a natural experiment
If the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan is utilized as a natural experiment,
then there will be less concern about the connection between in utero shock
and actual in utero malnutrition.21 In addition, if exact birth dates are
available, then the calendric nature of incidence of Ramadan allows for de-
termining the exact timing of exposure to Ramadan in utero as long as it
does not affect normal gestation length. Plus, boundaries of the influence
of Ramadan can be defined sharply across individuals and time given the
information of the mother’s religion and the child’s exact birth date.22
The newly-developed Ramadan literature uses Ramadan’s unique charac-
teristics to identify adverse effect of malnutrition in utero on birth weight,
vulnerability to chronic diseases and disabilities at old age, wage at adult-
hood, and education (Almond and Mazumder 2011, van Ewijk 2011, Almond
et al. 2012, Majid 2012). Almond and Mazumder (2011) and Majid (2012)
show that in utero exposure to Ramadan causes low birth weight. The stud-
ies link the effect of Ramadan to later stages of life in accordance with an
empirical stream of studies that support the fetal origins hypothesis. While
height provides a better proxy for fetal nutritional environment in compar-
ison to birth weight, for example, it has not been used to link the effect of
gestational malnutrition to adulthood by the Ramadan studies.23
21In Section 5, I show that Ramadan nutritional shock is in the form of nutritional
disorder than malnutrition. Thus, I am intended to use the phrase “nutritional disorder”
to describe Ramadan nutritional shock in this study.
22The only non-Ramadan in utero shock that provides sharp and clear boundaries of
treatment in space and time is the Dutch famine, but it has only been used for preliminary
height studies.
23van Ewijk (2009) estimates the height effect of exposure to Ramadan in utero along
with an array of other health outcomes. Despite the prediction of medical theory, he finds
almost no effect of exposure to Ramadan in utero on Muslims’ anthropometric character-
istics. For example, exposure to Ramadan only at the month of conception has weakly
significant negative effects on Muslim women’s height. Therefore, in the published version
of his study, van Ewijk (2011) drops height analyses. van Ewijk (2009)’s height analysis
would improve with sufficient number of observations. He has less than 7,400 height ob-
servations for men at all ages and almost the same number for women, while it is essential
to conduct height analyses by age, especially for individuals under age 21.
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The Ramadan studies have found no evidence that parents set the time
of conception according to the occurrence of Ramadan. The relationship
between exposure to and observance of Ramadan is another concern. Obser-
vance of Ramadan is expected to be high during the first month of pregnancy
when it is more likely that pregnancy is not realized. When realized, preg-
nant women are generally exempted from fasting, but they are required to
make up for it after parturition. Nevertheless, some mothers choose to fast
in order not to evade the religious task or not to do it alone later.24 Regard-
less, those women who do not fast face dietary restrictions and disorders.
Restaurants and food shops are usually closed at daytime during Ramadan
in most Islamic countries. At home, pregnant Muslim women usually set the
times of their main meals to before sunrise and after sunset when the fasting
members of households eat. Subsequently, their dietary disorders are accom-
panied by a derangement of their sleeping times. Thus, pregnant Muslim
women observe Ramadan either by fasting or by experiencing diet disorders.
1.2.4 Height and birth weight
In this section, I explain the relationship between height and birth weight
and emphasize on the importance of measuring height effect in conjunction
with the documented birth weight effect of malnutrition in utero. The strong
correlation of severe low birth weight and shortness in height is indisputable,
as the same correlation exists between that and an array of long-term health
problems (Ericson and Kallen 1998, Hack et al. 2003). Aside from extreme
cases, birth weight has little effect on a child’s growth and does not deter-
mine height (Scott et al. 1982, Martorell et al. 1994, Strauss 1997). In this
regard, Kusin et al. (1992)’s findings are particularly illustrative. In a ran-
domized experiment, they gave low and high caloric supplements to pregnant
women at the third trimester and recorded children’s weight and height until
the age of 5. They find that height differences in the children of the two
groups tended to increase and become statistically significant while weight
differences tended to decrease and become statistically insignificant with age.
24The sparse evidence on the observance of Ramadan shows that majority of pregnant
Muslim women observe Ramadan for one day at least. As it is documented by Almond and
Mazumder (2011), between 70% to 90% of surveyed pregnant Muslim women in Gambia,
Iran, Singapore, U.K., U.S.A., and Yemen had observed Ramadan for one day at least.
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To explain the different trends in height and weight gain after birth, one
should consider that weight is a short-term indicator of health that mainly
reflects the nutritional environment around the time of measurement. As
such, birth weight mainly reflects the nutritional status at the latest weeks
of gestation. Thus, it is more possible that a deficiency in birth weight can be
overcome shortly after birth. Height, however, is a long-term accumulative
indicator of health. In other words, it is less likely that defects in height at
critical windows of growth can be compensated.
Looking into the dynamics of fetal growth displays the forces behind the
different trends. As it will be explained in details in the next section, the
potential for growth in height, which is laid in development of long bones,
starts forming from the end of the first month of gestation and a fetus grows
in length in a steady, almost linear, rate until birth. A fetus’s weight gain,
however, follows an exponential pattern such that the rate of gaining weight
increasingly goes up when approaching to birth.25 That is, the later weeks of
gestation are more important in terms of fetus’s growth in weight. Hence, it
is more likely that weight deviation of the newborn, from the typical weight,
is caused by a nutritional deficiency during the latest weeks or month of
gestation.26
The fetal origins hypothesis also predicts that fetal programming may not
necessarily affect birth size (Eriksson 2006). In fact, any inflicted change
in phenotype need not be promptly visible at birth. For example, Rose-
boom et al. (2001)’s findings from the Dutch famine show that the fetal
programming of an adulthood disease can occur with no trace on birth size.
Therefore, biological research about the link between birth weight and height
is in no way conclusive. Therefore, height requires independent attention. In
the next section, I argue that height may be even more informative that birth
weight when fetal programming is traced because critical windows of fetal
growth in height overlap with critical windows of development of vital organs
in utero.
25This increasing rate of weight gain is mainly due to accumulation of fat and en-
largement of the fetus’s organs, which have undergone the crucial stages of comple-
tion during the first half of pregnancy in most cases. Visit the following link to
see a graph of a fetus’s weight gain during gestation: http://www.babycenter.com/
average-fetal-length-weight-chart
26Moore and Persaud (2008) show that poor nutrition defects a fetus’s weight from its
normal pattern from about the mid-eighth month of gestation (Figure 6-13, Page 103).
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1.2.5 Biology of fetal development in length
In this section, first I give a brief overview of the biological process of fetal
development as it enhances the capacities of growing in height. Height is
mainly determined by the length of long bones, thus I give a cellular descrip-
tion of development of long bones and highlight the timing of the pertinent
stages, or the critical windows. Then, I compare the timing of the critical
windows of development in height with the timings of the critical windows
of development of human body’s vital organs to suggest that height is a
more informative indicator of health than birth weight. The contents of this
section will also afford a guideline to interpret the empirical results.
Long bones develop in four distinctive stages during the gestational period.
The sequence of the stages is mesodermal condensation, chondrification, for-
mation of primary ossification centers, and early endochondral ossification.27
During the fourth week of gestation, by migration of embryonic stem cells
to areas destined to grow bones and the rapid differentiation of the stem
cells, limb buds appear. During the next two weeks, column-like mesoder-
mal condensations appear along the axis of the limb buds. The next stage
is chondrification, i.e. development of cartilage models of the limb bones
within the mesodermal condensations, that starts from week 6 and continues
to week 18 of gestation (Figure 1.1, Illustration 1-4).28 The cartilage models
are the templates of the final bones and emulate their future size, shape, and
position. During the development of each template, an extra cellular matrix
containing vascular growth factors develops as well (Larsen 1997, Cooper
et al. 2006).
While cartilage models are growing in size, a parallel process is underway
leading to formation of the primary ossification centers, which takes place
during the second and third months of gestation (Figure 1.1, Illustration 2-
4).29 Early endochondral ossification, i.e. materialization process of the long
27In general, fetal skeleton development involves two distinct processes: the ossification
of flat bones, such as skull and facial bones, and the ossification of long bones, such as
found in legs and arms. These are distinguished by the presence or absence of cartilage
(Khurana 2009).
28The timing of the start of chondrification is different for different bones.
29Primary ossification center is the first site where a long bone begins to take shape.
The process that leads to formation of a primary ossification center includes the following
stages: (i) formation of a bony collar around the cartilage model; (ii) partial calcification
of the cartilage matrix and creation of a cavity in its mid-region; (iii) invasion of blood
vessels into the cavity; (iv) migration of stem cells into the cavity, differentiation of the
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bones, starts after the sufficient expansion of cartilage models and formation
of primary ossification centers. Endochondral ossification is, in fact, the
expansion of the primary ossification centers at the presence of the remaining
cartilage at both ends of the cavity in the middle region of bones (Figure 1.1,
Illustration 5-6). For some bones, such as ischium and calcaneous, this stage
starts from mid fourth month of gestation and persists until birth. But for
long bones of arms and legs, endochondral ossification starts from the fifth
month of gestation (Larsen 1997, Rose and Pawlina 2010).30
The time lines of the four stages of development of the limbs during ges-
tation, which I call them as the critical windows of development of the limbs
in utero, are shown in Figure 1.2. Focusing on long bones, two phases of de-
velopment can be distinguished: pre-ossification phase that includes the first
three stages of development (around the end of the first month to around
the end of fourth month) and ossification phase that includes that last stage
(from about the beginning of the fifth month to birth).
The development processes of both phases are influenced by the mother’s
nutrition (Gluckman et al. 1996, Cooper et al. 2006). Also, as cartilage mod-
els lay the framework for early endochondral ossification, the two phases are
interdependent.31 There is evidence that calcium and vitamin D, transferred
from the mother to the fetus via the placenta, are crucial for the process of
ossification. The transfer commences around week 20 of gestation (Cooper
et al. 2006).32
Figure 1.2 also shows the critical windows of development of human body’s
vital organs and systems during gestation. Almost all of them have an evolu-
tionary phase during which the organ’s components shape and complete and
an expansionary phase during which the completed organ enlarges alongside
the growth of fetus.33 For the heart, the evolutionary phase consists of the
stem cells alongside an expansion of blood vessels.
30Subsequent, stages of ossification, including the formation and expansion of the sec-
ondary ossification centers, take place after birth (Figure 1.1, Illustration 7-10).
31The interdependency is also justified by the fact that the expansion of primary ossifi-
cation centers is supported by the presence of cartilage at its ends; this is called epiphyseal
cartilage (Rose and Pawlina 2010).
32Less is known about the effects of maternal nutrition and growth of cartilage models
in the first trimester. However, from animal studies, there is an abundance of evidence of
the effect of fetal undernourishment on bone growth, skeleton growth, and bone related
diseases. Lanham et al. (2011) provide the most recent and extensive survey of such
studies.
33This rule does not apply to the respiratory system. Since, the respiratory system
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episodes indicated by H1, H2, and H3, which span from week 3 to week 12
of gestation, and the expansionary phase consists of the episode indicated
by H4, which spans from the second trimester of gestation to birth. For the
digestive system, the time spans of the two phases are the same as those for
heart. That is, the evolutionary phase consists of the episodes indicated by
D1, D2, D3, D4, and D5, which span from week 3 to week 12 of gestation,
and the expansionary phase consists of the episode indicated by D6, which
spans from the second trimester of gestation to birth. For the kidney and
the brain, the evolutionary phase lasts for a month more.
The idea of dividing development of organs to evolutionary and expan-
sionary phases can also be applied to the development of long bones such
that the pre-ossification and ossification phases resemble evolutionary and
expansionary phases, respectively. As it can be seen in Figure 1.2, the time
spans of the two phases of development of long bones approximately coincide
with the time spans of the two phases of development of the heart, the di-
gestive system, the kidney, and the brain. More specifically, the time line of
the evolutionary phase of development of long bones encompasses the time
lines of the evolutionary phases of the organs. The coincidence suggests that
height may be more informative than birth weight if long-term health is con-
sidered. As it was described in section 2.4, the major weight gain of a fetus
takes place during the last trimester of gestation in which the last weeks of
gestation are of far more importance. These times coincide only with a part
of one phase of development of vital organs, i.e. expansionary phase.
1.2.6 Selective male misery
In this section, I review evidence of a greater vulnerability of male fetuses
to hardship in comparison to female fetuses. While a smaller number of
female fetuses are conceived than males, a stream of clinical studies from the
1960s records physical, psychological, and neurological disadvantages of the
males in comparison to the females. For example, Neonatal mortality and
morbidity rates, susceptibility to many diseases, and learning and behavior
disorders are higher for male. Also, the risks of abortion, premature birth,
and stillbirth are significantly higher in male fetuses (Singer et al. 1968,
is not going to be used during gestation, but it evolves and completes during the entire
gestation.
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Gualtieri and Hicks 1985, Lavoie et al. 1998). Loke (1978) and Gualtieri and
Hicks (1985) review the possible causes of the sex differences and conclude
that female fetuses are capable of better adaptation in utero environment
than male fetuses.34 The accumulated evidence of sex differences in aﬄiction
has led to the fragile male hypothesis (Kraemer 2000).
Studies that provide causal evidence of the fragile male hypothesis are
focused on the effect of in utero shocks on sex ratio using earthquakes, smogs,
floods, wars, severe life events, and Ramadan (Fukuda et al. 1998, Lyster
1974, Zorn et al 2002, Hansen et al 1999, Almond and Mazumder 2011).
However, evidence of the hypothesis from afterbirth incidences of disease is
generally observational and focused on neurological problems. One unique
feature of this study is that it allows for documenting sex differences in a non-
neurological disorder, namely height, in childhood through a causal analysis.
1.3 Data and Econometrics Model
1.3.1 Data
I use Demographic and Health Survey data. The data provide information
on fertility, family planning, maternal and child health, nutrition, malaria,
and HIV/AIDS in about 90 developing countries. Initially, I take the samples
of all of the countries that have at least a sizable minority of Muslim popula-
tion. These include 102 DHS samples from 45 countries. Among them, I drop
the samples lacking children’s exact birth date, children’s height information,
or mother’s religion. The exact birth dates are required to compute precise
measures of exposure to Ramadan, and information indicating a mother’s re-
ligion is required to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. Applying these
criteria leaves 86 samples from 37 countries. After assigning consistent vari-
able names and variable contents to the remaining samples, I append them
and run several consistency tests. First, I inspect height measurement dates.
I drop observations with a missing height measurement day because it is not
34Loke (1978) describes evidence of the differential viability in genetics, the number of
previous male pregnancies, and blood groups. Gualtieri and Hicks (1985) discuss the role
of maternal insufficiency, mainly rooted in genetics, in the higher vulnerability of male
fetuses.
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possible to generate height-for-age Z-scores for them. I also drop observa-
tions for which days of measurement and interview are not identical to avoid
uncertainty about the causes of the difference.35
Second, I examine the reported height-for-age Z-scores, or height-for-age
Z-scores. Since different reference populations are used to compute the Z-
scores at different phases of DHS, height-for-age Z-scores of children of the
same height and age, but in different samples, are not necessarily the same.
To prevent this type of inconsistency, I recompute height-for-age Z-scores by
utilizing a single reference population across all of the samples. In practice,
I use Child Growth Standards, provided by the World Health Organization,
in 2006 for children.36 These child standards are gender-specific in days of
age from birth to day 1856, i.e. the end of the fourth year of age. After
computing uniform height-for-age Z-scores, I retain only the data of children
with Z-scores in the range of -6 and 6.
While this study focuses on children’s height by using children’s height-
for-age Z-scores, adults’ Z-scores are also required to evaluate the effect of
exposure to Ramadan in utero on children’s mothers’ height. To compute
the uniform height-for-age Z-scores for adults, I use WHO Reference 2007 for
years 5-19. The standards for years 5-19 are also age-specific but in months
of age, from month 61 to 218.37 For adults older than 19, I assume that
height remains unchanged.38
Third, I drop data concerning children who have a mother with height
that is either below 100 or beyond 200. I take this action to rule out mis-
measurement, misreporting, or genetic anomalies. Finally, I drop observa-
tions with no information about parents’ education and household wealth.
Cleaning the pooled data for height measurement issues, extreme values of
35In the absence of days of measurement, my attempts to replace them with days of
interview were unsuccessful. When the day of measurement is reported, it matches to the
day of the interview in about 86% of cases. For the rest, the day of measurement is either
before the day of interview (77% of the cases) or after the day of interview (23% of the
cases). The reason for the later is unclear, but the former is possible if anthropometric
measures are transferred from children’s health cards. Thus, to avoid any unexplained
measurement error, I only keep the observations for which the days of measurement and
interview are the same.
36These standards that are internationally representative replace the formerly used
NCHS standards. The WHO standards are also more precise, especially in early infancy.
The standards are publicly available at http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/en/
37The adults’ standards are publicly available at http://www.who.int/growthref/en/
38This is not a strong assumption because the growth in body height after the age of 19
is very slow (Beard and Blaser 2002, Figure 3A).
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height-for-age Z-scores and mothers’ height, and missing parental education
and household wealth shrinks the number of samples and countries to 80 and
35, respectively. The total number of remaining observations is 251,370. In
Table 1.1, the number of observations from each country in the pooled data
set is presented by religion and gender. The numbers show that there are
almost equal numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims and, also, boys and girls
in the finalized data set.
1.3.2 Measures of exposure to Ramadan
I use the exact birth date of a child and go backward for about a year to find
out if any pre-birth-day has collided with Ramadan. Ramadan is a month
on the lunar calendar. Ramadan varies by years when considered according
to the commonly used solar calendar. Thus, to find the collision of a pre-
birth-day with Ramadan, I need to record occurrences of Ramadan from the
mid-1980s to 2011, i.e. the time period for which births of the children in
the dataset have taken place. Considering the collision of every pre-birth day
with Ramadan, the timing of exposure can be computed assuming a given
length for gestation. I have assumed typical 40-week gestation period for
each child. Hence, the number of days of exposure in entirety, in trimesters
of, and in months of gestation can be determined (Figure 1.3).39
Knowing whether any pre-birth-day of gestation is a Ramadan day allows
for calculating the hours of fetal exposure to Ramadan. First, I determine
the date of any pre-birth-day that has collided with Ramadan on the solar
calendar. This allows me find the “yearly day numbers”of the collision days,
which are numbers between 1 to 365 or 366.40 Then, I use yearly day numbers
of the collision days and latitude degrees of the place of residence, assuming
39Obstetricians use the last period of a pregnant woman’s menstruation to estimate
the fetus’s age of gestation. Since fertilization can transpire only after ovulation and
ovulation takes place halfway during the monthly menstrual cycle, it is estimated that the
fetus is about 2 weeks old relative to the occurrence of the mother’s last menstruation
(Altman and Bayer 2001, p. 282). Almond and Mazumder (2011) use reported physician
estimated lengths of pregnancies beside assumptions about the length of gestation and
find no significant difference in the results. Physician estimated lengths of gestation are
not reported for the children in the DHS data files. Therefore, I rely on an assumption
about the length of gestation. While I assume 40 weeks is the duration of gestation for all
children, changing it to one week or two weeks more and less does not alter the results.
40For example, if January 10 is a day of gestation colliding with Ramadan, then yearly
day number of this collision day is 10.
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that mothers’ current place of residence is the same as their place of residence
during pregnancy, to compute the numbers of daylight hours in every collision
day.41 Numbers of daylight hours indicate the length of exposure to Ramadan
in a single day. Finally, once the hours of exposure at each pre-birth collision
day are calculated, I compute the hours of exposure in entirety, in trimesters,
and in months of gestation.
Forty weeks of gestations consist of 280 days. Since I chose to work with
trimesters and months of gestation, I assume having 279 days of gestation
that can be divided to 3 and 9 to obtain integer numbers for lengths of
trimesters and months of gestation, respectively. Hence, trimesters and
months last for 93 and 31 days, respectively, in my calculations. By dividing
the gestation period as described above, I define the following variables:
HER279 : hours of exposure to Ramadan during the entirety of gestation
HERt i: hours of exposure to Ramadan during the i -th trimester of gesta-
tion, i=1,2,3
HERm i: hours of exposure to Ramadan during the i -th month of gesta-
tion, i=0,1,...,9
DER279 : number of days of exposure to Ramadan during the entirety of
gestation
DERt i: number of days of exposure to Ramadan during the i -th trimester
of gestation, i=1,2,3
DERm i: number of days of exposure to Ramadan during the i -th month
of gestation, i=0,1,...,9
1.3.3 Identification strategy
To identify the effect of malnutrition in utero on height, I exploit variations in
religion and in timing of exposure to Ramadan during gestation. In practice,
I use a difference-in-difference strategy where I ask whether Muslim children
who were exposed to Ramadan during gestation are shorter in height than
Muslim children who were not exposed to Ramadan during gestation, relative
to non-Muslim children. I ask the question for different measurements of
41In most of the DHS samples, the approximate latitude number of the place of residence
is included in a separate data file, named Geographical Database. For the samples with
no Geographical Database, I use the city or town of residence to find the corresponding
latitude.
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exposure to Ramadan and do so separately for boys and girls at different
years of age. Therefore, my identification assumption is that the occurrence
of Ramadan does not affect the timing of conception and pregnancy.
In Table 1.2 Panel A, I have presented the summary statistics of the ob-
servable characteristics of boys and girls categorized into Muslims and non-
Muslims, which in turn are divided into four groups: those who are not
exposed to Ramadan, those who are not fully exposed (1 to 29 days of ex-
posure), and those who are fully exposed (30 days of exposure). Comparing
the exposed and non-exposed Muslim boys and girls in terms of the charac-
teristics shows no sign of selection bias in exposure to Ramadan.
The identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 1.4 where non-parametric
relationships between height-for-age Z-scores and months of age are estimated
for the exposed and non-exposed Muslim boys and girls.42 Figure 1.4A shows
that the difference between height-for-age Z-scores of the exposed and non-
exposed Muslim boys is minimal during the first 24 or 25 months of life,
but it starts to increase thereafter. More specifically, Muslim boys who are
exposed to a full month of Ramadan during gestation (solid line) are consis-
tently shorter in height than Muslim boys who are not exposed to Ramadan
during gestation (dashed line) at ages 2, 3, and 4. Figure 1.4B, however,
does not show a consistent pattern for the difference between height-for-age
Z-scores of the exposed and non-exposed Muslim girls at the late childhood.
To further illustrate the identification strategy, I have provided the mean
and standard deviation of height-for-age Z-scores of boys and girls who are
not exposed to Ramadan, are fully exposed to Ramadan, and are partially
exposed to Ramadan by years of age and religion in Table 1.2 Panel B.
Comparing the mean height-for-age Z-score of Muslim boys who are not
exposed to Ramadan with that of Muslim boys who are fully exposed to
Ramadan reveals a developing negative effect by age. More specifically, the
latter is less than the former by 0.07, 0.12, and 0.16 standard deviations
at age 2, 3, and 4, respectively. For Muslim girls, the differences are very
small and no trend can be identified. Similar comparisons for non-Muslim
boys and girls show that fully exposed non-Muslims also have lower mean
42The non-parametric relationships are estimated by kernel-weighted local polynomial
regressions of height-for-age Z-scores on age in months using an Epanechnikov kernel. Age
in months is computed by using children’s exact birth dates. In practice, I assign n to a
child with n months and 0 to 14 days of age and n+1 to a child with n months and 15 to
30 days of age. The exposed children are exposed to Ramadan for a full month.
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Z-scores compared to non-exposed non-Muslims by about a 0.10 standard
deviation at all ages.
1.3.4 Econometric model
Graphical and tabular illustrations of the identification strategy show the
impact of exposure to Ramadan on Muslim boys during late childhood; how-
ever, no visible impact on Muslim girls is detected. Given the implications
of the illustrations of the identification strategy, I specify age- and gender-
specific econometric models. Such models also control for background in-
formation, which is extensively available for child, mother, household and
community. This is done in order to more accurately estimate the height
effect of Ramadan-induced malnutrition in utero.
To estimate the effect of fetal malnutrition induced by exposure to Ra-
madan on Muslim children’s height, measured by height-for-age Z-scores, I
use OLS regressions controlled by a host of relevant regressors. I run sepa-
rate regressions for boys and girls at every year of age. I also run the same
regressions for non-Muslims as falsification tests. Non-Muslim regressions
also allow testing for the possible effects of seasonality. Then, I combine
data for Muslims and non-Muslims and recover the coefficients of the former
regressions in an interaction regression. The specifications of the regressions
are as follows:
Yi = α
BOYj ,M + βBOYj ,M .HERi + δ
BOYj ,M .Xi + ε
BOYj ,M
i (1.1)
Yi = α
BOYj ,N + βBOYj ,N .HERi + δ
BOYj ,N .Xi + ε
BOYj ,N
i (1.2)
Yi = α
BOYj + βBOYj(HERi ×MOMMUSLIMi) + ρBOYj .HERi
+ δBOYj(Xi ×MOMMUSLIMi) + σBOYj .Xi
+ µBOYj .MOMMUSLIMi + ε
BOYj
i (1.3)
Yi = α
GIRLj ,M + βGIRLj ,M .HERi + δ
GIRLj ,M .Xi + ε
GIRLj ,M
i (1.4)
Yi = α
GIRLj ,N + βGIRLj ,N .HERi + δ
GIRLj ,N .Xi + ε
GIRLj ,N
i (1.5)
Yi = α
GIRLj + βGIRLj(HERi ×MOMMUSLIMi) + ρGIRLj .HERi
+ δGIRLj(Xi ×MOMMUSLIMi) + σGIRLj .Xi
+ µGIRLj .MOMMUSLIMi + ε
GIRLj
i (1.6)
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where i indicates a child and j indicates the age of the child in years (each
specification is estimated five times for j = 0, 1, ..., 4). M and N mark Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, respectively. Y is the dependent variable of interest,
i.e. height-for-age Z-score. HER is a set of exposure measures. It can
be HER279 , i.e. hours of exposure to Ramadan during entirety of gesta-
tion, {HERt1,HERt2,HERt3}, i.e. hours of exposure to Ramadan during
trimesters of gestation, or {HERm0,HERm1, ...,HERm9}, i.e. hours of ex-
posure to Ramadan during months of gestation. MOMMUSLIM is a dummy
variable that indicates if the child’s mother is Muslim. X is a set of control
variables that consists of age in days, year of birth, month of birth, birth
order, a variable that indicates twin birth, urban/rural indicator, an indica-
tor of province or state of residence, parents’ ages at child’s birth, parents’
education, mother’s height, and household’s wealth indicator.
The regressions are set such that the following equalities hold:
βBOYj = βBOYj ,M − βBOYj ,N for i = 0 , 1 , ..., 4
βGIRLj = βGIRLj ,M − βGIRLj ,N for i = 0 , 1 , ..., 4
The first equality uses the results of Equations 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The second
equality uses the results of Equations 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6. Thus, the results of
the estimations of Equations 1.3 and 1.6 can be used to test if Muslim versus
non-Muslim differential effects are significant.
A mother’s height is included among the control variables in order to ad-
dress genetic effects. I also plug year and month of birth to address seasonal-
ity and other time related effects on height.43 Parents’ education, especially
a mother’s education, are also shown to be correlated with children’s height
(Behrman and Deolalikar 1988). It is also been shown that the effect of
education on height is transmitted by access to information (Thomas et al
1991). Thus, I also control for parents’ education.
In addition, in order to recognize the well-documented correlation between
height and well-being, I also include an index of well-being among the regres-
sors (Gowin 1919, Martorell and Habicht 1986). In order to create a uniform
43Researchers document the correlation of birth time (year, season, or month) with
adulthood health outcomes, such as life span, older age mortality, and chronic conditions
(Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001, Costa and Lahey 2005, Costa et al. 2007). In a Nature
article, Weber et al. (1998) show sinusoidal variation in height by month of birth in
Austria (taller if born in warmer months). Hennenberg and Louw (1993) made similar
observations in South Africa. Buckles and Hungerman (2008) show that one’s season of
birth is correlated to the mother’s socioeconomic characteristics.
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index of wealth across all countries and samples from different years, I choose
variables that display different aspects of a household’s well-being and, also,
ones that are reported in all of the samples. The variables are (i) source of
drinking water; (ii) type of toilet facility; (iii) main floor material; (iv) access
to electricity; (v) owning radio; (vi) owning TV. Then, I extract the principle
component of the six variables and use its quintiles to generate an indicator
variable (1: very poor, 2: poor, 3: average, 4: rich, 5: very rich).
1.4 Main Results
After estimating Equations 1.1-1.6 by age, the coefficient(s) of the effect of
exposure to Ramadan during entirety, trimesters of, and months of gestation
on height-for-age Z-scores are reported in Tables (3), (4), and (5), respec-
tively. In the month regressions, I have also included hours of exposure in the
month prior to conception, named month 0. This will allow for investigating
the interaction between human eggs and its environment at pre-conception
period.44
The results display almost no significant effect of exposure to Ramadan
on height in the first two years of age for Muslim boys or for Muslim girls.
Height effect starts to appear from the third year of age, i.e. age 2, 3, and
4. No early childhood height effect is consistent with the predictions of
the fetal origins hypothesis and related experimental findings (Kusin et al.
1992, Roseboom et al. 2000, Gluckman and Hanson 2005, Eriksson 2006).
For example, Kusin et al. (1992) find that differential height effects of late
gestation nutritional interventions are less pronounced after birth and grow
stronger with age.45
Despite Kusin et al. (1992), who find no sex difference in the height effect of
late gestation nutritional intervention, the height effects of Ramadan-induced
malnutrition in utero are gender-specific: few to zero effects are detected for
girls, but strong effects are identified for boys (Tables 3-6).46 Because of the
44Fleming (2011) extends studies of the developmental origins of health to the pre-
fertilization period. He uses biological theories and argues that the pre-conception envi-
ronment where human eggs forms can have short-term and long-term health consequences.
45The possibility of mis-measurement is also higher at the stage of very early childhood,
when child “length”is usually reported (Floud et al. 1990, p. 243).
46Banerjee et al. (2007) also report significant causal height effect of prenatal/postnatal
malnutrition, but they are merely focused on the males using military data.
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major sex difference in the effect, I analyze the male and female separately.
1.4.1 Effect on boys’ height
To make the results of regressions reported in Tables (3)-(5) sensible, I mul-
tiply them by 330(=11×30). Multiplied by 11 because the sample average
of daylight hours in a Ramadan day is about 11. Further multiplication by
30 is to approximate the effect of a full month of exposure since about 80%
of Muslims in the sample are exposed to a full month of Ramadan. I also
focus on 3 and 4 year-old Muslim boys for whom Muslim versus non-Muslim
differential effects are statistically significant.
Multiplied by 330 to indicate the effect of a full Ramadan exposure, the
Muslim-specific effects (the results under the column named M in Table 1.3 at
ages 3 and 4 translate to –0.11 and –0.10 standard deviations, respectively.47
At the same ages, the sizes of Muslim versus non-Muslim differential effects
of full exposure are –0.13 and –0.10 standard deviations, respectively. Using
the standard deviations of the height of the children at the same ages in the
WHO 2006 reference population, the results in terms of standard deviation
can be converted to millimeters (mm). Then, the impacts translate to a
3.9mm-4.4mm decline in the height of Muslim boys at age 3, i.e. when
the age is between 3 years and 0 days to 3 years and 364 days. Compared
to non-Muslim boys at age 3, the magnitude of the negative effects rise to
4.9mm-5.5mm. At age 4, i.e. when the age is between 4 years and 0 days
to 4 years and 364 days, the sizes of Muslim-specific and Muslim versus
non-Muslim effects are both equivalent to a 4.1mm-4.5mm decline in height.
To account for the timing of exposure, I consider the results of trimester
regressions in Table 1.4. Again, the effects of exposure start emerging at age
2, but the Muslim versus non-Muslim differential effect is still insignificant
at this age. Strong effects are again found at ages 3 and 4. At age 3, effects
of exposure to Ramadan at the first and third trimesters are statistically
significant for Muslim boys. If full exposure during trimesters is considered,
then the sizes of the effects are –0.15 and –0.10 standard deviations for first
and third trimesters, respectively. These translate to a 3.6mm-4.0mm and
5.7mm-6.4mm decrease in height, respectively. At age 3, Muslim versus non-
47As expected, no effect on non-Muslims is detected.
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Muslim differential effects are also significant at the same trimesters, trans-
lating to a 3.4mm-3.9mm and 7.6mm-8.6mm decline in height and caused
by full exposure during the first and third trimesters, respectively. At age 4,
when it is most expected to see the real effects of prenatal malnutrition on
height, Muslim-specific and Muslim versus non-Muslim differential effects for
all trimesters are significant with larger size at the second trimester, which
is the most important trimester in terms of bone development. At this age,
for a full exposure, the effects’ size varies between –0.08 and –0.14, where
the lower bound belongs to the first and upper bound belongs to the second
trimester. The standard deviations translate to a 4.4mm-6.4mm decline in
height.
Evaluating the effects of exposure to Ramadan by month delivers even
more detailed information about the timing of exposure to Ramadan and its
height consequences (Table 1.5). According to the results, no or negligible
height effect in the first three years of life is detected. Similar to the trimester
regressions, the differential effects are significant at age 3 and 4. At age 4,
exposure to Ramadan at almost any month of gestation, even the month
prior to conception, has statistically significant adverse effect on height. The
Muslim versus non-Muslim effects are correspondingly significant. At this
age, the stronger effects of exposure belong to months 3, 4, 5, and 7 of
gestation. Similar patterns of monthly effects, at smaller sizes, are identified
at age 3.
The times at which the effects are stronger are in accordance with the bio-
logical dynamic of fetal growth, described in Section 2.5, where two distinct
phases were characterized. These include the pre-ossification or evolutionary
phase during which the cartilage models and the primary ossification cen-
ters of long bones form (month 2 to 4) and the ossification or expansionary
phase during which bone cells develop (from month 5 to birth, peaked at the
second trimester). However, the differences of the effects at the two phases
are not statistically significant. Thus, decreased growth potentials, derived
from exposure in the first phase and abated bone cell generation, arose with
exposure in the second phase, statistically have the same impact on height
at late childhood.
Presenting a millimeter equivalent of height declines caused by full expo-
sure to Ramadan during a month of gestation is unrealistic because the exact
coincidence of Ramadan at a month of gestation is rare. However, knowing
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the effect of the hypothetical full exposure at some critical months is insight-
ful. Month 0 (pre-conception month when the interaction of human eggs and
environment can be evaluated), month 3 (the most productive period in the
formation of the cartilage models), month 4 (the most productive period in
the formation of the primary ossification centers), month 5 (when bones’ cells
start developing at high rates and general fetal growth rate is at its peak) are
of particular interest. According to the results, a hypothetical full exposure
at month 3 leads to a 9.2mm to 10.0mm decrease in the height of 4 year-
old Muslim boys, compared to non-exposed Muslim boys. At months 4 and
5, similar comparisons show declines in height with sizes of 8.7mm-9.5mm
and 8.6mm-9.4mm, respectively. The effect of preconception exposure is less
strong. At age 4, a hypothetical full exposure to Ramadan about a month
prior to conception results in a 7.5mm-8.2mm decline in the height of Muslim
boys, compared to the Muslim boys who were not exposed.48
In addition, exposure to Ramadan in the first month of pregnancy has a
significant effect on height at ages 3 and 4. For the first month, the stem cells
that make the foundation of cartilage models migrate toward bone locations
and start concentrating. The height effect of exposure to Ramadan during
the first month of gestation is of special interest because pregnancy is usually
not realized during the first month. In this case, a higher observance rate of
Ramadan is expected.
In summary, if full exposure at entirety and trimesters of gestation are
considered, then the size of the negative effect of exposure to Ramadan on
height is between 3.4mm to 8.6mm at age 3 and between 4.1mm to 6.4mm
at age 4 when exposed Muslim boys are compared to non-exposed Muslim
boys and non-Muslim boys. However, the negative effects amount to about
10mm in the hypothetical cases of full exposure at months 3, 4, 5, and 7 of
gestation.49
48I have run the regressions for entirety, trimesters of, and months of gestation regres-
sions without control variables and with inclusion of any of them. The results demonstrate
that none of the control variables change the pattern of the results, and the height impacts
of exposure hold in all regressions.
49The range of the results are comparable to the findings of Banerjee et al. (2007). They
estimate the effect of income shocks at the year of birth on height at age 18 and measure
6mm-10mm negative effects.
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1.4.2 Effect on girls’ height
For girls, no height effect of exposure to Ramadan is detected from entire
gestation regressions (Tables 3). Trimester and month regressions, however,
illustrate some significant effects (Tables 4 and 6). Exposure at some late ges-
tation months is associated with a decrease in height/length in the first year
after birth. Apart from this, exposure during the month prior to conception
and the last month of gestation are seen to have negative effects on height at
age 3 and 4. Furthermore, month regressions do not show consistent effects
on girls’ height, and the few detected effects do not follow a specific pattern.
The effects in the first year are not only prone to mis-measurement but also
cannot be taken as strong signs of growth deficiency in the future. Also, the
effect of exposure during the last month of gestation has the least relevance
to biological growth facts.
Before jumping to the conclusion that prenatal malnutrition induced by
exposure to Ramadan has no adverse height consequences for girls, I con-
ducted another test. As demonstrated by what follows, I investigate the
effect of exposure to Ramadan on children’s mothers’ height. The idea is
that if no sign of height deficiency is detected during stages of late child-
hood, given the fact that the correlation between height at late childhood
and ultimate height is beyond 80%, then it is not expected to discern the
height effect of in utero exposure to Ramadan in adulthood.
To run mothers’ height analyses, I utilize information from the same data
samples. In DHS data samples, in addition to children’s anthropometrics,
mothers’ anthropometrics are reported. But, mothers’ day of birth is not
reported. Without the day of birth, it is not possible to analyze the height
effects of exposure to Ramadan by its exact timing. This compromises the
analysis of the effects of exposure in the first and last month of gestation, and
it makes the boundaries of gestation months imprecise. Nevertheless, mid-
gestation analyses, which are of particular importance in terms of height,
are not expected to change dramatically. Hence, the results of entirety and
trimesters of gestation regressions will generally remain valid.
In practice, I run econometric models similar to Equations 1.4 to 1.6 with a
few differences. First, I cannot include mothers’ mothers’ height and mothers’
parents’ educational attainment among the control variables because they are
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unavailable.50 Second, since WHO 2007 adults’ reference population does
not go beyond the age of 19, I use the standards for a 19 year-old woman
to compute the Z-scores for mothers of 20 years of age and more. Thus,
mothers’ Z-scores are not as precise as children’s Z-scores.51 Third, I do not
run age-specific regressions for mothers because (i) there are very rare cases
with mothers below the age of 15; (ii) the majority of mothers are at age 19
or older; (iii) young adults’ height growth is slow, especially after the peak
growth velocity during puberty, which occurs between the ages of 13 and 15
(Beard and Blaser, FIGURE 3A). Fourth, I compute the hours of exposure to
Ramadan, assuming that mothers are born at the 15th of their corresponding
month of birth.52
The results of mothers’ regressions are reported in Table 1.7. According
to the results, exposure to Ramadan, either measured by hours or by days,
has no effect on mothers’ height. Estimating no height impact for moth-
ers accords with estimating no height impact for female children. As it is
now reconfirmed, Ramadan-induced nutritional disorder has no effect on the
height of females although males are very vulnerable to such nutritional dis-
orders. This result is in agreement with the previously documented finding
that female-to-male ratio rises as a result of malnutrition in utero and pro-
vides a unique causal evidence of afterbirth sex differences in height growth
in support of the fragile man hypothesis.
However, finding no effect on females’ height is in contrast with the findings
of Maccini and Yang (2009) and Akresh et al. (2011). They use variations in
rainfalls and crop failures across time and space in Indonesia and Rwanda,
respectively, to estimate the health effects of nutritional insufficiency at the
year of birth. They find that only women’s height is affected by the shocks
and suggest gender bias as an explanation. Since gender bias is mainly
effective after a child’s birth, it is not likely that gender bias contaminates
the measuring of the effect of exposure to shocks in utero, especially when
50Inclusion of mothers’ height and parent’ education among the control variables does
not change the pattern of the effects on children. Subsequently, I do not expect a lack of
these control variables in mothers’ regressions to distort the results.
51Limiting mothers’ anthropometric standards to those for a 19 year-old woman is not
expected to cause substantial measurement errors because the rate of body height growth
is very slow from age 20.
52The results of these analyses do not change by changing the day of birth to any of the
numbers in the range of 10 to 20. Thus, I only report the result of regressions in which I
have assumed the 15th to be all mothers’ day of birth.
27
prenatal and postnatal malnutrition can exactly be differentiated. As it is
found in this section, the absence of such unobservable factors results in
documenting the difference of sexes in carrying the height effect that fits to
medical facts.
1.4.3 Robustness tests
The height effects are biased if parents set the timing of pregnancy with
respect to Ramadan. To address this concern, I use controlled regressions
to evaluate the effect of parents’ and households’ characteristics on hours of
exposure. The results of such regressions do not show that parents system-
atically set the timing of conception according to occurrence of Ramadan. I
also check if the results hold under alternative measures of exposure to Ra-
madan, which are computed based on days of exposure, and find comparable
results.
I run further robustness tests, but these results are not reported for the
sake of space. To check if the results are driven by observations from a spe-
cific country, I rerun the regressions (Equations 1.1-1.6), dropping any of
the countries that are over-represented in the sample. These countries are
Bangladesh, India, Egypt, and Nigeria. The results do not show dramatic
changes in the size and pattern of the effects. In addition, I rerun Equations
1.1 to 1.6, including mothers’ fixed-effects, to control for household-level un-
observable factors that may correlate with decisions to get pregnant or to
fast during Ramadan. In such regressions, comparing siblings of the same
mother drives the identification. In this case, one child was exposed to Ra-
madan in utero and the other was not. Again, the pattern of results does not
change, and the size of coefficients only change minimally. I also reestimate
the regressions using the exposure measures that assume different lengths of
gestation, e.g. 261 and 270 days, and obtain similar results.53
To show that how the height effects would be mismeasured in lack in-
formation about children’s day of birth, I reestimate the height effects by
assigning specific days of birth to all children. The results demonstrate that
unavailability of day of birth can result in sizable overestimation or under-
53If gestation lasts for 270 days, durations of trimesters and months of gestation are 90
and 30 days, respectively. But, if gestation lasts for 261 days, durations of trimesters and
months of gestation are 87 and 29 days, respectively.
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estimation of the real effect. The size of the measurement error is bigger if
day of measuring height is also missing.54
1.5 Further investigation of the Ramadan effect
I have so far shown that Ramadan-induced malnutrition in utero has adverse
height effects on male children. In this section, mainly focused on boys, I
examine the details of this relationship. More specifically, I consider how
adjustments in the intensity of exposure change the effect, if the effect trans-
mits from mothers to children, how shifts in latitude alter the effect, and if
the effect is reversible.
1.5.1 Adjusting the intensity of the effect
In Section 4.1, in order to evaluate the effect of a full month’s exposure to
Ramadan, I multiplied the estimated coefficients for an hour of exposure by
330. This practice, however, does not address some important aspects of
the issue. First, the height effects may not be linear. Second, it is unclear
if adjusting the intensity of exposure still renders the effects on girls’ and
younger boys’ height insignificant. Therefore, in this section, I examine the
height effects of full and partial exposure to Ramadan during the entire
gestation period.
In practice, I estimate Equations 1.1-1.6 but replace the exposure mea-
sure(s) by an index measure that takes four values: 0 if there is 0 days of
exposure, 1 if there is/are 1 to 10 day(s) of exposure, 2 if there are 11 to 20
days of exposure, 3 if there are 21 to 30 days of exposure.55 The results of
the regressions illustrate clear impacts of change in the intensity of exposure
54Height studies generally suffer from this measurement error. Even the studies that
focus on in utero environment and provide estimates of adverse height effects of malnutri-
tion in utero, e.g. Brainerd and Menon (2012) and Rosales (2013), endure the problem.
Although Ramadan studies do not examine height, but their analysis of other outcomes
suffers from the measurement error at times. For example, Almond and Mazumder (2011)’s
analyses that use data from Iraq and Uganda and Almond et al. (2012)’s analyses that
use Muslim children’s test scores in the U.K. suffer from the problem. However, Almond
and Mazumder (2011)’s analyses that use Michigan natality data and van Ewijk (2011)
and Majid (2012) studies that use Indonesian Family Life Surveys use exact birth dates.
55Changing the cutting points of days of exposure around these values does not change
the pattern of results.
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(Table 1.8). For boys, the strongest effects appear at ages 3 and 4 again,
although the pattern of the effects is not linear. Still no significant effect is
identified for girls. Thus, to save space, I have not reported the results of
girls’ regressions.
It is worthwhile to scrutinize the pattern of height effects by intensity for
boys who are at ages 3 and 4. First, exposure for 1 to 10 days have no
statistically significant adverse height effect for 3 year-old or for 4 year-old
Muslim boys. Second, for 3 year-old boys, the Muslim versus non-Muslim
differential effect is significant only if the child is exposed for more than 20
days. Third, for 4 year-old boys, the effect is significant for both ranges of
11-20 and 21-30 days of exposure. In addition, a decrease in the size of effect,
from the range 11-20 to 21-30, is observed. This indicates that after being
exposed to Ramadan for more than 10 days, the marginal effect of further
exposure decreases. This result will be confirmed in Section 5.3 where the
latitude effect is investigated, leading to the hypothesis that the Ramadan
effect is derived by a combination of mere dietary distortion and some fasting.
1.5.2 Transmission of the effects
In this section, I examine the intergenerational transfer of height effect caused
by Ramadan-induced prenatal malnutrition. I investigate if a mother’s own
experience of malnutrition in utero can cause shortness in the height of her
offspring. Additionally, I consider whether a mother’s own malnutrition in
utero exacerbates the height effect of children’s malnutrition in utero.56
To answer these questions, I examine the effects of exposure of both chil-
56The literature of intergenerational transfer of anthropometric deficiencies, which are
induced by environment rather than genetics, is narrow and new. In fact, there is sparse
empirical evidence in this regard. Mainly because the required data is inaccessible or
unavailable, the scarce attempts have usually been spent just to draw correlations. Conley
and Bennett (2001), for example, use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
find that the probability of a child’s low birth weight can be predicted by a mother’s birth
weight and the household’s income at birth. Currie and Moretti (2007) use California
birth records to find that mothers who were born with low birth weight are more likely
to give birth to low birth weight babies. There are two recent studies that try to shed
light on the causal intergenerational effects of environmental adversity during gestation or
childhood. First, Painter et al. (2008), using the Dutch famine as a natural experiment,
found no relationship between parents’ in utero and childhood exposure to the famine
with the risk of low birth weight and cardiovascular and metabolic diseases in children.
Caruso (2013) uses floods in Tanzania to show that a mother’s exposure during childhood
and early adulthood reduces her own height and that of her children as well.
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dren and mothers to Ramadan on children’s height-for-age Z-scores. I limit
this analysis to Muslim boys because I have shown so far that girls are not
likely to bear the height effects of fetal malnutrition. In principle, I estimate
Equation 1.1, but I use indexes of exposure to Ramadan instead of measures
of hours and days of exposure. Indexes of exposure are dummy variables
that take the value 1 if any exposure has happened during gestation and 0
otherwise. The reason to use the indexes is to achieve straightforward inter-
pretations from the interaction terms. Thus, in addition to the indexes of
children’s and mothers’ exposure to Ramadan, interaction terms of the two
sets of indexes are included in the regressions. This is to evaluate whether
mothers’ exposure exacerbates the effect of children’s own exposure.57
The estimated coefficients of the exposure indexes, during entirety and
trimesters of gestation, as well as the interaction terms are provided in Ta-
bles (9) and (10), respectively. At each year of age, the results are given in
three columns. In the first column, only the effect of children’s exposure,
measured by the index of exposure, is examined. The results confirm that
the generated outcomes from index regressions are consistent with the out-
comes from hours and days regressions. In the second column, the effect of
children’s and mothers’ exposure are examined. In the third column, the in-
teraction term(s) is/are also included. If it is expected that mothers’ height
loss, derived from their exposure to Ramadan, be transmitted to their chil-
dren, then the coefficients of mothers’ exposure, or the interaction terms,
should be statistically significant, especially at ages 3 and 4 when the dif-
ferences start to appear. Virtually, neither entire gestation regressions nor
trimester regressions display transmission effects. The few significant coef-
ficients of mothers’ exposure indexes in the trimester regressions at ages 1
and 2 cannot be taken seriously because none of the children’s own exposure
indexes illustrate any significance at those ages.58
The findings of this section, i.e. no intergenerational transfer of Ramadan
effect from mothers to children, is consistent with the findings of Section 4.2,
57In Section 5.1, I mentioned that the index of exposure is not the best measure of
exposure to Ramadan because it does not account for the level of exposure. However,
I have used them in the transmission regressions since they are more suitable for this
purpose.
58Using alternative measures of exposure to Ramadan, i.e. days and hours of exposure
during entire gestation, in similar regressions also does not result in significant intergen-
erational effect(s).
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where no height effect of exposure to Ramadan was identified for the female
children and adults. In fact, if females do not carry the adverse height effects
of exposure to Ramadan during their fetal life, then it is also not expected
that they transfer such an effect to their children.
1.5.3 Latitude effect
The length of a Ramadan day, which determines the time span of fasting
for that day, is itself determined by latitude. In high latitude locations, the
length of a day considerably varies in the course of a year. For example, at the
northern latitude degree of 40, where Istanbul (Turkey), Baku (Azerbaijan),
and Tashkent (Uzbekistan) are approximately located, the daylight hours of
the longest days are about 5.6 more than those on the shortest days of a year
(14.8 hours versus 9.2 hours). The difference gradually diminishes toward
the equator, such that the length of a day does not change during a year at
equator locations.59
The timing of Ramadan during a given year is not fixed. Since it is a lunar
month, it comes about 11 days earlier every year, such that it takes about
32 years to have a full rotation of Ramadan across solar years. Therefore,
Ramadan may come about mid-summer, when the days in high latitude
locations are longer than the days in low latitude locations. It may also occur
mid-winter, when the relationship is inversed. As a result, Muslims living
at different latitudes do not experience a specific Ramadan day at the same
intensity. The accumulative difference in daylight hours is immense. For
example, a three-hour daily difference amounts to the remarkable magnitude
of 90 hours in a month. The inevitable question, then, is how the effect of
exposure to Ramadan varies by latitude. In this section, I suggest a statistical
framework to answer this question.
First, I divide the observations among eight latitude ranges: 5◦S plus, 5◦S-
5◦N, 5◦N-10◦N, 10◦N-15◦N, 15◦N-20◦N, 20◦N-25◦N, 25◦N-30◦N, 30◦N plus.
The specific latitude ranges are selected in order to have a sufficient number
of Muslim and non-Muslim boys and girls at each age (Table11). I define
59At latitude 30◦N, i.e. 30 degrees north, where Cairo (Egypt), Amman (Jordan), and
Casablanca (Morocco) are approximately located, the difference is about 4 hours. And,
at latitude 15◦N, where most parts of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad are
located the difference is about 2 hours.
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dummy variables for each latitude range that take the value 1, if a child is
surveyed in the latitude range, and 0 otherwise, L1,L2, ...,L8, respectively.
Then, I run regressions in which latitude dummies are interacted with the
measures of exposure to Ramadan and the control variables. In effect, I
add the interaction terms to Equation 1.3 and 1.6 for boys and girls, respec-
tively, and run the corresponding regressions.60 More specifically, I interact
each latitude dummy to days of exposure, to days of exposure times Muslim
dummy, and to Muslim dummy, but the coefficients of the second interac-
tion (i.e. Ll × DER279 ×MOMMUSLIM for l = 1 , 2 , ..., 7 ) are my primary
interest.61
The estimated coefficients of the triple interaction term are reported in Ta-
ble 1.12. The latitude dummy for the equatorial range, taken as the reference
range, is dropped from the regressions. The data samples of the high lati-
tude countries are collected from the mid-1990s when Ramadan took place
during late fall and early winter (shortest Ramadans). The data samples of
the middle and low latitude countries are gathered from 1990 to 2011 and
include long and short Ramadans. This feature of the data is reflected in
the children’s average hours of exposure by latitude range. For the exposed
children from households in a place on latitude 5◦S plus, 5◦S-5◦N, 5◦N-10◦N,
10◦N-15◦N, 15◦N-20◦N, 20◦N-25◦N, 25◦N-30◦N, and 30◦N plus, the average
hours of exposure during gestation are 342, 330, 325, 318, 309, 304, 299,
and 293, respectively. Hence, if latitude has a role, then it is expected that
the size of the latitude specific effects will be lower at higher latitudes. The
results, however, show no sign of latitude effect.62
No latitude effect can be interpreted by a pregnant mother’s response to
the length of Ramadan days. For example, if a pregnant woman wants to
60I use a version of Equations 1.3 and 1.6 in which exposure to Ramadan is measured in
days during the entire gestation, i.e. DER279 . The choice of daily measures over hourly
measures is deliberate. In fact, to compute hours of exposure to Ramadan, I have used the
corresponding latitudes; while days of exposure to Ramadan are not affected by latitude.
Hence, I do not use hourly measures in order to avoid a double counting of latitude effects.
61I have all of the single and double terms in the regressions.
62Differential latitude effects, also, cannot be identified in alternative regressions where
smaller and larger latitude intervals are applied. I have examined the following sets of
latitude dummies in separate regressions and have not detected influence of latitude:
{4◦S plus, 4◦S-4◦N, 4◦N-8◦N, 8◦N-12◦N, 12◦N-16◦N, 16◦N-20◦N, 20◦N-24◦N, 24◦N-28◦N,
28◦N plus}, {6◦S plus, 6◦S-6◦N, 6◦N-12◦N, 12◦N-18◦N, 18◦N-24◦N, 24◦N-30◦N, 30◦N
plus}, {10◦S-10◦N, 10◦N-20◦N, 20◦N plus}, {15◦S-15◦N, 15◦N plus}, and {0◦N-20◦N,
20◦N plus},{10◦S-20◦N, 20◦N plus}. Also, the impact of latitude cannot be identified in
the latitude regressions that only use Muslims’ data.
33
fast, then she might fast for fewer days if it is a long Ramadan. Moreover,
if the Ramadan’s effect is mainly derived by the dietary distortion induced
by Ramadan rather than fasting, then the marginal effect of latitude on top
of the main effect cannot be sizable. To investigate further on the effect of
latitude, I run the same regressions, replacing the previous indicator of ex-
posure, i.e. days of exposure during entire gestation (DER279 ), with days of
exposure to Ramadan during the first month of gestation (DERm1 ), which
is the month that pregnancy is less likely to be realized. Hence, mothers
do not get the chance to respond to the length of Ramadan days, and they
actually are more likely to fast, not knowing that they are pregnant. There-
fore, if latitude has any effect, it should be detected in these new regressions.
However, no latitude effect of exposure to Ramadan during the first month
of gestation is identified, leading to the conclusion that intense fasting does
not induce Ramadan’s effect (results not reported).
The no latitude effect finding is in accordance with the findings of Section
5.1. It examined the impact of the change in the intensity of exposure in
terms of day. Marginal adjustments in the intensity of exposure to Ramadan
either by the number of days or by the latitude does not change the height
effect. Thus, it can be concluded that the Ramadan effect is actually induced
by partial fasting or/and the fasting environment that induces distortions in
a pregnant woman’s diet.
1.5.4 Reversibility and catch up
Another question is if the height deficiency induced by malnutrition in utero
is reversible and whether the suffered Muslim boys can catch up the lost
height. There is no definite answer to this crucial question in lieu of empirical
studies that apply randomized recovery treatments on those who are affected
by prenatal malnutrition and follow up with the subjects throughout their
childhood. Thus, the answer should be sought in the implications of child
development studies, experiments on animals, and biological explanations
of the dynamics of human growth. In what follows, I argue that evidence
from these three sources implies that height loss originating from prenatal
malnutrition is irreversible. This claim gestures toward the importance of
maternal nutrition during pregnancy, especially for the first two trimesters.
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Child development literature shows that the earlier a nutritional insult oc-
curs the less the chance of catch-up growth in height (Martorell et al. 1994,
Martorell 1999, Rasmussen 2001). Victoria et al. (2010) show that height de-
fects in children between 0 and 24 months remain permanent. Subsequently,
it is expected that the likelihood of reversibility of height deficiency caused
by malnutrition in utero to be minimal, even at the presence of a favorable
afterbirth environment.
Animal studies try to simulate human growth in animals.63 Considering
the stages of development, researches simulate shocks to the human fetal
environment by shocks to the newborn animals and find irreversible growth
impacts (Strauss 1997, Lanham et al. 2011).
From the fetal origins point of view, malnutrition in utero propels the fetus
to develop a thrifty stature as a survival strategy. Either it is a choice implied
by fetal origins hypothesis or mere insufficiency of energy and nutrients for
fetal development in length. In either case, fetal malnutrition impedes the
vital process of cellar differentiation and multiplication. Consequently, the
generated number of cells will be less in organisms, depending on the timing
of malnutrition occurrences. With a decreased number of cells, the growth
potential of the child will diminish.
1.6 Conclusion
In a detailed analysis of the effect of nutritional insult in utero on height,
I employ exposure to the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan as a natural
experiment seeking for a causal relationship between the two variables. I use
all available DHS samples and observations that qualify for this measurement
and analyze some unknown aspects of exposure to Ramadan in utero as well.
Consistent with the accumulative nature of height formation and in line
with the prediction of the fetal origins hypothesis, I identify the first signs
of height effects of Ramadan-induced malnutrition in utero with some delay
and at age 2. The effects become stronger and more significant henceforth.
Such effects, however, are found in male children. Also, no effect on the
63The most popular animals in such studies are rats because of the similarities of the
early stages of their development with those in the human. Lambs and pigs have also been
subjected to these types of studies.
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height of the mothers of children is detected. Finding no female height effect
provides a unique causal evidence of sex differences in aﬄiction, supporting
the fragile man hypothesis.
More specifically, I find that a full 30-day exposure to Ramadan during
gestation, regardless of the timing of exposure, causes an approximate 4mm-
5.5mm decline in height of 3 and 4 year-old exposed Muslim boys when com-
pared to the non-exposed Muslim boys and non-Muslim boys. Decomposing
the effect to trimesters of gestation shows statistically significant effects at all
trimesters of gestation at age 4, when it is more likely that height differences
become apparent. At this age, height decline is measured between about
4.4mm-6.4mm.
Further decomposition of the height effect to months of gestation is more
revealing, such that the peaks of the effect coincide with the crucial win-
dows of fetal development of long bones that lay the potentials growth in
height. At age 4, the largest effects are found at month 3 (when the car-
tilage models develop at their highest rates), months 4 (when the primary
ossification centers develop), and month 5 and 7 (when bone cells develop
at accelerated rates). In a hypothetical situation when Ramadan coincides
with any of these months, the effects for an average 4 year-old Muslim boy
compared to a non-exposed Muslim boy and non-Muslim boy amounts to
7.5mm-10.5mm. The effect of pre-conception malnutrition on height is also
found to be significant, and around 8mm in size, highlighting the importance
of the interaction between human eggs and environment.
My research finds that mothers do not transmit Ramadan-induced height
effect to their children. This conclusion is in line with the finding that female
children and mothers bear no height effect from exposure to Ramadan. As-
sessing adjustments in the intensity of exposure shows that the effect appears
after 10 days of exposure, but the size of marginal effect declines thereafter.
In addition, latitude analyses do not show a significant impact of latitude on
the results. These two pieces of evidence imply the presence of a combina-
tion of two types of distresses on pregnant Muslim women during Ramadan:
(i)“partial”observance as a result of mothers response; (ii) dietary disorders,
not fasting, imposed by the household and community.
Finally, I argue that there is no or a very limited likelihood that the height
defects can be reversed. As a result, the measured height losses will remain
permanent, and convey other health problems, and labor market disadvan-
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tages. Therefore, the findings of this study highlight the importance of in-
forming pregnant women about the irreversible health impacts, caused by
persistent meal skipping, diseases and infections at critical windows of fetal
development. In the Muslim world, such polices need to be combined with ef-
forts to persuade Islamic authorities to issue fatwas that “completely”exempt
pregnant women from fasting.
The findings of this study offer numerous domains for further research.
While I examine the height effects of the fetal nutritional limitations, re-
searchers should examine height effects of fetal nutritional supplementation
to test if possible improvements mirror the documented deteriorations. An-
other line for investigation would be to evaluate the transmission of height
effects from fathers to children. Also, latitude effect requires an updated eval-
uation when larger DHS samples from high latitude countries from the early
2010s, when Ramadans coinciding with summer, become available. Provid-
ing experimental evidence for the hypothesis of irreversibility of height effects
of malnutrition in utero is another area for further investigation.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of developing a long bone
Notes: The illustrations on the figure, numbered from (1) to (10), show the stages of
development of a long bones. Illustrations (1)–(4) show the chondrification stage. Illus-
trations (2)–(5) show the formation of primary ossification centers. Illustrations (5)–(6)
show early endochondral ossification. After birth, long bones’ development continues,
shown by Illustrations (7)–(10). The illustrations that show pre-birth development can
also be divided into two phases: pre-ossification phase (Illustrations 1–5) and ossification
phase (Illustrations 5–6). Phase one starts about the end of the first month and closes
about the end of the forth month of gestation. Phase two starts right after phase one and
continues until birth.
Source: Rose and Pawlina (2010), Figure 8.17.
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Figure 1.3: Graphical illustration of calculating days of exposure to Ramadan during
gestation
Notes: The figure shows how exposure to Ramadan is calculated. Ramadan in 2000
began on November 28 and ended on December 27 (the left rectangle on the time line).
In 2001, Ramadan began on November 17 and ended on December 16 (the right rectangle
on the time line). Assuming that Ramadan does not impact the length of gestation, all
gestations are presumed to be normal and last 279 days. Four hypothetical birth dates are
taken on the time line: 11/1/2001, 10/1/2001, 9/1/2001, and 2/1/2001. Moving backward
from the birth dates by 279 days, the corresponding dates of conception are found on the
time line, pointed by arrow signs on 1/27/2001, 12/27/2000, 11/27/2000, and 4/29/2000,
respectively (the last conception date cannot be shown in the figure because of limited
space). As it is presented on the figure, a gestation period ending on 11/1/2001 has no
overlap with Ramadan. However, gestation periods ending on 10/1/2001, 9/1/2001, and
2/1/2001 overlap with Ramadan at day 1, day 2 to 31, and day 214 to 243. If the length of
the particular gestation periods go below or beyond 279 days, the timings of exposure are
misclassified. However, as it is discussed in the empirical analyses, such misclassification
do not change the size and pattern of results.
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Figure 1.4A: Height-for-age Z-scores by months of age and exposure to Ramadan
(Muslim boys)
Figure 1.4B: Height-for-age Z-scores by months of age and exposure to Ramadan
(Muslim girls)
Notes: These figures are presented to illustrate the empirical strategy of this paper. The
figures show the kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions (using Epanechnikov kernel)
of height-for-age Z-scores on months of age. Age in months is computed by using children’s
exact birth dates. It is assigned n for a child with n months and 0 to 14 days of age and
n+1 for a child with n months and 15 to 30 days of age. The exposed children are those
who were exposed to Ramadan in utero for a full month.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.1: Number of observations from countries in the pooled sample by religion
and gender
Muslims Non-Muslims
Country All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
1 Albania 788 384 404 151 81 70
2 Azerbaijan 1,743 933 810 5 2 3
3 Bangladesh 18,634 9,526 9,108 2,004 1,026 978
4 Benin 657 349 308 4,634 2,300 2,334
5 Burkina Faso 5,913 3,024 2,889 3,979 2,001 1,978
6 Burundi 90 47 43 2,309 1,180 1,129
7 Cameroon 1,204 616 588 4,612 2,277 2,335
8 Central Afr. Rep. 181 84 97 1,509 765 744
9 Chad 3,254 1,579 1,675 2,328 1,202 1,126
10 Comoros 467 248 219 0 0 0
11 Egypt 23,998 12,262 11,736 1,138 624 514
12 Ethiopia 5,144 2,675 2,469 8,607 4,371 4,236
13 Gabon 144 83 61 1,745 855 890
14 Ghana 736 397 339 4,063 2,024 2,039
15 Guinea 1,773 919 854 271 146 125
16 India 5,047 2,628 2,419 32,454 17,207 15,247
17 Jordan 5,296 2,709 2,587 87 38 49
18 Kazakhstan 490 229 261 174 82 92
19 Kenya 1,101 592 509 7,632 3,801 3,831
20 Kyrgyzstan 830 429 401 63 40 23
21 Liberia 296 177 119 2,287 1,194 1,093
22 Malawi 2,393 1,181 1,212 13,809 6,898 6,911
23 Maldives 979 472 507 0 0 0
24 Mali 13,703 6,930 6,773 1,259 639 620
25 Morocco 4,454 2,259 2,195 0 0 0
26 Mozambique 1,958 957 1,001 10,891 5,440 5,451
27 Niger 2,993 1,561 1,432 30 13 17
28 Nigeria 7,999 3,933 4,066 6,893 3,530 3,363
29 Senegal 2,915 1,529 1,386 101 45 56
30 Sierra Leone 977 486 491 312 151 161
31 Tanzania 3,579 1,810 1,769 5,795 2,921 2,874
32 Togo 377 184 193 2,174 1,072 1,102
33 Turkey 1,897 1,031 866 8 3 5
34 Uganda 809 410 399 5,315 2,650 2,665
35 Uzbekistan 890 458 432 22 9 13
Total 123,709 63,091 60,618 126,661 64,587 62,074
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of independent and dependent variables for boys
Muslims Non-Muslims
No. Days of Exposure: No. Days of Exposure:
0 1 to 29 30 0 1 to 29 30
Panel A: Parent’s and Household’s Characteristics
Birth Order 3.47 3.40 3.44 3.37 3.39 3.38
(2.40) (2.38) (2.38) (2.27) (2.30) (2.30)
Mother’s Education 3.91 4.04 3.94 4.51 4.58 4.52
(4.81) (4.82) (4.85) (4.66) (4.50) (4.49)
Father’s Education 5.00 5.03 4.94 6.19 6.29 6.22
(5.44) (5.44) (5.41) (4.83) (4.80) (4.77)
Mother’s Age at Birth 26.50 26.37 26.39 26.36 26.57 26.44
(6.56) (6.46) (6.47) (6.25) (6.38) (6.34)
Father’s Age at Birth 35.52 35.47 35.44 33.28 33.38 33.48
(9.85) (9.87) (10.05) (9.12) (9.22) (9.24)
Mother’s Height 157.30 157.22 157.33 156.27 156.14 156.28
(6.95) (7.07) (7.05) (6.91) (6.96) (7.01)
Urban (%) 33.45 35.10 34.41 26.77 27.89 26.98
Twin (%) 2.59 2.47 2.45 2.37 2.55 2.52
Poor (%) 44.22 42.68 44.07 37.26 37.06 38.81
Rich (%) 36.48 36.80 35.86 41.36 42.43 40.35
Average (%) 19.30 20.52 20.08 21.39 20.51 20.84
Panel B: Height-for-Age Z-scores by Age
Height-for-Age Z-Score -0.69 -0.75 -0.71 -0.76 -0.77 -0.88
if Age is 0 (1.79) (1.78) (1.80) (1.75) (1.74) (1.75)
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.85 -1.83 -1.76 -1.88 -1.97 -2.09
if Age is 1 (1.75) (1.73) (1.76) (1.66) (1.65) (1.64)
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.85 -1.92 -1.92 -2.01 -2.11 -2.11
if Age is 2 (1.69) (1.78) (1.72) (1.58) (1.55) (1.57)
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.63 -1.60 -1.75 -1.91 -1.89 -2.01
if Age is 3 (1.59) (1.60) (1.61) (1.48) (1.45) (1.52)
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.41 -1.48 -1.57 -1.69 -1.71 -1.79
if Age is 4 (1.47) (1.43) (1.48) (1.31) (1.44) (1.44)
Obs. 8,265 10,498 44,328 8,644 10,736 45,207
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Mother’s and father’s education are in years. The poor
are the children living in the households at the bottom two quintiles of the welfare indicator. The
rich are the children living in the households at the top two quintiles of the welfare indicator. The
average are the children living in the households at the middle quintiles of the welfare indicator.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.2 (continued): Summary statistics of independent and dependent
variables for girls
Muslims Non-Muslims
No. Days of Exposure: No. Days of Exposure:
0 1 to 29 30 0 1 to 29 30
Panel A: Parent’s and Household’s Characteristics
Birth Order 3.43 3.41 3.45 3.39 3.36 3.41
(2.37) (2.35) (2.39) (2.31) (2.29) (2.32)
Mother’s Years 4.08 4.00 3.96 4.48 4.48 4.44
of Education (4.89) (4.81) (4.85) (4.46) (4.59) (4.41)
Father’s Years 5.07 4.98 4.95 6.20 6.18 6.16
of Education (5.36) (5.35) (5.43) (4.84) (4.74) (4.77)
Mother’s Age 26.40 26.38 26.42 26.51 26.37 26.43
at Birth (6.46) (6.41) (6.51) (6.39) (6.38) (6.36)
Father’s Age 35.47 35.42 35.55 33.40 33.37 33.49
at Birth (9.88) (9.90) (10.13) (9.41) (9.63) (9.52)
Mother’s 157.18 157.23 157.41 156.17 156.28 156.28
Height (7.12) (7.03) (7.04) (7.03) (6.97) (6.99)
Urban (%) 35.30 34.65 34.53 26.16 26.93 26.40
Twin (%) 2.81 2.23 2.57 2.11 2.62 2.70
Poor (%) 42.52 43.41 43.59 38.41 38.11 39.34
Rich (%) 37.82 37.64 36.07 41.02 40.53 40.22
Average (%) 19.67 18.95 20.34 20.57 21.36 20.44
Panel B: Height-for-Age Z-scores by Age
Height-for-Age -0.54 -0.51 -0.46 -0.52 -0.57 -0.63
Z-Score if Age=0 (1.71) (1.66) (1.68) (1.68) (1.61) (1.64)
Height-for-Age -1.62 -1.55 -1.52 -1.63 -1.68 -1.82
Z-Score if Age=1 (1.68) (1.71) (1.70) (1.62) (1.58) (1.54)
Height-for-Age -1.78 -1.78 -1.75 -1.80 -1.89 -1.97
Z-Score if Age=2 (1.66) (1.64) (1.69) (1.50) (1.55) (1.53)
Height-for-Age -1.64 -1.58 -1.72 -1.81 -1.76 -1.92
Z-Score if Age=3 (1.58) (1.62) (1.59) (1.46) (1.42) (1.50)
Height-for-Age -1.48 -1.46 -1.54 -1.77 -1.74 -1.79
Z-Score if Age=4 (1.45) (1.46) (1.46) (1.37) (1.37) (1.38)
Obs. 7,932 10,126 42,560 8,072 10,344 43,658
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Mother’s and father’s education are in years. The poor
are the children living in the households at the bottom two quintiles of the welfare indicator.
The rich are the children living in the households at the top two quintiles of the welfare
indicator. The average are the children living in the households at the middle quintiles of the
welfare indicator.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.3: Estimations of the effect of an hour of exposure to Ramadan during entire
gestation on height-for-age Z-scores by gender and age
Measure Boys Girls
Age of Non- Non-
Exposure Muslims Muslims All Muslims Muslims All
0 HER279 -3.4e-05 0.0002 -0.0001 -5.5e-05 0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 15,103 15,951 31,054 14,571 15,537 30,108
1 HER279 5.0e-05 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0003** -0.0002* 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 13,575 15,029 28,604 13,007 14,464 27,471
2 HER279 -0.0002 -9.0e-05 -8.5e-05 9.8e-05 -7.7e-05 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 12,832 13,898 26,730 12,324 13,366 25,690
3 HER279 -0.0003** 7.9e-05 -0.0004** -0.0001 -9.4e-05 -2.5e-05
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 11,222 10,322 21,544 10,910 9,894 20,804
4 HER279 -0.0003** 1.8e-07 -0.0003* 0.0001 -4.5e-05 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 10,359 9,387 19,746 9,806 8,813 18,619
Notes: HER279 is hours of exposure to Ramadan during the entirety of gestation, which is assumed to be
279 days. The coefficients show the effect of an hour of exposure to Ramadan. The control variables are age in
days, year of birth, month of birth, birth order, a variable that indicate twin birth, urban/rural indicator, an
indicator of province or state of residence, parents’ age at child’s birth, parent’s education, mother’s height,
and household’s wealth indicator. The regressions are set such that the coefficients under All columns be equal
to the difference of the corresponding coefficients under columns Muslim and Non-Muslim (any discrepancy
is caused by rounding the numbers to four decimals). Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at the
1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.4: Estimations of the effect of an hour of exposure to Ramadan during
trimesters of gestation on height-for-age Z-scores by gender and age
Measure Boys Girls
Age of Non- Non-
Exposure Muslims Muslims All Muslims Muslims All
0 HERt3 -0.0001 5.9e-05 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002* -0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt2 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003** -0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt1 8.2e-05 0.0001 -6.1e-05 0.0002 1.2e-05 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 15,103 15,951 31,054 14,571 15,537 30,108
1 HERt3 -0.0001 -8.4e-05 -3.2e-05 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt2 -2.6e-06 -3.6e-05 3.3e-05 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt1 0.0002* -0.0002 0.0004** 0.0003* -0.0002* 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 13,575 15,029 28,604 13,007 14,464 27,471
2 HERt3 -0.0003* -6.8e-05 -0.0002 -2.1e-05 -8.0e-05 5.9e-05
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HERt2 -7.9e-05 -8.9e-05 10.0e-06 0.0001 -9.7e-05 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -1.0e-05 0.0002 -6.1e-05 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 12,832 13,898 26,730 12,324 13,366 25,690
3 HERt3 -0.0005*** 0.0002 -0.0006*** -0.0002 6.8e-05 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt2 -7.6e-05 7.5e-05 -0.0002 -2.3e-05 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
HERt1 -0.0003* -1.2e-05 -0.0003* -7.1e-05 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 11,222 10,322 21,544 10,910 9,894 20,804
4 HERt3 -0.0003* 6.01e-05 -0.0003*** 0.0001 2.55e-05 7.7e-05
(0.0001) (0.0001) (6.6e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt2 -0.0004** 4.13e-05 -0.0004*** 0.0001 3.8e-06 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (9.5e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HERt1 -0.0003** -8.0e-05 -0.0002 9.4e-05 -0.0001 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Obs. 10,359 9,387 19,746 9,806 8,813 18,619
Notes: HERt1, HERt2, and HERt3 are hours of exposure to Ramadan during the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd trimesters of gestation, respectively. The coefficients show the effect of an hour of exposure to
Ramadan in each trimester. The control variables are age in days, year of birth, month of birth, birth
order, a variable that indicate twin birth, urban/rural indicator, an indicator of province or state
of residence, parents’ age at child’s birth, parent’s education, mother’s height, and household’s
wealth indicator. The regressions are set such that the coefficients under All columns be equal
to the difference of the corresponding coefficients under columns Muslim and Non-Muslim (any
discrepancy is caused by rounding the numbers to four decimals). Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10
percent level.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.7: Estimations of the effect of an hour and a day of exposure to Ramadan during
entirety and trimesters of gestation on children’s mothers’ height-for-age Z-scores
Hours of Exposure Days of Exposure
Non- Non-
Muslims Muslims All Muslims Muslims All
Entire Gestation 8.5e-05 3.3e-05 5.2e-05 0.0009 0.0003** 0.0006
(3.9e-05) (8.0e-06) (4.7e-05) (0.0004) (1.3e-05) (0.0004)
Obs. 65,507 68,818 134,325 65,507 68,818 134,325
3rd Trimester 3.5e-05 4.1e-05 -5.8e-06 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001
(5.9e-05) (3.0e-05) (8.9e-05) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0010)
2nd Trimester 9.6e-05 5.7e-05 3.9e-05 0.0011 0.0006** 0.0004
(3.2e-05) (1.0e-05) (4.2e-05) (0.0003) (3.1e-05) (0.0003)
1st Trimester 0.0001 2.0e-05 0.0001* 0.0015 0.00020 0.0013***
(2.3e-05) (1.2e-05) (1.1e-05) (0.0003) (0.0003) (5.5e-06)
Obs. 65,507 68,818 134,325 65,507 68,818 134,325
Notes: Effect of exposure to Ramadan in utero on children’s mothers’ height is examined to check if no late
childhood height effect for girls (demonstrated in previous tables) translates to adulthood. The coefficients
under “Hour of Exposure”show the effect of an hour of exposure to Ramadan during entirety and trimesters
of gestation. However, the coefficients under “Days of Exposure” show the effect of a day of exposure to
Ramadan during entirety and trimesters of gestation. Mother birth day is no available. Therefore, the
exposure measures are computed assuming that all mothers are born at the 15th of their birth month (the
results will not change if any day from 10 to 20 is chosen). The control variables are age in days, year of birth,
month of birth, urban/rural indicator, an indicator of province or state of residence, and household’s wealth
indicator. The regressions are set such that the coefficients under All columns be equal to the difference of the
corresponding coefficients under columns Muslim and Non-Muslim (any discrepancy is caused by rounding
the numbers to four decimals). Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1 percent level; **
significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.8: Age-specific estimations of the effect of exposure to Ramadan by 1-10,
11-20, and 21-30 days during entire gestation on boys’ height-for-age Z-scores
Non- Non-
Muslims Muslims All Muslims Muslims All
Age=0: Age=3:
1-10 Days -0.116* 0.0969 -0.213** -0.0737 -0.0476 -0.0261
(0.0689) (0.0632) (0.0933) (0.0282) (0.0697) (0.0176)
11-20 Days -0.0201 0.0592 -0.0793 -0.0768* 0.0088 -0.0856
(0.0686) (0.0643) (0.0939) (0.0111) (0.0696) (0.0376)
21-30 Days -0.0433 0.0569 -0.100 -0.123*** 0.0282 -0.151**
(0.0452) (0.0421) (0.0617) (0.0017) (0.0471) (0.0028)
Obs. 15,103 15,951 31,054 11,222 10,322 21,544
Age=1: Age=4:
1-10 Days -0.0066 0.0141 -0.0207 -0.110 0.0276 -0.138
(0.0697) (0.0398) (0.0933) (0.0675) (0.0696) (0.0972)
11-20 Days -0.0157 -0.113 0.0973 -0.193*** -0.0061 -0.187**
(0.0704) (0.0646) (0.0946) (0.0669) (0.0667) (0.0946)
21-30 Days 0.0192 -0.0425 0.0617 -0.132*** -0.0070 -0.125*
(0.0457) (0.0283) (0.0615) (0.0453) (0.0470) (0.0654)
Obs. 13,575 15,029 28,604 10,359 9,387 19,746
Age=2:
1-10 Days 0.0121 0.0016 0.0105
(0.0719) (0.0491) (0.0950)
11-20 Days -0.0453 -0.136 0.0911
(0.0720) (0.0883) (0.0946)
21-30 Days -0.0497 -0.0499 0.00013
(0.0461) (0.0415) (0.0613)
Obs. 12,832 13,898 26,730
Notes: These tests are intended to examine how changing the intensity of exposure to Ramadan
impacts the results. The exposure measure in these regressions is an index variable that takes four
values: 0 if there is 0 day of exposure, 1 if there is/are 1 to 10 day(s) of exposure, 2 if there are
11 to 20 days of exposure, 3 if there are 21 to 30 days of exposure. The estimated coefficients of
the index variable are presented in this table. The coefficients show the marginal effects of days
of exposure to Ramadan at the ranges with respect to when there is no exposure. The control
variables are age in days, year of birth, month of birth, birth order, a variable that indicate twin
birth, urban/rural indicator, an indicator of province or state of residence, parents’ age at child’s
birth, parent’s education, mother’s height, and household’s wealth indicator. The regressions are
set such that the coefficients under All columns be equal to the difference of the corresponding
coefficients under columns Muslim and Non-Muslim (any discrepancy is caused by rounding the
numbers to four decimals). Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1 percent level;
** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.9: Estimations of the effect of any exposure of male children and their mothers to
Ramadan during entire gestation on male children’s height-for-age Z-scores by age
(only Muslims are included)
Boys & Boys &
Boys & Mothers & Boys & Mothers &
Boys Mothers Interaction Boys Mothers Interaction
Age=0: Age=3:
ER279 -0.0546 -0.0545 0.0189 -0.113** -0.113** -0.195
(0.0439) (0.0440) (0.124) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.121)
ER279m 0.00478 0.0776 0.0274 -0.0544
(0.0423) (0.122) (0.0424) (0.120)
ER279×ER279m -0.0826 0.0934
(0.130) (0.128)
Obs. 14,977 14,977 14,977 11,102 11,102 11,102
Age=1: Age=4:
ER279 0.00703 0.00707 -0.0626 -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.150
(0.0444) (0.0444) (0.119) (0.0436) (0.0436) (0.123)
ER279m -0.0273 -0.0964 0.0427 0.0255
(0.0423) (0.118) (0.0397) (0.121)
ER279×ER279m 0.0793 0.0193
(0.126) (0.128)
Obs. 13,451 13,451 13,451 10,237 10,237 10,237
Age=2:
ER279 -0.0434 -0.0437 -0.0630
(0.0448) (0.0448) (0.122)
ER279m 0.0278 0.00892
(0.0446) (0.119)
ER279×ER279m 0.0219
(0.128)
Obs. 12,708 12,708 12,708
Notes: These tests are designed to explore transmission of Ramadan height effect from mothers to male children.
ER279 is the index of boys’ exposure to Ramadan during the entire gestation, which takes value 1 if there has been
any exposure and 0 otherwise. ER279m is the index of mothers’ exposure to Ramadan during the entire gestation,
which takes value 1 if there has been any exposure and 0 otherwise. It is assumed that all mothers are born at
the 15 of their birth moth. Initially, for the sake of comparison, only boys’ exposure to Ramadan (measured by
ER279) is plugged into the regressions and the estimated coefficients are reported under the column“Boys”. The
coefficients show the average height effect of exposure to Ramadan on Muslim boys by age. Then, both boys’ and
mothers’ exposure to Ramadan (measured by ER279 and ER279m, respectively) are plugged into the regressions
and the estimated coefficients are reported under the column“Boys & Mothers”. Finally, the interaction variable
of boys’ and mothers’ exposure (ER279×ER279m) is added to the regressions and the estimated coefficients are
reported under the column“Boys & Mothers & Interaction”. The control variables are age in days, year of birth,
month of birth, birth order, a variable that indicate twin birth, urban/rural indicator, an indicator of province
or state of residence, parents’ age at child’s birth, parent’s education, mother’s height, and household’s wealth
indicator. Only Muslim boys and their mothers are examined. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at
the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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Table 1.11: Dividing observations along the ranges of latitude by gender, religion, and age
Panel A: Boys
Latitude Number of Muslims at Age: Number of Non-Muslims at Age:
Range 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
30◦N plus 3,196 3,153 3,012 2,674 2,525 867 887 870 418 416
25◦N–30◦N 1,707 1,599 1,649 1,516 1,437 1,543 1,426 1,441 712 630
20◦N–25◦N 2,092 1,893 1,887 1,923 1,747 1,518 1,428 1,347 789 733
15◦N–20◦N 601 486 481 338 298 591 566 563 230 260
10◦N–15◦N 4,718 3,800 3,501 2,848 2,538 1,851 1,696 1,674 1,270 1,153
5◦N–10◦N 1,389 1,196 1,142 960 860 3,346 3,089 2,811 2,413 2,178
5◦S–5◦N 521 453 406 350 342 2,961 2,753 2,557 1,977 1,846
5◦S plus 878 793 754 614 613 3,273 3,186 2,635 2,514 2,171
Panel B: Girls
Latitude Number of Muslims at Age: Number of Non-Muslims at Age:
Range 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
30◦N plus 3,096 2,994 2,910 2,613 2,375 757 711 710 307 275
25◦N–30◦N 1,639 1,477 1,485 1,416 1,346 1,460 1,314 1,250 648 575
20◦N–25◦N 1,960 1,932 1,851 1,789 1,645 1,387 1,270 1,284 722 690
15◦N–20◦N 543 505 425 327 287 500 553 480 219 199
10◦N–15◦N 4,601 3,764 3,429 2,832 2,428 1,775 1,647 1,573 1,204 1,117
5◦N–10◦N 1,356 1,074 1,038 972 830 3,481 3,051 2,772 2,358 2,006
5◦S–5◦N 469 446 424 343 301 2,923 2,787 2,564 1,925 1,760
5◦S plus 907 815 762 618 595 3,255 3,132 2,733 2,510 2,191
Notes: Observations are divided along 8 latitude ranges: 5◦S plus, 5◦S–5◦N, 5◦N–10◦N, 10◦N–15◦N, 15◦N–20◦N,
20◦N–25◦N, 25◦N–30◦N, 30◦N plus. The latitude range “5◦S plus”indicates the locations at latitude 5 degree
or more in the southern hemisphere; The latitude range “5◦S-5◦N”indicates the locations between latitude 5
degree in the southern hemisphere and latitude 5 degree in the northern hemisphere; The latitude range 5◦N-10◦N
indicates the locations between latitudes 5 and 10 degrees in the northern hemisphere; ...; The latitude range
“30◦N plus”indicates the locations at latitude 30 degree or more in the northern hemisphere.
Data Source: Demographic and health surveys of MEASURE DHS project.
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CHAPTER 2
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF A BIG
BANG APPROACH TO REFORM ENERGY
AND FOOD SUBSIDIES
2.1 Introduction
Price subsidies, especially on fuel and energy carriers, are the most unequally
distributed government transfers to the private sector.1 The magnitude of the
unequal distribution used to be particularly noticeable in Iran, where energy
carriers were massively underpriced. Highly skewed distribution of gasoline
subsides is a striking example. In 2010, the cash equivalent of the gasoline
price subsidies paid to an average urban Iranian household in the top income
decile was about 30 times more than that paid to an average urban Iranian
household in the bottom income decile simply because the major consumers
of gasoline are the rich. Set aside the distributive drawback of price subsidies,
wasting energy and neglecting energy conservation in constructions, trans-
portation, and residential uses are induced by underpriced fuels beside the
environmental and health damages of the resulted pollution. Government’s
fiscal imbalance from handling the massive price subsidies should also be
added to the lists of harms. Fiscal concerns may seem irrelevant in the case
of Iran with exceptional oil revenues, which may make it redundant to levy
distortionary taxes to finance the price subsidy scheme, but it has transpired
that the demand for the incredibly underpriced energy has been exponen-
tially increasing devouring a constantly growing share of the country’s oil
revenues.
To address the described problems, the Iranian government undertook a
reform to eliminate the energy and food price subsidies on December 18,
2010. In an abrupt elimination of energy carriers’ and foods’ price subsidies,
the prices of the most of the subsidized energy and food items were elevated
by more than hundred percent. For the most important energy sources of
1This is a joint work with Prof. Firouz Gahvari.
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households, namely natural gas, gasoline, and electricity, prices were raised
by above 500%, 600%, and 60%, respectively. Knowing that the poor could
be crushed by such a monstrous end, government conducted a parallel rebate
scheme in which households received government cash transfers in a uniform
manner according to the number of households’ members. Analyzing the
welfare and fiscal consequences of this enormous policy change is the subject
of this study. The rich and long-running Iranian household surveys create
a rare opportunity to embark welfare and fiscal analyses of this Big Bang
approach to reform price subsidy structures in a developing country.
For these purposes, first the subsidy system in Iran, debates on its re-
form, and how the reform was applied are described to create the pertinent
institutional background. A review of the literature that have examined
changes in price subsidies is presented next. The review reveals that the the-
oretical framework to assess non-marginal price changes is underdeveloped.
Therefore, the structure that is designed to examine marginal price changes is
inevitably adopted for the case in hand. The model and the estimation strat-
egy are introduced next. The selected theoretical model employs Quadratic
Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS), which is suitable to assess con-
sumer behavior that illustrates nonlinearity in the Engel curves. Then the
data, household budget surveys, price indices and any other piece of infor-
mation that is used, are described. This study focuses on urban households
because of the lack of price data in rural areas that constitute less than 30%
of the population. The empirical Engel curves are drawn to justify using the
QUAIDS model, then the estimation results and elasticities are presented.
While cross-price compensated elasticities and income elasticities create the
ground to run initial welfare analyses, the more comprehensive welfare anal-
yses are conducted in the next sections.
To commence fiscal and welfare analyses of the subsidy reform, the results
of the estimations are used to evaluate the change in the cash equivalent of
government transfers to households induced by the reform. The results show
that while the size the net transfers to an average urban household, including
cash equivalent of price subsidies and the post-reform rebates, is shrunk,
the lower income half of the population are expected to undergo growth
in net transfers. Even without launching more precise welfare evaluations,
this crude measure indicates improvement in targeting. The change in the
transfers to households is just the flip side of the change in government’s fiscal
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condition. Thus, it is expected that the government have positive balance.
Details of fiscal consequences of the subsidy reform are thus opened up in
the followed section. Notably, it is illustrated that the expected increase in
the government’s foreign revenues from selling the decreased domestic energy
consumption, caused by the elevated domestic prices, does potentially shape
the biggest source of funding the rebates. In the next section, a relevant
welfare analysis is conducted using the concept of equivalent variation. The
derived results defy the implications of the findings about the change in
monetary transfers and indicate that only the top 30% of the urban society
do not better off by the reform. In the next section, all of these calculations
are repeated for the case in which the government is facing trade barriers
and cannot sell realize its foreign revenues.
It should be noted that this study does not consider the effects of the
subsidy reform on producer prices. This per se needs a separate comple-
mentary research that considers the share of domestically produced goods
in total consumption and how energy-intensive their production technology
are. Thus, the results of this study should be considered as upper bound of
the true effects.
2.2 Subsidy system in Iran and 2009 Subsidy Reform
Act
Energy and necessary foods have been under-priced in the last decades in
Iran. Under-pricing, in fact, has been strikingly more severe for energy carri-
ers and enforced with the government that is the sole supplier of energy and
has the ultimate market power in the Iranian energy market. Iran actually
obtained the second lowest rank among 168 countries in terms of pump price
for gasoline and diesel oil among 168 countries, after Venezuela, in 2010.2
The specifics are more illustrative in this regard. A liter of gasoline priced
at $0.097 in 2010 in Iran that was about 13 times cheaper than the world
average of $1.234 and about 11 times cheaper than the neighboring countries’
average. Diesel oil is even cheaper relatively; it is about 68 times cheaper
than the world average and 55 times cheaper than the neighboring countries’
2Pump price for gasoline and diesel oil across the world, expressed in terms of US$ per
liter, are make available by the World Bank in http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/
57
average.
While Iran’s enormous oil revenues allow the Iranian government to dis-
tribute the public largesse, there have been long-lasting debates on how to
manage eliminating the indirect price subsidies and moving toward better-
targeted direct subsidies. The administrations in charge in 1990s and early
2000s believed in a step-wise gradual procedure of elimination of the prices
subsidies such that energy prices were increased by about 20% at the first
day of April each year. This policy was discarded by the new administration
in 2005 and the prices of energy and necessary foods were kept unchanged
for the second half of 2000s. Extensive fiscal costs of this policy finally per-
suaded the administration to compensate the dramatic lift in its expenditures
and consider fundamental reform price subsidy policies. Pursuing the new
approach finally led to 2009 Subsidy Reform Act.
The 2009 Subsidy Reform Act obliges government to gradually eliminate
the subsidies on the prices of energy carriers, piped water, wheat, rice, veg-
etable oil, milk, sugar, post services, and aerial and railroad transportation
until the end of country’s Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, which spans
from 2011 to 2015. More specifically, through a time period of five years, the
prices of oil products were mandated to reach the 90% of their Persian Gulf
FOB prices3. Similarly, it was mandated to raise the price of natural gas
to 75% of its average export price, the price of electricity to its production
costs, and the price of piped water to its delivery costs. All the elevated prices
should include transportation costs, distribution costs, taxes, and tolls. The
government, then, was allowed to spent (1) up to 50% of the raised revenues
on direct cash transfers and social security purposes to households; (2) 30%
of it on supporting production sector via promoting energy-efficient technolo-
gies, developing public transportation, encouraging non-oil export, extending
information technology, and compensating the losses of utility companies; (3)
up to 20% it on compensating the expected declines in the it development
expenditures.
Execution of the act was postponed several times until the 19th of Decem-
ber 2010, when its sudden execution was announced by the president on the
national TV. Consequently, raised prices were announced and enforced from
the next day as they are illustrated in Table 2.1. In parallel with eliminating
3FOB stands for freight on board. FOB prices are usually used as a reference interna-
tional price excluding transportation cost, taxes and any other overhead costs
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a major part of price subsidies, lump-sum subsidies have been transferred to
households. The amount of the lump-sum direct transfers in the first year
after the reform was determined at 44.5 ITT per person and deposited to
heads of households saving accounts4.
2.3 Literature review
This section is structured in two distinctive parts. first, a review of studies of
non-marginal tax/subsidy reforms, similar to what happened in Iran by the
recent subsidy reform, is presented. Then, a berief review of the literature
on modeling demand system is presented and then application of the model
that is used in this study is justified for Iranian subsidy reform.
Price subsidy reforms, especially those aimed at energy and food, are meant
to address inefficient targeting and the induced inequal distribution of the
subsidies, to rule out distortions in the related markets, to fix governments’
fiscal deficits, or to reduce environmental damages of fuel emissions. Regard-
less of the rational behind price subsidy reforms, they are commonly per-
formed in an incremental, marginal manner. Non-marginal changes in prices,
what is here termed as Big Bang approach, are usually avoided because of
their unpredictable social consequences. Thus, there are just few infrequent
cases of non-marginal price subsidy reforms and even fewer related researches.
Apart from Iran’s 2010 non-marginal energy and food price subsidy reform,
which is the subject of this study, Nigerian case is an outstanding one. In
January 2012, Nigiria abruptly eliminated fuel price subsidies and doubled
fuel prices, as the highest single leap of prices in the country’s history. In-
donesia is also at the verge of launching a massive reform to eliminate fuel
price subsidies that had emerged in the wake of 1998 Asian financial crisis.5
On the other hand, the rare studies of welfare effects of price subsidy re-
forms in developing countries do not use the most appropriate welfare mea-
sures partly because of data limitations. More specifically, the economic
4ITT, as it is defined here, stands for Iranian Thousand Tomans. One ITT can be
translates to about $1 using the spot exchange rate in 2010 and 2011 (Iranian government
was following a fixed exchange rate policy during the time of interest). Thus, through
this study, ITT and $ values are used interchangably although Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) exchange rate in these years is $2.5 per 1 ITT.
5Indonesia was supposed to raise fuel prices in April 2012 but delayed the plan because
of nationwide protests against the policy.
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agents’ monetary gains (or change in transfers between government and pri-
vate sector) induced by an expected subsidy reform program have been the
underlying criteria to judge about welfare consequences.6. This problem has
been addressed in this study by computing exact welfare gains of house-
holds of different income groups in addition to computing households’ mere
monetary gains.
Legitimate studies of price subsidy reforms, however, consider marginal
elimination of subsidies, as it is usually the case. From theoretical point
of view, Ahmad and Stern (1984)’s paper founded the basis for marginal
tax/price reforms. At the empirical side, Gahvari and Taheripour (2011), in
midst of debates on reforming subsidy structure in Iran and right before exe-
cution of the subsidy reform, suggest an order for marginal and non-marginal
cuts of different types of subsidies based on evaluation of the associated wel-
fare gains. They employ the standard methodology that is most suitable
for analyzing marginal changes in prices, but they use it for non-marginal
changes as well. Taking similar analytical approaches for both cases is en-
forced by technical toolbox available to researchers since consumer theory
is developed in a way to model consumers’ responses to marginal changes
given or exogenous factors such as prices. Likewise, welfare effects of non-
marginal prices changes are analyzed using the theoretical framework that is
essentially designed to analyze marginal price changes in this study.
Estimation of consumer demand system is central to the standard method-
ology for welfare evaluation. The most common model of consumers demand
system is Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), introduced by Deaton and
Muellbauers (1980). AIDS constitutes flexible demand functions that are
consistent with consumer theory and also sui for welfare analysis.7 AIDS,
6For instance, see Clarke and Menard (2002), Clements, Jung, and Gupta (2007), and
del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010).
7Household consumption data do not support linear demand functions derived from
common specifications of utility function such as Cobb-Douglas and CES. They also have
testing problem, i.e. they fail satisfying standard restrictions of consumer theory, es-
pecially homogeneity. The more advanced model of this type is the Rotterdam model
proposed by Theil (1965) and Barten (1966). Using flexible functional forms in the empir-
ical analyses of demand theory first introduced by Diewert (1971). The basis of Liewert’s
idea of modeling utility function was using functional forms with enough parameters so
that it can reasonably approximate the true hidden utility function. Initial studies that
exerted the idea of flexible forms used translogarithmic models as a second-order Taylor
approximation of any implicit utility function (See Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975)
for instance). Translog version of flexible forms, however, is not the most practical one
because of enforcing unacceptable assumptions on demand functions such as quantities
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however, embeds the rather strong assumption that the Engel curves of all
goods are linear in terms of the logarithm of household’s income or aggregate
expenditure. This assumption is usually defied by empirical evidence. Engel
curves often exhibit linear relationships instead.
Referring to the limitation on Engel curves, Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel
(1997) introduced a generalized version of AIDS that allows nonlinearity in
Engle curves, namely Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS),
and applied it to the UK data. QUAIDS then are used in numerous studies
like Blundell and Robin (1999) applied to the UK data but through a differ-
ent econometric strategy, Moro and Schokai (2000) applied to Italian data,
Abdulai (2002) applied to Switzerland data, and West and William (2004,
2007) applied to the US data, mentioned just as few of them. QUAIDS has
also been applied on Iranian data first by Gahvari and Taheripour (2011).
It is also chosen as the underlined model of this study with an re-organized
categorization of goods and services and a different estimation method. Its
application is verified by non-parametric depiction of shares of households’
expenditures on the new categories of goods and services versus logarithm
aggregate expenditure and observing that Engel curves for most of the cate-
gories are nonlinear.
2.4 The model
An economy is considered with households having the same preference struc-
ture and face similar prices in each quarter of year but their income levels are
different. They have one unit of time endowment and supply all of it. They
have access to n categories of goods and services to choose their consump-
tion basket x = (x1, x2, ..., xn). Markets of all of the categories of goods and
services are competitive and they are produced by constant returns to scale
technologies. This implies that optimal consumer and undistorted producer
prices of all of the categories of goods and services are identical. Thus, the
gap between the subsidized prices of food and energy and their correspond-
ing first-best producer prices can be used to compute cash equivalent of price
determine prices instead of prices determine quantities and its complexity of implemen-
tation. Nonetheless, the flexible functional form that Deaton and Muellbauer exert and
how their develop their model not only address the problems, but also does suit better for
welfare analyses and optimal tax theory.
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subsidies and welfare gain from the subsidy reform. Such computations will
be performed having the estimation of the parameters of the indirect utility
function of the representative household.
If households’ preferences support the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System introduced by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), then the indirect
utility function of a representative household can be formulated as:
ln υ =
{[
lnm− ln a(p)
b(p)
]−1
+ λ(p)
}−1
(2.1)
in which
ln a(p) ≡ α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi ln pi +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γij ln pi ln pj (2.2)
b(p) ≡
n∏
i=1
pβii (2.3)
λ(p) ≡
n∑
i=1
λi ln pi (2.4)
where m is household’s aggregate expenditure spent on the basket of cate-
gories of goods and services x, p is the vector of price indices such that p =
(p1, p2, ..., pn), and α0, αi, βi, γij, and λi are parameters with i, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
The parameters need to be restricted to satisfy the essential properties of a
demand system, namely homogeneity of degree zero in income and prices,
symmetry of Slutsky matrix, and adding up of the budget constraint. For-
mally, these properties can be translated to the following restrictions on the
parameters of Equations 2.2-2.4:
n∑
j=1
γij = 0 (2.5)
γij = γji for all i 6= j = 1, 2, ..., n (2.6)
n∑
i=1
αi = 0,
n∑
i=1
γij = 0,
n∑
i=1
βi = 0 (2.7)
The first restriction, presented by Equation 2.5, guarantees homogeneity of
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degree zero. The second restriction, presented by Equation 2.6, ensures Slut-
sky symmetry. The third set of restrictions, presented by Equations 2.7,
secure adding up property. It should be noted that the indirect utility func-
tion expressed by Equation 2.1 will reduce to Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS), which enforces linearity of Engel curves, if λi = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Given the indirect utility function expressed by Equation 2.1, demand
functions for each of the categories of goods and services can now be derived
by using Roy’s identity. While the derived demand functions are the im-
mediate candidates for estimation, it is simpler to estimate the categories’
expenditure shares. In the following, it is shown how expenditure shares are
related to demand functions, which themselves are derived by using Roy’s
identity:
ωi ≡ pixi
m
=
pi
m
(−∂υ/∂pi
∂υ/∂m
)
= −pi
m
−∂ ln υ/∂pi
∂ ln υ/∂m
where ωi indicates the expenditure share for category i of goods and services,
i = 1, 2, ..., n. To find a simplified expression for expenditure shares, partial
differentiation of the indirect utility function with respect to price and income
need to be derived and inserted in above expression. Simplifications through
incorporating Equations 2.2-2.4 and imposing symmetry restriction yield the
following expenditure shares’ system of equations:
ωi = αi +
n∑
j=1
γij ln pj + βi ln
m
a(p)
+
λi
b(p)
[
ln
m
a(p)
]2
, i = 1, 2, ..., n (2.8)
where logarithm of aggregate expenditure, m, is appeared in both linear and
quadratic forms.8
Using Equation 2.8, income and price elasticities can be derived. In the
followings, income elasticity of demand for good i, denoted by ηi, and un-
compensated cross-price elasticity of demand for good i with respect to good
j, denoted by εij, are presented:
8In order to address heterogeneity of population in the sample, some researchers control
for a vector of demographic factors, say z, by imposing more structure into the model.
This, in practice, ends up to a modification of Equation 2.8 such that αi and βi will be
replaced by terms like αi +θiz and βi +ϕiz, respectively, where θ and ϕ are the parameters
correspondent to z. This approach, however, is not applied to this study. Demographic
factors are directly entered into regressions instead.
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ηi ≡ ∂xi
∂m
=
1
ωi
∂ωi
∂ lnm
+ 1 =
1
ωi
[
βi +
2λi
b(p)
+ ln
m
a(p)
]
+ 1 (2.9)
εij ≡ ∂xi
∂pj
pj
xi
=
1
ωi
∂ωi
∂ ln pj
− δij,
=
1
ωi
{
γij −
[
βi +
2λi
b(p)
ln
m
a(p)
]
×(
αj +
n∑
k=1
γjk ln pk
)
− λiβj
b(p)
[
ln
m
a(p)
]2}
− δij (2.10)
where δij is Kronecker delta. It is notable that both income and price elas-
ticities will depend on income level if λ 6= 0. λ , in turn, gets nonzero value
because of having the quadratic income term in the equation of expenditure
share, i.e. Equation 2.8, that allows non-linearity in the Engel curve.
2.5 Data
In this section, it is explained what the main data sources are and how
they are adjusted and employed to construct a workfile to be used in esti-
mations. The main data sources are household’s income and expenditure
surveys (HIES) provided by the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) and detailed
urban price indices provided by the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). In addition
to these main sources, to evaluate the real prices of the under-priced energy
carriers and then compute the indirect monetary transfers or cash equiva-
lent of price subsidies to households, energy production and consumption
information are extracted from Energy Balance Sheets published by Iran’s
Ministry of Energy, international prices of energy carriers are obtained from
OPEC’s publications, and their export prices are found among the announce-
ments and news of the websites of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
and National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC).
HIES are repeated cross-sections of household budget surveys collected,
documented, and published by SCI from 1984. HIES contain information
in four main parts: socio-economic characteristics, ownership, expenditures,
and income. In Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, more details of the components of
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HIES are shown. The last accessible HIES data set belongs in 2010. The
surveys, which include information about both urban and rural households,
are provincially and nationally representative in each quarter. The available
HIES, hence, spans over 27*4=108 quarters.9
To have the biggest possible picture of households consumption behavior,
it is desired to use all of the available data. However, for the initial years of
the time period for which HIES are available, namely 1984 to 1986, number
of observations is much less than that in the later years. In addition, the
surveyed items of expenditures are very limited in compare to the other years.
Hence, to have time-consistent repeated data sets, the first three years are
dropped. Consequently, the number of time quarters shrinks to 95.
Part 3 of HIES contains information on households’ expenditures in 14
categories. Each category contains several items and many sub-items, each
specified by a commodity code. Through the time that HIES have been
collected, the commodity codes, which are the main data processing tools,
have been subjected to frequent changes. While there have always been year-
to-year minor changes in the codes and increases or decreases in the number of
items, substantial structural changes in commodity codes have also occurred
in 1990 and 2004. In the absence of formal document to match commodity
codes, in order to make the data contents of all years of HIES compatible,
year-to-year changes in the codes assigned to every commodity are carefully
tracked and transformed to those assigned from 2004. The time-consuming
matching process of thousands of commodity codes has been performed for
the first time in this study.
For the purposes of this study, the standard categories of goods and ser-
vices, i.e. food, tobacco, clothing, housing, etc, as they are presented in
Table 2.2, are not used. The subsidy reform is about eliminating price sub-
sidies on energy carriers and necessary foods. But, there are no specific
formal categories for energy and necessary food expenditures. Expenditures
on necessary food items and different energy carriers are spread in several
expenditure categories mixed with non-energy and non-food items instead.
To be more specific, there are energy items among housing and utility expen-
ditures, transportation expenditures, and durable expenditures. Also, there
are both subsidized (necessary) and unsubsidized (unnecessary) food items
9HIES data are collected according to the Persian calendar. How Persian calendar is
matched with Georgian calendar is explained later in this section.
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among those listed under food expenditures.
In addition, knowing that public sector has the upper hand in the supply
of education and health services at very low prices and the prices have not
changed by subsidy reform, these items are dropped from the analyses to
present a clear-cut contrast between items that carry price subsidies and the
items that are transacted at their market prices before the subsidy reform.10
Therefore, to have categories of goods and services better matched with
the analysis of the subsidy reform, new categories of goods and services are
constructed. The new categories are: (1) subsidized food, denoted by SF;11
(2) unsubsidized food, denoted by UF;12 (3) non-energy-consuming goods,
denoted by NE;13 (4) energy-consuming goods, denoted by EG;14 (5) energy,
denoted by E;15 (6) services, denoted by S;16 (7) housing, denoted by H.17
Having all the detailed expenditure information with uniquely assigned com-
modity codes throughout the entire time period, total expenditures on each
of the new categories of goods and services are computed for each household.
Official price indices for the new categories of goods and services, of course,
do not exist. To construct price indices for the categories, detailed monthly
country-level prices indices of the Central Bank of Iran are used. In the
first step, price indices of the items that their corresponding expenditures
are used in the categories of goods and services are singled out. Then, their
quarterly averages are computed to be matched with quarterly expenditure
information in HIES. Finally, using the expenditure shares of the base year
10Education and health services are also partly delivered by private suppliers. HIES
data, however, do not distinguish the expenditures on privately supplied education and
health expenditures from the publicly supplied ones.
11The category of subsidized foods contains all of the food items that received price
subsidy before the reform such as all types of bread, sugar, sugar cube, egg, and solid oil.
12The category of unsubsidized foods contains all other food, drink, and tobacco that
did not receive price subsidy before the reform.
13The category of non-energy-consuming goods contains all the goods that do not con-
sume any type of energy when used. This generally includes cloth, furniture, and the
likes.
14The category of energy-consuming goods contains all the goods that consume some
sort of energy when used. This generally includes electrical home appliances, heating and
cooling apparatus, car, bike and the likes.
15The category of energy contains all sorts of energy that household consumes such as
electricity for both home and transportation use, all types of fuels and energy carries used
for house heating and cooling, transportation, any other non-business purposes.
16The category of services contains all types of services, except for education and health
services, that household has spent for.
17The category of housing only contains two items: household’s direct rent payments
and rental equivalence of residing in the self-owned home.
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2004 as weights, quarterly price indices of the new categories of goods and
services are built up.
While very similar, the set of items for which the CBI publishes price
indices is actually not exactly the same as the set of items for which HIES
reports household expenditures. Therefore, only the expenditure items for
which there exists CBI price index are used in the categories of goods and
services and the rest are dropped.
The refined and adjusted new expenditure data are merged to the other
household information, i.e. socio-economic characteristics, ownership, and
income and the constructed price indices. This yields a complied body of
different types of households information for each year. In the next step,
workfiles of different years are appended to build a mega workfile for estima-
tion. Since the CBI price indices are only for urban areas, rural households
information is dropped from the workfile. In Table 2.4, number of urban
households in the workfile in each year is listed. There actually are about
278 thousands of households in the workfile. Also, all the dates that are in
Persian calendar are adjusted for western Georgian calendar as well.18
Since welfare analyses are performed for groups of households divided by
deciles of “total expenditures”as proxy of income, in Table 2.5, the ranges of
total expenditure, number of households and average household sizes across
deciles in HIES 2010 are shown. The last two rows contain the same for
the top five and top one percentiles, respectively.19 Then, in Table 2.6, for
18In Persian calendar, a year precisely includes four natural seasons. A Persian year,
hence, approximately coincides with last three seasons of a western year and the first
season of the next western year. For example, the Persian year 1389, which is the last
year for which HIES data are available, coincides with Spring, Summer, and Fall of 2010
and Winter of 2011. As a corollary, 2010 includes Winter of the Persian 1388 and Spring,
Summer, and Fall of the Persian 1389. Backward running of this rearrangement procedure
finally ends up to 1987, which should include Winter of the Persian 1366 and Spring,
Summer, and Fall of the Persian 1367. As it was explained previously, HIES data for 1363
to 1366 are not used because of the abundance of mismatched items. As a result, 1987
only includes Spring, Summer, and Fall of the Persian 1367. This is why the number of
observations in 1987 is much less than that in 1988 (Table 2.4).
19Total expenditure is defined different from aggregate expenditure. Aggregate expen-
diture contains expenditures on the new categories of goods and services and it is what
is denoted by m in the model and used in the estimations. Whereas, total expenditure
contains expenditures on new categories of goods and services plus expenditures on other
goods or services that are not included in the new categories because of their irrelevance
to this study such as expenditures on health and education, unavailability of their cor-
responding CBI prices, or any other data matching reason. Total expenditure, instead
of aggregate expenditures m, has been used to divide households into deciles because it
present a closer approximation of households’ income. Having this in mind, groups of
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the same group of households, the shares of aggregate expenditure spent on
each category of goods and services are presented. The figures show that the
shares of aggregate expenditure spent on both subsidized and unsubsidized
food and housing diminish when moving toward higher deciles. A reverse
trend is seen for the shares of aggregate expenditure spent on both non-
energy- and energy-consuming goods and services. Although the share of
energy expenditures in aggregate expenditure is small,20 it increases slightly
from lower to median deciles, then decreases slightly toward higher deciles.
2.6 Engel curves
QUAIDS model allows quadratic Engel curves. To check tentatively how rel-
evant application of QUAIDS model to Iranian household expenditure data
is, the relationships between shares of aggregate expenditure and the loga-
rithm of aggregate expenditures and the square of the logarithm of aggregate
expenditure are estimated through simple linear regression models. The re-
gressions are run for the whole time period using real income, for the last
year data (2009), for a mid year (2000), and for an early year (1990) and
their results are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Moreover, non-parametric
kernel regressions and quadratic polynomial regressions for the categories of
goods and services are graphed in Figures 2.12.4.
The regressions support quadratic relationship for all categories of goods
and services when the data from entire time period is considered. The
quadratic relationship is also supported in the selected years with a decade
of distance except for housing in 1990 and 2000. These observations are also
consistent with what the figures show.21 thus, it seems using a preference
structure that allows for nonlinear Engel curves is supported by the data.
households shaped by total expenditure are called income groups.
20The share is much smaller in total expenditure, as it is expected.
21The figure were also drawn for the specific years of 1990, 2000, and 2010. The shapes
remain generally unchanged.
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2.7 Estimation procedure and results
Empirical Engel curves, showed signs of quadratic relationship between the
the shares of the categories of goods and services and real aggregate expen-
diture. This implies inclusion of the square of households’ aggregate expen-
diture as an explanatory variable in the right hand side of Equation 2.8 that
exemplifies a typical equation of households’ demand system. In this sec-
tion, details of estimation procedure of the demand system is explained in
this section.
The demand system consists of 7 equations, each for one of the 7 cate-
gories of goods and services. Every demand equation, in turn, contains 10
parameters (γi1,γi2,...,γi7,αi,βi,λi). Subsequently, there are 70 (= 7× 10) pa-
rameters to be estimated. The equation for category of “housing”is dropped
from direct estimation procedure to get its parameters recovered from adding
up restriction. This leaves 60 parameters to be estimated. In addition, the
price index of the same category, housing, is taken as numeraire, and then
the price indices of other categories of goods and services and aggregate ex-
penditure are measured relative to housing price index. This, finally, reduces
the number of parameters by 6 and leaves 54 parameters to be estimated.
The chosen strategy to estimate the system of demand equations is a two-
stage procedure a la Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997) in which a(p) and
b(p) are computed using an iterative routine of estimating parameters in the
first stage and obtaining the final estimation of parameters in the second
stage by imposing all the restrictions, given the values of computed a(p) and
b(p). However, how the second stage is performed here, different than Banks,
Blundell, and Lewbel (1997)’s method, is adopted from West and Willims
(2007). In what follows, how each stage is performed is described in details.
The first stage of the estimation procedure comprise an iterative procedure
to compute a(p) and b(p). First, initial values are assigned to the parameters
in a(p) and b(p) i.e. α0, α1, α2,..., α6, β1, β2, ... , β6, and γij’s. The initial
values assigned to all of the parameters, except for α0, are chosen randomly
from a uniform distribution of numbers between zero and 0.01. The assigned
values, except for α0, will then get updated through the iteration procedure
that will be described after justifying the initial value assigned to α0.
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show that α0 can be interpreted as the level
of expenditures that would be needed for subsistence or minimal standard of
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living if all prices are set to be equal to one. To apply this idea and find the
relevant value for α0 in the prepared workfile of Iranian household surveys,
poverty line in 2004, i.e. the base year of the price indices, is computed and
employed. To do so, Assadzadeh and Paul (2004)’s computation of poverty
line in Iran’s urban regions in 1989 is updated for inflation to get its 2004
value and assign to α0. In the poverty line computation, both dietary and
non-dietary components of households’ expenditures are considered.
Plugging the initial value of α0 and random initial values of other param-
eters in the formula for a(p) and b(p) given by Equations 2.2-2.4 gives the
initial values for a(p) and b(p). These, in turn, are used in estimation of
the demand system represented by Equation 2.8. In practice, each of the 6
demand regressions (the regression for housing is dropped to be recovered
later by adding up restriction) is estimated separately with the OLS model
in which household size, the gender of households’ heads and province of res-
idence are inserted as covariates. The estimated parameters of the 6 demand
regressions and the computed parameters for the 7th from the adding up
restriction, then, are used to update the initially computed values of a(p)
and b(p). This procedure is repeated as many times as required to achieve
convergence for a(p) and b(p) in the tolerance level of 0.00001.
As it was mentioned, adding up restrictions are satisfied in the first stage by
dropping the category of housing and then recovering its parameters by ap-
plying the restrictions. Homogeneity restrictions are also satisfied in the first
stage by using relative-to-housing-price-index values. This ensures that pro-
portional changes in price indices and aggregate expenditure will not change
expenditure shares. Symmetry restrictions, however, are not satisfied in the
estimation procedure of the first stage. To address symmetry restrictions is
a reason to undertake another series of estimation.
In addition to the concern about satisfying the symmetry restrictions, the
first stage estimations potentially suffer from endogeneity and cross equa-
tion correlation of errors. Endogeneity can emerge from using households’
aggregate expenditure as their income in the right hand side of the regres-
sions while having shares of categories of goods and services in aggregate
expenditure as dependent variables. In addition, since all the right hand side
explanatory variables of the first stage OLS regressions are identical, their
error terms are possibly correlated.
To address the the listed concerns, i.e. to impose cross equation symmetry
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restrictions, control for endogeneity of aggregate expenditure, and account
for correlation of error terms across equations, similar to West and Williams
(2007), a three-stage least squares regression routine (3SLS) is adopted.
3SLS, apart from allowing to force cross-equation parameter restrictions,
puts two-stage least square regression routine (2SLS) together with seem-
ingly unrelated regression model (SUR) to control for both endogeneity of
aggregate expenditure with instrumental variables and endogeneity of error
terms with taking into account the correlated error structure, respectively.
In practice, aggregate expenditure are instrumented with demographic
variables (head’s age, dummy variable for head’s literacy, head’s years of
education, and head’s employment status), ownership variables (type of own-
ership of residence, area of the place of residence, dummy variables separately
for ownership of TV, refrigerator, freezer, vacuum cleaner, and washer), job-
related variables (number of self-employed jobs hold by head, number of
wage-and-salary jobs hold by head, head’s job title, head’s main activity at
workplace, and dummy variable for the main job in public/private sector),
and logarithm of real price of oil.
The 3SLS estimation of the coefficients of the demand system are reported
in Table 2.9.22 Observing that the estimated coefficients for aggregate expen-
diture squared are statistically insignificant for the cases of energy-consuming
goods and energy, aggregate expenditure squared is not included among the
explanatory variables of the corresponding equations. The demand system,
thus, is re-estimated after applying this adjustment23. The results presented
in Table 2.9 are for the adjusted version.
The estimation results show that the coefficients of aggregate expenditure
squared are strongly significant in the equations for subsidized food, unsubsi-
dized food, non-energy-consuming goods, and services justifying imposition
of non-linear Engel curve structure. Own-price coefficients, while statistically
insignificant, are negative for energy-consuming goods and services, which
implies that absolute values of own-price elasticities for energy-consuming
goods and services are likely to be more than one that means they have
elastic demands as one expects. In the contrary, own-price coefficients are
statistically significant and positive for subsidized and unsubsidized food,
22To fit the results just in one table, coefficients of the dummy variables for households’
province of residence are not reported.
23The results of the re-estimation are almost exactly the same as the the former results.
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non-energy-consuming goods, energy and housing indicating that absolute
values of own-price elasticities for these categories are more likely to be less
than one that means they have inelastic demands as one may expect.24
The estimated coefficients reported in Table 2.9 are then plugged into
Equations 2.9 and 2.10 to calculate elasticities. The calculated uncompen-
sated own-price, aggregate expenditure, and compensated own-price elastic-
ities for a household with average size, average income, and male head are
reported in Table 2.10. Going over uncompensated own-price elasticities, all
categories of goods and services have inelastic demands except for energy-
consuming goods and services. The most inelastic category is subsidized food
as it is actually expected. Income elasticities of subsidized and unsubsidized
food are less than one verfying that they are necessary goods. For non-
energy-consuming-goods, energy, and housing, income elasticities are about
unity, while energy-consuming goods and services can be considered luxu-
rious with income elasticities that are larger than one. All of the income
elasticities are positive meaning that all of the categories represent normal
goods. This also implies that uncompensated price elasticities are larger than
the corresponding compensated price elasticities in absolute value.
In terms of compensated price elasticities, similar to uncompensated price
elasticities, all categories of goods and services have inelastic demands ex-
cept for energy-consuming goods and services. Energy-consuming goods have
elastic compensated price elasticities while it is about unity for services.
Table 2.11 reports the values of uncompensated cross-price elasticities for
the seven good categories (again for a household with average income). The
interesting observation here is that energy and subsidized food, the two
highly subsidized categories, are complements (their cross-price elasticities
being negative). Aggregate welfare loss increases when the two subsidized
goods are complementarity. This follows because subsidizing one category
implicitly subsidizes the other and leads to more revenue loss to the govern-
ment and thus a higher welfare loss (than if the two were substitutes). On
the other hand, the fact that energy and subsidized food have inelastic de-
mands, helps reduce the welfare loss associated with their subsidization. One
counterintuitive finding reported in Table 2.11 is the positive value for the
cross-price elasticity between energy and energy consumer goods. One would
24Since the coefficients of the equation for housing are recovered by adding up conditions,
standard errors cannot be computed for them neither statistical inference.
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expect these goods to be complements and not substitutes (as indicated by
a positive cross-price elasticity).
2.8 Expected change in monetary transfers to
households implied by the reform
Change in the cash equivalent amount of energy and food price subsidies
added by post-reform rebates puts forward an initial assessment of change in
households’ benefits from the subsidy reform and a rough idea about winners
and losers of the reform. Such an assessment is mainly intended to gauge
the size of monetary transfers between households and government right be-
fore and after the reform, but it does not take into account the substitution
effects passing through households’ utility function. Thus, the amounts of
monetary transfers must not be interpreted as exact welfare effects of the
subsidy reform. They, however, are more relevant in investigating the effect
of the reform on fiscal situation of government. Keeping the remarks in mind,
in this section, cash equivalent amount of pre-reform food and energy price
subsidies are computed first. It is also shown that the subsidy reform does
not eliminate food and energy subsidies completely, thus a similar calcula-
tion is repeated in post-reform conditions. Pre-reform and post-reform cash
equivalent transfers are finally compared, direct rebates are included, and
the net change in total cash transfers is computed.
To transform pre-reform price subsidies for food and energy to their equiv-
alent monetary values, expenditures on subsidized food items and energy
carriers are extracted from 2010 sample of households. Applying food items’
and energy carriers’ subsidy rates on the corresponding expenditures, then,
gives the cash equivalent of the price subsidies paid to a household with
given levels of consumption of those goods. Subsidy rates are separately
computed as deviation of pre-reform prevailed prices of the goods from their
opportunity costs. Formally speaking, if xsfhj and xe
h
k denote consump-
tion of household h = 1, 2, ...,H from subsidized food item j = 1, 2, ..., J
and energy carrier k = 1, 2, ...,K, respectively, ssf = (ssf1, ssf2, ..., ssfJ) and
se = (se1, se2, ..., seK) denote the vectors of food and energy subsidy rates,
respectively, and psf = (psf1, psf2, ..., psfJ) and pe = (pe1, pe2, ..., peK) denote
the vectors of subsidy-free food and energy prices (or opportunity costs of
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food and energy), respectively, then the cash equivalent of food and energy
price subsidies that household h receives can be expresses as:
S(sf)h =
J∑
j=1
ssfj . xsf
h
j (psf− ssf,mh) (2.11)
S(e)h =
K∑
k=1
sek . xe
h
k(pe− se,mh) (2.12)
where mh is household h’s income.
It is assumed that post-reform food prices reflect the opportunity cost of
pre-reform subsidized food. Then, pre-reform subsidy rates for the subsidized
items of food are computed as the deviation of their pre-reform prices from
their post-reform prices. For energy carriers, however, post-reform prices
cannot simply be taken as opportunity costs because of the existence of
international markets for energy carriers in which prices fluctuate in day
basis and the fact that post-reform prices are not necessarily the same as
international prices.
Energy carriers that households reported consuming are (1) gasoline for
transportation use, (2) gas oil for transportation use, (3) gas oil for residen-
tial heating, (4) compressed natural gas (CNG) as fuel for automobile, (5)
liquefied natural gas (LNG) for residential cooking, (6) piped natural gas for
residential cooking, heating , and lightening (7) fuel oil for residential heating,
(8) kerosene, and (9) electricity. For direct products of oil, i.e. gasoline, gas
oil, fuel oil, and kerosene, their international market prices provide the bases
to compute their opportunity costs. The same is true for CNG and LNG.25
Prices of electricity and natural gas, however, differ considerably around the
world with no integrated international market, making it difficult to pin down
some international prices as the bases for opportunity cost computations. In
these cases, the average per unit prices of export to the neighboring countries
are used as the bases for opportunity cost computations26
25In practice, Persian Gulf FOB prices are taken from OPEC reports as the international
prices for Iranian oil products, CNG, and LNG. A 10% distribution costs is added to these
to obtain the opportunity costs. The dollar value opportunity costs, then, are transformed
to ITT using the prevailed fixed exchange rate of 1 ITT per a US dollar.
26The required information is extracted from the website of National Iranian Gas Com-
pany (NIGC) and Energy Balance Report published by Iran’s Ministry of Energy. A 30%
distribution costs is added to them to obtain the opportunity costs. Again, The dollar
value opportunity costs are then transformed to ITT using the prevailed fixed exchange
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Since households of different income groups vary in their consumption of
the food items and energy carriers, they differ in the cash equivalent amount
of price subsidies that they receive. To open up on this, the cash equivalent
of transfers (or monetary value of price subsidies) are computed for average
income household of each decile, of top 5%, of top 1%, and of the whole
sample of 2010.
The results of computing the cash equivalent of pre-reform price subsidies
are presented in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. In Table 2.13, break down of cash
equivalent of pre-reform price subsidies on energy carriers is presented. The
following takes of the results are noteworthy: (1) households get the biggest
amounts of energy price subsidies on natural gas, gasoline, electricity, and
kerosene, respectively. This is no surprise because they are the main sources
of energy for urban households; (2) the amounts of energy price subsidies
were remarkable in any standard. For example, an average household re-
ceived energy price subsidies equivalent to about $262 in the monthly basis.
Moreover, energy subsidies come to more than 80% of the total expenditure
of an average household from the lowest decile of total expenditure. By no
means, energy price subsidies are negligible even for the richest households
whose benefit from them comes to about 30% of their total expenditure; (3)
except for gas oil, fuel oil, and kerosene, the richer consistently benefited
more than the others from all types of price subsidies on energy.27 In fact,
what the households from higher deciles of total expenditure used to receive
in the form of energy price subsidies was tremendously more than what those
from lower deciles did. For instance, what an average household from the
highest decile received via all energy price subsidies was about 7 times more
than what an average household from the lowest decile received; $616.871
versus $90.417; (4) the inequality in receiving energy price subsidies are gi-
gantic in the case of gasoline. As a matter of fact, an average household
in highest decile received gasoline price subsidy as about 30 times as what
an average household in lowest decile did. This figure is about 6 and 5 for
natural gas and electricity, respectively.
In Table 2.13, break down of cash equivalent of pre-reform price subsidies
rate of 1 ITT per a US dollar.
27Gas oil and fuel oil are the least popular sources of energy, thus there are few related
observations in the data set. Hence, the no-pattern situation is mainly rooted in the lack
of sufficient data.
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on subsidized food items is presented. In comparison to energy subsidies, food
subsidies are much lower such that an average household received about $19
in cash equivalent of food subsidies. Again, it can be seen that the richer
households consistently receive more of food subsidies on all of the subsidized
items. The inequality in distribution of food subsidies, however, is less severe
than that of energy subsidies. Similar to the case energy price subsidies, if
subsidy distribution inequality is measured by the ratio of the cash equiva-
lent of price subsidies received by the highest decile to that received by the
lowest decile, the figure for all food subsidies is about 3 and between 2 and
6 for different food items. As a hint from the given account of pre-reform
price subsidies, an average household received an equivalent amount of $281
per month as energy and food price subsidies, above 92% of it was energy
subsidies.
Evaluating post-reform energy price subsidies is motivated by the fact
that post-reform price of energy carriers were still deviated from their op-
portunity costs. Thus, applying post-reform subsidy rates on post-reform
consumption of energy carriers will yield the cash equivalent of post-reform
energy subsidies. Post-reform consumption of energy carriers, however, is
not available since post-reform household budget survey, i.e. HIES 2011, is
not yet available. Nevertheless, estimation of households’ demand system
allows predicting households’ consumption of energy carriers in a year after
the subsidy reform invoking new price levels. Using the prediction of aggre-
gate energy consumption and assuming that the shares of consumption of
different energy carriers in aggregate energy consumption remains the same
as their pre-reform levels, households’ consumption of different energy carri-
ers can then be computed. Finally, applying post-reform subsidy rates to the
predicted consumption of energy carriers gives the cash equivalent of post-
reform energy price subsidies. Formally, if se′ = (se′1, se
′
2, ..., se
′
K) denote the
vectors of post-reform energy subsidy rates, then the post-reform cash equiv-
alent of energy price subsidies that household h receives can be expresses
as:
S(e)′h =
K∑
k=1
se′k . xe
h
k(pe− se′,mh + nha) (2.13)
where nh is the number of the members of household h and a is the amount
of direct rebate.
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Break down of post-reform cash equivalent of energy price subsidies re-
ported in Table 2.14 shows that energy price subsidies, in general, were re-
duced considerably by the subsidy reform from about $262 to about $78 per
month for an average household. Decrease in price subsidies on natural gas
and gasoline are majorly responsible for the reduction such that the cash
equivalent of natural gas and gasoline price subsidies diminished from about
$145 and $66 to about $37 and $3 per month, respectively. In spite of the
considerable decrease in natural gas price subsidy, it still constitute almost
the half of the post-reform price subsidies with about $37 per month for an
average household. Inequality in the distribution of non-eliminated energy
subsidies is still remarkable as it used to be.
To evaluate the change in the monetary transfers induced by the subsidy
reform, post-reform direct rebates to households need to be added to post-
reform cash equivalent of energy price subsidies and then the summation
should be compared to pre-reform cash equivalent of energy and food price
subsidies. This is done in Table 2.15. Column S, which contains cash equiv-
alent of all pre-reform price subsidies, is actually the summation of columns
Sum from Tables 2.12 and 2.13. Column S ′, which contains cash equivalent
of post-reform energy price subsidies, is transferred from column Sum in
Table 2.14. And, Column A, which contains direct rebates to households, is
computed by multiplying the average household size in each income group by
the amount of the post-reform uniform rebate, which is 44.5 ITT per person
per month. The change in monetary transfer, then, can be computed by
∆R = A+ S ′ − S. The results are recorded in the last column of Table 2.15
and show that subsidy reform led to an about $46 loss per month in cash
equivalent for an average household. However, if only the monetary transfers
are considered (as it is the case here), the lower half of the population in
terms of total expenditure actually benefit from the subsidy reform in the
expense of the higher half. It seems that the subsidy reform led to an enor-
mous income redistribution in which half of the urban population are the
losers, but the other half are the winners. More specifically, the lower total
expenditure is, the more the benefits are; but the higher total expenditure
is, the more the loses are. It should be reminded that the results of comput-
ing the net cash equivalent of transfers must not form the ultimate judgment
about the welfare effects of the subsidy reform. A more relevant criterion has
to passes the changes in the monetary transfers through consumers’ utility
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functions and takes the reduced price distortions into account. This issue is
addressed in Section 10.
2.9 Household- and society-level welfare gains
In Section 8, the change in the amount of subsidies paid to urban households
was computed. Change in subsidies paid to households is actually equal to
the change in government’s transfers to households. If the effects of the sub-
sidy reform were confined to a change in government’s transfers to households
and if transfers to households of different income groups had the same social
value, then positive and negative transfers would have nullified each other
and might made the net effect of the reform zero. The conditions for none of
the “if”s, however, are fulfilled. First, altering the cash equivalent of transfers
is not the only attainment of the reform; the prices have also changed and
become less distortionary, closer to their real values. The delicate implication
of this economic reality is that the reform, which replaced a big chunk of price
subsidies with direct transfers, makes households better off even if the net
government transfers to them is zero. In other words, receiving an amount in
cash increases households’ welfare more than paying the same amount in the
form of price subsidy because households can spend the cash on whatever
is more desirable form them, while they enjoy price subsidies only if they
consume subsidized goods. Second, if society cares about equality, then it
assigns more value to transfers to the poor than the transfers to the rich.
In this section, the notion of equivalent variations, EV, is used to evaluate
welfare gains of households of different income groups induced by the reform.
The notion of social equivalent variations is then used to summarize all the
welfare gains from society’s point of view.
A household’s welfare gain from the subsidy reform can be measured by
equivalent variations, EV . EV h measures household h valuation of subsidies
and can be found in:
υh(p− s,mh + EV h) = υh(p− s′,mh + nha) (2.14)
To be more specific, EV h is the amount of money household h would be
willing to give up to prevent the subsidy reform (or, it is the change in
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income that would get household h to the after reform utility level as the
reform would if it happened). A positive EV h, as it is defined in Equation
2.20, implies household’s unwillingness to change while the negative EV h
implies household’s willingness to change. Negative of EV h, hence, can be
interpreted as household h’s welfare gain from the subsidy reform.
The results of EV calculations for different income groups are reported
in Table 2.16. The results show that only the households in the top decile
would not agree with the reform. More specifically, urban households in the
first, second, third, ... , eight, and ninth deciles would gain about $61, $63,
$60, ... , $–37, and $–150 per month to prevent the subsidy reform (these
values can also be interpreted as their welfare gains). This finding, that 70%
of households better off with the reform, is close to the finding in Section 8,
that 60% of households gain monetarily from the reform.
To evaluate the welfare gain of the society as a whole due to the subsidy
reform, a social welfare function is required in the first place. Atkinson
(1973) iso-elastic welfare function makes it feasible to apply a wide range of
attitudes towards inequality in the society. It is defined as:
W =
1
1− ρ
H∑
h=1
pih(υh)1−ρ ρ 6= 1 0 ≤ ρ <∞
=
H∑
h=1
pih ln υh ρ = 1 (2.15)
where ρ ≥ 0 is the inequality aversion index, which determines society’s at-
titude toward inequality such that ρ = 0 and ρ→∞ indicate utilitarian and
Rawlsian welfare function, respectively. Equation 2.1 with parameters spec-
ified by Equations 2.2-2.4 that is estimated through the described QUAIDS
procedure in Section 7, determines the functional form of υh.
Given the social welfare function specified by Equation 2.21, the notion of
the “social equivalent variations”, EV s, is employed. EV s is defined analo-
gously to the notion of equivalent variations for a household, Equation 2.14.
Thus, EV s is specified as:
H∑
h=1
pih
[
υh(p− s,mh + EV s)]1−ρ = H∑
h=1
pih
[
υh(p− s′,mh + nha)]1−ρ (2.16)
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Based on the definition, EV s is the amount of money every household in the
society would be willing to give up to prevent the subsidy reform. A positive
EV s, similar to EV h, implies society’s unwillingness to accept the subsidy
reform.
The results of computing EV s for six different values of the inequality
aversion index, ρ, are reported in Table 2.17. It is remarkable that under all
different attitudes toward inequality in the society, social equivalent varia-
tions are positive indicating society’s willingness to accept the subsidy reform.
The values of EV s, indicating society’s welfare gain, span in a range of about
$14 to $61 per urban household per month, which seems to be reasonable in
compare to the range of EV h’s. As it is expected, EV s is larger for bigger
values of ρ, when society put more value on inequality.
2.10 Conclusion
In this paper, change in the monetary transfers to households, fiscal con-
sequences, and welfare gains induced by the massive 2010 energy and food
subsidy reform in Iran are evaluated. To achieve these goals, the results
of estimating Iranian economy’s Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
are used. The demand system consists of seven unconventional categories
of goods and services. In particular, the conventional categories of food,
cloth, housing, furniture, transportation, health, education, miscellaneous,
and durables are broken and recomposed to seven categories of unsubsidized
and subsidized food, non-energy-consuming goods, energy-consuming goods,
services, energy, and housing. To estimate the demand system, the longest
consistent series of household budget surveys are employed, i.e. Household
Income and Expenditure Surveys from 1987 to 2010, which is the year right
before the reform’s execution. Only the information of the residents of urban
areas, who form about 71% of the population, are used in the estimation to
be matched with the urban price indices.
First, cash equivalent of pre-reform and post-reform energy and price sub-
sidies are estimated. The gigantic size of pre-reform price subsidies are por-
trayed so that energy subsidies amount to more than 80% of the total expen-
diture of the poorest households and even about 30% of the rich households.
The inequal nature of the pre-reform price subsidies are also demonstrated.
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In particular, cash equivalent of transfers in the form of energy price sub-
sidies to an average household from the highest decile of total expenditure
was about 7 times more than that to an average household from the low-
est decile of total expenditure. The inequality was monstrous in the case
of gasoline, ranked as the second source of household’s energy. In effect,
the corresponding transfers to an average household in the highest decile of
total expenditure was about 30 times bigger than transfers to an average
household in the lowest decile of total expenditure. Since all energy price
subsidies were not eliminated by the reform, especially there are still sizable
price subsidies on natutal gas and electricity, such estimations are repeated
in the post-reform year. Finally, the net change in the monetary transfers to
households of different total expenditure groups, including direct rebates, are
computed. The results show that the subsidy reform increases the net trans-
fers to low-income half of urban households while it decreases for high-income
half, although an average urban household undergo a decline.
Second, the influence of the subsidy reform on government’s fiscal condi-
tion analyzed. In particular, for an average household of any income groups,
government’s revenues and expenditures are computed. In average, govern-
ment’s net domestic revenue from reducing energy subsidies, i.e. increased
revenue from selling any unit of energy carriers at higher post-reform prices
minus decreased revenue from selling less of them in the post-reform year,
is positive and about $26 per urban household per month. The same fig-
ure from eliminating food price subsidies is also positive and about $45 per
urban household per month. Net of rebate total net domestic revenue, i.e.
net domestic revenue from reducing both energy and food subsidies minus
rebate, for an average household is considerably negative and about $03 per
urban household per month. Thus, if government’s potential foreign revenue
from selling the decreased domestic consumption in the international market,
which is a sizable amount for energy carriers, are not incorporated, then gov-
ernment faces huge loss in its accounts. The foreign revenues incorporated,
everything else kept equal, government is expected to make a profit of about
$46 per urban household per mouth.
Third, welfare gains of the households of different income groups and the
society as a whole are computed. Computing households’ equivalent varia-
tions demonstrate that only the top 30% households will be left unfortunate
with the subsidy reform. The rest of the urban households benefit from the
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subsequent welfare gains. This result is not in conflict with the results of
computing the change in transfers to households, that showed the top %
of the urban households take monetary advantage from the reform. Since
equivalent variations provide credible evaluation of welfare changes by ab-
sorbing the gains from less distorted prices, the corresponding results reflect
the more reliable welfare effects. Computing social equivalent variations show
increased welfare gains by the reform as well.
It should be noted that the evaluations of monetary transfers, governments
fiscal condition, and welfare gains are subjected to continuous changes caused
by ongoing changes in the prices of energy carriers in the international mar-
kets. On this account, energy prices are required to be constantly updated
according to their opportunity costs in the international markets, so is the
amount of the rebate. Therefore, introducing the next phases of the reform
is inevitable.
Finally some caveats should be taken into consideration when interpreting
the results of this study. The impact of elimination of energy subsidies on
producers, who did not receive any rebate, is ignored in this study. Impos-
ing this simplifying assumption that potentially biases welfare estimates is
unavoidable because of the scope of this study. Bearing this in mind, the
reported welfare estimates provide the upper bounds of the welfare effects
of the subsidy reform. On the other hand, this study does not considers
the welfare enhancing impacts of the reduced emission caused by declined
consumption of energy.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Engel curve for subsidized and unsubsidized foods at
average income
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Engel curve for non-energy- and energy-consuming
goods at average income
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Engel curve for services and housing at average
income
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Engel curve for energy at average income
Notes: (1) The pre-reform and post-reform prices of the items of “Energy” section are
in Rials. These are taken from Announcement 1 to 5 of the Bureau of Targeting Subsidies
(BTS) published in www.dolat.ir. (2) The pre-reform and post reform prices of the items
of “Subsidized Foods”section are the related price indices where 2004 is the base year.
Since BTS did not mention the exact pre-reform and post-reform prices of the items in
its announcements, we initially collected them by our own field experiment. Then, for
the sake of consistency and comprehensiveness, we used the Central Bank of Iran’s price
indices.
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Table 2.1: Pre-reform and post-reform prices and the percentage increases
unit of Pre-Reform Post-Reform Percentage
measure Prices Prices Increase
Energy:
Gasoline liter 1000 7000 600
Gas Oil - Transportation Use liter 165 3500 2021
Gas Oil - Residential Heating liter 165 1000 506
CNG - Compressed Natural Gas m3 400 3000 650
LNG - Liquified Natural Gas kilo 772 1800 133
Natural Gas - piped m3 100-130 700 509
Fuel Oil - Resodential Heating liter 98 2000 1941
Kerosene liter 165 1000 506
Electricity kwh 165 270 64
Subsidized Foods
Bread (Type 1: Taftoon) loaf 317 908 186
Bread (Type 2: Lavaash) loaf 271 963 256
Bread (Type 3: Sangak) loaf 322 887 176
Bread (Type 4: Barbari) loaf 386 960 149
Eggs dozen 200 295 47
Solid Oil gallon 192 325 70
Suger Cubes kilo 324 484 49
Suger kilo 229 489 114
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Table 2.2: Contents of HIES
The Major Parts Information Provided in each Part
Part 1: Socio-economic Urban/rural
characteristics Province
of households Age
members Gender
Employment status (employed/unemployed/student
homemaker/unemployed-but-earner/other)
Marriage status (with-spouse/without-spouse due to
death/without-spouse due to divorce/never-married)
Literacy/illiteracy
Student/non-student
Educational degree (2-digits codes)
Relationship to households head (head/spouse/child
/groom or bride/grandchild/parent/sibling/other
relative/other non-relative)
Part 2: Ownership Type of ownership of residence (proprietary/
leasing/provided-by-employer/free/other)
Properties of the place of the residence: area,
number of rooms, type and frame of construction
Material used in the building of the residence
Possession of a long list durables such as TV,
refrigerator, car, bike, bicycle, radio,
washing machine, and the likes.
Access to utilities such as running water,
electricity,natural gas, bath, central heater, kitchen,
land-line phone,cell phone, and the likes.
The main fuel used (kerosene/natural gas/gas oil/
electricity/firewood/others)
Part 3: Expenditures Food and drink
Tobacco
Clothing
Housing and utility
Furniture and home equipment
Health
Transportation
Communication
Cultural and leisure
Informal education
Hotel and restaurant
Miscellaneous items
Durables
Investment
Part 4: Incomes Income from wage-and-salary jobs
Income from self-employed jobs
Miscellaneous sources of income
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Table 2.3: Income information provided in HIES data sets
Source of Income Information reported for each Source
Wage-and-salary-base jobs: Job title (three-digit codes)
The main activity at workplace (four-digit codes)
Public sector / private sector (1/2)
Total gross income (last month and last year)
Net continuous income (last month and last year
Net irregular income (last month and last year)
Total net income (last month and last year)
Self-employed jobs: Job title (three-digit codes)
The main activity at workplace (four-digit codes)
Principal / independent worker / family worker
Agriculture / non-agriculture (1/2)
Salaries paid to employees in the last year
The cost of raw materials in the last year
The amount spent for machinery and equipment
in the last year
Rent, interest and utility costs in the last year
Total tax paid in the last year
Gross revenue or total sale in last year
Net revenue
Miscellaneous sources: Pension, redemption, and the likes
Renting all kinds of properties
Interest received from banking accounts, bonds,
stocks, and any other sources
Transfer payments from the state or other entities
for different purposes
Selling home-made stuff
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Table 2.4: Number of households in the workfile by year
Year Number of Households
1987 1,769
1988 3,145
1989 4,335
1990 7,820
1991 9,001
1992 9,058
1993 7,305
1994 10,631
1995 17,961
1996 13,043
1997 10,864
1998 8,900
1999 11,498
2000 12,273
2001 12,268
2002 14,332
2003 11,923
2004 11,369
2005 12,528
2006 13,759
2007 14,724
2008 18,075
2009 18,762
2010 18,536
All Years 273,879
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Table 2.5: Number and average size of households in total expenditure
(income) groups in 2010, the year ending to the subsidy reform (monetary
values are expressed per month and in units of Iranian Thousand Tomans,
ITT)
Income Range of Total Expenditure Number of Percentage Average
Group From To Households of Total Size
1 0 218 1583 10 2.83
2 218 362 1584 10 3.46
3 362 448 1584 10 3.75
4 448 575 1583 10 3.85
5 575 651 1584 10 4.02
6 651 749 1583 10 4.05
7 749 891 1584 10 4.26
8 891 1094 1584 10 4.24
9 1094 1379 1583 10 4.27
10 1379 2281 1584 10 4.35
11 2281 2762 927 5 4.35
12 2762 3969 186 1 4.34
Table 2.6: Shares of aggregate expenditure spent on categories of goods and
services in total expenditure (income) groups in 2010 (percent)
Income
Group SF UF NE EG S E H
1 12.03 25.55 6.07 0.82 9.26 3.87 42.40
2 10.94 26.08 7.65 1.35 11.25 3.89 38.84
3 10.11 26.39 8.87 1.52 11.55 3.93 37.64
4 9.59 26.64 9.88 1.79 12.48 3.93 35.68
5 8.91 26.77 10.82 2.22 13.19 4.11 33.98
6 8.42 26.29 12.53 2.81 13.21 4.01 32.72
7 7.74 26.49 13.22 3.29 13.82 4.19 31.25
8 6.74 25.87 14.70 5.33 13.64 4.30 29.42
9 5.65 24.07 15.89 9.97 13.68 4.14 26.60
10 3.99 19.65 16.53 22.36 11.97 3.66 21.83
11 3.39 17.66 17.26 26.41 11.60 3.43 20.25
12 2.57 16.90 20.29 25.76 12.60 2.85 19.03
SF: subsidized food, UF: unsubsidized food, NE: non-energy-consuming
goods, EG: energy-consuming-goods, S: services, E: energy, H: housing
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Table 2.9: Demand system equations
Variables E SF UF NE EG S H
E price 0.0184 –0.0086 0.0062 –0.0232 0.0045 0.0233 –0.0206
(0.0033)‡ (0.0046)d (0.0078) (0.0061)‡ (0.0038) (0.0059)‡ -
SF price –0.0086 0.0464 –0.0332 –0.0311 –0.0007 0.0246 0.0026
(0.0046)d (0.0092)‡ (0.0144)† (0.0097)‡ (0.0065) (0.0102)‡ -
UF price 0.0062 –0.0332 0.0564 –0.0230 0.0369 –0.0095 –0.0339
(0.0078) (0.0144)† (0.0326)d (0.0201) (0.0121)‡ (0.0171) -
NE price –0.0232 –0.0311 –0.0230 0.0488 0.0051 0.0138 0.0096
(0.0061)‡ (0.0097)‡ (0.0201) (0.0208)† (0.0117) (0.0110) -
EG price 0.0045 –0.0007 0.0369 0.0051 –0.0076 –0.0382 –0.0001
(0.0038) (0.0065) (0.0121)‡ (0.0117) (0.0068) (0.0060)‡ -
S price 0.0233 0.0246 –0.0095 0.0138 –0.0382 –0.0102 –0.0039
(0.0059)‡ (0.0102)† (0.0171) (0.0110) (0.0060)‡ (0.0163) -
H price –0.0206 0.0026 –0.0339 0.0096 –0.0001 –0.0039 0.0463
(0.0055)‡ (0.0090) (0.0231) (0.0136) (0.0088) (0.0109) -
ln income 0.0018 –0.0563 –0.0298 0.0553 0.0438 0.0142 –0.0288
(0.0006)‡ (0.0012)‡ (0.0023)‡ (0.0030)‡ (0.0023)‡ (0.0014)‡ -
(ln income)2 0.0000 0.0034 –0.0176 –0.0329 0.0000 0.0088 0.0384
- (0.0012)‡ (0.0018)‡ (0.0027)‡ - (0.0013)‡ -
Size 0.0003 0.0104 0.0064 0.0035 –0.0040 –0.0001 –0.0165
(0.0001)‡ (0.0002)‡ (0.0003)‡ (0.0003)‡ (0.0002)‡ (0.0002) -
Head’s sex –0.0026 –0.0106 –0.0327 0.0050 –0.0081 –0.0046 0.0536
(0.0003)‡ (0.0006)‡ (0.0018)‡ (0.0015)‡ (0.0006)‡ (0.0009)‡ -
Constant 0.0442 0.0609 0.2863 0.1127 0.0489 0.0961 0.3508
(0.0010)‡ (0.0023)‡ (0.0034)‡ (0.0029)‡ (0.0024)‡ (0.0022)‡ -
Notes: 1. E: Energy, SF: subsidized food, UF: unsubsidized food, NE: non-energy-
consuming goods, EG: energy-consuming-goods, S: services, H: housing.
2. The figures in the parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors based
on 1500 replications.
3. ‡, †, d denote statistically significant at 99%, 95%, and 90% level.
4. Standard errors are not reported for coefficient of (ln income)2 in SE
and E regressions because the (ln income)2 term is set to zero.
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Table 2.10: Income and own price elasticities (for an urban household with
average income in 2010)
Categories of
goods and services
Energy
Subsidized food
Unsubsidized food
Non-energy consumer goods
Energy consumer goods
Services
Housing
Income
elasticity
1.04
0.39
0.78
1.05
1.85
1.22
1.09
Uncompensated
price elasticity
–0.54
–0.41
–0.72
–0.58
–1.20
–1.11
–0.89
Compensated
price elasticity
–0.50
–0.37
–0.52
–0.46
–1.10
–0.96
–0.53
Table 2.11: Uncompensated cross-price elasticities (for an urban household
with average income in 2010)
E SF UF NE EG S H
E –0.50 –0.18 0.19 –0.54 0.15 0.62 –0.49
SF –0.04 –0.39 –0.18 –0.26 0.06 0.38 0.28
UF 0.25 0.11 –0.52 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.16
NE –0.05 –0.13 –0.10 –0.47 0.18 0.24 0.16
EG 0.19 –0.07 1.04 0.08 –1.32 –1.57 –0.53
S 0.32 0.33 0.05 0.24 –0.12 –0.93 0.08
H 0.26 0.33 0.21 0.35 0.32 0.31 –0.54
E: energy, SF: subsidized food, UF: unsubsidized food, NE: non-energy
consumer goods, EG: energy consumer goods, S: services, H: housing.
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Figure 2.15: Change in
monetary values of the subsidies (per urban household, monthly, in TIT=$1)
Pre-reform Post-reform Change in
Income Range of price price Direct the amount of
Group expenditures subsidies subsidies rebates subsidies
Sh = She + S
h
f S
′h = S′he A
h = nha ∆Sh = Ah + S′h − Sh
1 0–228 99.562 31.602 126.006 58.046
2 228–308 141.377 44.989 153.973 57.585
3 308–376 169.375 52.218 166.708 49.551
4 376–443 197.169 57.653 171.256 31.740
5 443–518 221.265 61.055 179.055 18.845
6 518–607 246.595 68.297 180.037 1.739
7 607–720 288.210 72.627 189.545 –26.038
8 720–888 357.987 82.308 188.592 –87.087
9 888–1,215 439.782 101.401 190.145 –148.236
10 1,215–5,880 644.355 151.473 193.565 –299.318
11 1,587–5,880 739.126 184.073 193.666 –361.387
12 2,578–5,880 920.048 263.173 193.154 –463.721
Average 650 297.827 77.898 173.888 –46.041
99
Figure 2.16: Equivalent variation of the change in subsidies (per urban
household, monthly, in TIT=$1)
Income Range of Monetary value of Equivalent
group expenditures subsidy changes variation
1 0–228 58.046 60.902
2 228–308 57.585 63.098
3 308–376 49.551 59.978
4 376–443 31.740 51.541
5 443–518 18.845 45.235
6 518–607 1.739 31.765
7 607–720 –26.038 22.778
8 720–888 –87.087 –1.254
9 888–1215 –148.236 –36.896
10 1,215–5,880 –299.318 –149.870
11 1,587–5,880 –361.387 –208.417
12 2,578–5,880 –463.721 –347.191
Figure 2.17: Social equivalent variation of the change in subsidies (per
urban household, monthly, in TIT=$1)
Inequality aversion index 0 0.5 1 2 5 10
Social equivalent
variation 13.785 28.585 39.289 51.788 60.460 60.924
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CHAPTER 3
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF PUBLIC
SPENDING AND PROGRAMS IN IRAN
3.1 Introduction
Economic growth is often viewed as the most effective means of poverty al-
leviation. However, growth by itself may not be sufficient for addressing the
problems of poverty and inequality.1,2 As the debates and empirical evidence
on the Kuznets hypothesis show, the growth-inequality nexus is complex and,
in some situations, growth can be unequalizing (Frazer, 2006; Ferreira et al.,
2010; Datt and Ravallion, 2011). Moreover, sustaining growth requires effec-
tive social protection and redistribution mechanisms that alleviate the credit
and insurance market failures for the poor and help control macroeconomic
and social instability risks (OECD, 2009). Thus, to better understand the
growth process and to select policies more effectively, it is imperative to as-
sess and compare the role of growth as well as public policies and household
characteristics in income distribution.
The literature on economic growth, inequality, and public policy is vast.
One part of this literature that focuses on the relationships among aggregate
indicators has revealed the complexities of involved, but has not yet yielded
clear patterns (Fosu, 2011). In addition, the use of aggregate indicators
masks the details of the distributional effects of growth and policy programs.
Other parts of the literature are concerned with evaluating the impact of
various social protection programs on their targeted groups through surveys
or experimental and pilot projects. However, these studies typically deal
with individual programs and do not show how they compare and interact
with other programs and factors. Moreover, these micro studies rarely take
1This is a joint work with Prof. Hadi Salehi Esfahani
2For overviews of the large literature on growth, distribution, and poverty, see, for
example: Ames et al. (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2002), World Bank (2001, 2004, and
2006), Fosu (2010), and Ravallion (2010, 2012).
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account of the indirect and general equilibrium effects of public programs
on the population at large (see Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009, for a rare
exception). In this paper, I use quantile regression method and micro data
from Iran to estimate the broad effects of various social programs, govern-
ment spending, economic growth, and household characteristics, on different
quantiles of the expenditure distribution. I also apply the decomposition
technique of Machado and Mata (2005) to assess the role of these factors
on the 1998-2005 trends in household expenditure distribution. It should be
pointed out that my focus in this paper is the direct effects of policy indica-
tors on household expenditure, taking the trends in household characteristics
as given. To the extent that the policies influence household characteristics,
there are indirect effects that call for a much more extensive model. I leave
that exercise for future research.
The case of Iran is interesting because in recent decades the country has
experimented with new arrangements for addressing poverty concerns and
has been relatively successful in this regard. In fact, the head count poverty
rate in Iran declined robustly from about 40 percent in 1989 to well be-
low 10 percent in the mid-2000s (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009). This trend was
partly driven by economic growth and partly by other factors such as large
food and fuel subsidies, improved access to education and infrastructure, and
expanded welfare services by the government, public foundations, and non-
government organizations (Esfahani, 2005; Abounouri and Khoshkar, 2008;
Salehi-Isfahani, 2009). Changes in household characteristics, especially due
to reduced fertility, are also likely to have influenced expenditure distribution.
However, little is known about the effectiveness and the relative importance
of such channels.
Of particular interest for policy purposes is the assessment of welfare and
social security bureaucracies (Social Welfare Organization, SWO, and Social
Security Organization, SSO) and Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF).
SWO is part of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security. SSO is also su-
pervised by that Ministry, but it acts as an autonomous organization financed
by its investments and member contributions. IKRF, on the other hand, is
a public foundation that receives public funding to address poverty, but has
its own assets and operates independently of the government bureaucracy
under the auspices of Irans Supreme Leader. These three organizations have
different missions, but their activities overlap in some areas. All three orga-
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nizations are believed to have major distributional consequences since they
are large and each manages substantial resources. Yet, the effects of their
programs on household expenditures have never been quantitatively assessed
in ways that could be compared across programs or with other factors such as
economic growth, government spending, and changes in household structure.
This is the task that I take up in this paper.
Endogeneity of policy variables poses a challenge for my analysis, partic-
ularly in the context of quantile regressions, which are computationally very
demanding. In fact, there is currently no quantile regression package that
can handle more than one endogenous variable and yield reliable estimates. I
address this problem by employing a two-stage process that produces consis-
tent point estimates, but may yield inconsistent standard errors. I argue that
the main results of the analysis are reasonably reliable because the biases in
standard errors are likely to be relatively small. I provide support for this
claim by comparing the results of the two-stage and full estimation proce-
dures using restricted models that have only one endogenous variable. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the relevant
literature on poverty reduction and highlight the contributions of this paper.
In section 3, I discuss the poverty trends and the social protection system
in Iran and place them in the countrys political economy context. Section
4 describes the data. Section 5 provides an overview of the trends in the
macroeconomy, the social spending, and the household expenditure quan-
tiles. Section 6 describes the quantile regression model and presents and
analyzes the results. In section 8, I decompose the shifts in the household
expenditure distribution to assess the role of various factors in the trends
during 1998-2005. Section 9 concludes.
3.2 An Overview of the Related Literature
The vast literature on economic growth, inequality, and public policy has
many sub-areas. One area focuses on measuring the changes in poverty
rates and decomposes them into growth and redistribution components (see,
for example, Foster et al, 1983; Maasoumi, 1986; Ravallion, 2004). The
decomposition is useful, but it does not establish the sources of the shifts in
the position and shape of the expenditure distribution. Indeed, many of the
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underlying factors may simultaneously affect both growth and redistribution.
Another major part of the literature on poverty has dealt with program
evaluation. These studies typically estimate the effects of specific poverty
relief programs on the targeted individuals, using untreated groups as con-
trols. A prime example of the programs under study is the widely debated
conditional cash transfers (CCT) and their comparison with the uncondi-
tional transfers. CCT programs have been found effective in many cases
such as support for poor households that ensure their children attend school
or received needed vaccinations. However, the outcome depends crucially on
the supply of pertinent infrastructure and public services.3 In the absence
of such complimentary services, CCTs have little impact on poor households
investment in their childrens health and education (de Janvry and Sadoulet,
2005). Examples are households in the remote, war-torn, or disaster-struck
areas. Also, CCTs are often harder to design for poor households with no
children or those with disabilities and disadvantages that impede their ac-
cess to such programs (Das et al., 2005; de la Brire and Rawlings, 2006).
Schubert and Slater (2006) further argue that the full costs and benefits of
conditionality are often difficult to assess, especially when the country lacks
the institutional capability to execute the program efficiently. In such cases,
unconditional transfers may work more effectively. Coady et al (2006) review
of the lessons and experiences of targeting attempts extensively and conclude
that implementation details matter tremendously in the performance of CCT
programs.
Given the limitation of CCT programs, providing safety nets and target-
ing them on the most vulnerable groups is often done via means testing (i.e.,
conditioning support on the individuals socio-economic characteristics). The
success of means testing hinges on the setup of the program, the quality of the
collected data, and the efficacy of administrative and networking infrastruc-
3See, for example, Berhman and Hoddinott (2001) and Shultz (2003) show that Mex-
icos Progresa program has had positive impact on child growth and school attainment.
Bourguignon et al. (2002) and Cardoso and Souza (2003) find that Brazils Bolsa Escola
has had positive effects on school enrollment, especially for poor households. Bourguignon
et al. (2002) further demonstrate that child labor and school attendance are not influenced
by alternative UCT programs. Khandker et al. (2003) study Bangladeshs Female Stipend
Program, finding positive educational effects, especially among girls. Studying another
CCT program executed in Bangladesh, Food for Education, Ravallion and Wodon (1999)
show favorable effects on schooling and child labor. Similarly, Miguel and Kremer (2004)
demonstrate that Kenyas Deworming Project has increased school attendance.
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ture.4 Means testing seems to have contributed to the success of Brazils Bolsa
Familia and Mexicos Progresa. But, little is known about the conditions un-
der which it can work in other contexts. Research on the match between the
setup of the social protection programs and the institutional context in which
they operate is still at early stages. Since Irans social protection programs
are generally based on means testing, the results could shed light on how well
each one fits its institutional settings. The literature on program evaluation
has mostly focused on the impact of transfers and conditions on the targeted
groups, treating the indirect and general equilibrium effects (e.g., through
inter-personal transfers and relative price changes) as secondary. However,
in many developing countries, where institutions are weak and market fail-
ures abound, transfers are likely to have major indirect effects on household
members, relatives, acquaintances, and community members. In addition,
slow supply response and limitations of trade and market integration often
lead to price changes that could affect the real expenditures of the transfer
recipients as well as others in the economy. This particularly matters for
large, country-level programs. Therefore, in order to account for such gen-
eral equilibrium effects, the impact of the program on the entire population
needs to be assessed. But, this has often been overlooked. A notable excep-
tion is the work of Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), who takes advantage of
the experimental data on the treated and untreated households in Mexican
villages where Progresa has been implemented. They show that the program
led to higher loans and transfers to family and friends, raising the food con-
sumption of untreated households by about 10%. This effect is quite sizable
since the increase in the food consumption of the treated households is about
20%.
The broad effects of policies on income distribution and poverty have been
the subject of two other lines of study. The first line has examined the con-
sequences of growth and major policy shifts on the summary indicators of
household expenditure distribution, such as the poverty rate, quintile shares,
and the Gini coefficient. For example, Adams (2004) estimates the growth
elasticity of poverty rate using 126 surveys from 60 countries. Another ex-
ample is Datt and Ravallion (2011), who build aggregate indices based on 50
years of household surveys in India to assess the impact of economic growth
4See Samson et al. (2006) and Samson (2009) for more details about the design of such
programs.
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and policy reforms on expenditure distribution in the country. They find that
growth has generally helped reduce poverty, though it has been associated
with increased inequality since the start of economic policy reforms in 1991.
Similarly, Ferreira et al. (2010) measure the elasticity of poverty with respect
to growth in Brazil, over time and across sectors and locations. Their results
show that the growth-poverty relationship has varied across situations, but
on the whole, growth has played a small role in poverty reduction. Rather,
the improvement has been due to the taming of hyperinflation in 1994 and to
the expansions in social security and social assistance transfers. Yet another
example is a series of papers from Garuda (2000) to Oberdabernig (2013)
that examine the effects of IMF programs on poverty and distributional in-
dicators. In the case of Iran, Abounouri and Khoshkar (2008) examine the
role of employment, inflation, and the governments tax revenue and social
expenditure on the Gini Coefficient and the shares of different quintiles, using
time series methods. They find that employment and social expenditure are
associated with less inequality, lower shares of the top quintile, and higher
shares of the bottom 60 percent. The exact opposite is found for the asso-
ciation of the distributional indicators with inflation tax revenue. None of
these studies control for the variations in household characteristics.
The second line of research on the broad consequences of policies has taken
a more detailed modeling approach, typically in the form of simulation via
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Among the earliest use of
CGE models with representative households to evaluate distributional impact
of economic policies are Adelman and Robinson (1978), Dervis et al. (1982),
and Gunning (1983). Later generation of CGE models included micro sub-
models to take fuller account of the distributional effects. However, CGE
models depend on a myriad of detailed assumptions and require immense
amounts of data, hampering their reliable application, especially in the case
of developing countries.
Over the past decade and a half, the conditional quantile regression method,
pioneered by Koenker and Bassett (1978), has come to be recognized as an
important tool for assessing the impact of various factors on the entire dis-
tribution, allowing for the effects to vary according to the position of each
individual in the distribution. This method has been applied to a variety of
issues concerning inequality, especially in the case of wage and firm size dis-
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tribution.5 This literature mainly focuses on how changes in the distribution
of individual characteristics have shaped the shifts in outcome distributions.
In this paper, I use a quantile regression to estimate the effects of household
characteristics as well as economic growth and policy factors on the sample
of households included in the yearly household expenditure surveys in Iran.
I take advantage of the data at the province level to enhance the amount
of information on government and social program spending. The dependent
variable in my model is household-level real expenditures, which is regressed
on province level growth and policy variables, controlling for a battery of
relevant household characteristics. Adding year and province fixed effects
help deal with cross-sectional dependence and many unobservable factors.
3.3 Poverty Reduction, Social Protection, and Political
Institutions in Iran
Irans 1979 revolution was based on a mass movement led by a charismatic
figure, Ayatollah Khomeini. The process was facilitated by the activities
of many small groups that were ideologically diverse and organizationally
fragmented. However, almost all of them shared two key objectives. First,
they opposed the Shahs authoritarian regime and its Western-oriented social
and economic policies. Second, they resented the increased inequality under
the Shah and favored redistribution and pro-poor policies. Although many of
these organizations were wiped out in the power struggle that ensued after the
revolution, the ideal of redistribution and poverty reduction remained a core
principle of the new regime. Accordingly, the existing public organizations
engaged in social protection were reshaped and reoriented and new ones were
formed to address this objective.
The private and public foundations and NGOs that engage in various social
support activities in Iran are numerous. Many of them are relatively small
and are not focused on poverty alleviation or redistribution per se. For ex-
ample, a number of public foundations support war veterans and the families
of martyrs. Some foundations, including the sizable Astan Quds Razavi, are
5See for example, Machado and Mata (2000 and 2005), Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2008), and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007). Lemieux (2010) provides a recent survey
of the wage inequality literature.
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committed to religious and cultural goals. Most NGOs pursue causes such
as support for cancer patients or for children or women in difficult circum-
stances. Many of the private entities that mainly deal with poverty issues are
the traditional charity organizations, which are numerous and largely infor-
mal (Bahramitash, 2013). The main public foundation that dominates the
poverty alleviation activities is IKRF, which I include in the analysis below.
Unfortunately, there is very limited data on other foundations, NGOs, and
charities to allow to assess as part of my estimations.
IKRF has its roots as a clandestine organization in support of families of
religious political prisoners before the Islamic Revolution. It was led by a
group of bazaar merchants and clergymen, who were follower of Ayatollah
Khomeini. They developed a strong network to solicit funds for their cause,
to identify the prisoners families and their needs, and to deliver the necessary
support to them. Shortly after the Revolution, the leaders of the organization
decided to expand their network and use it for addressing poverty issues.
They established IKRF as a public organization under the supervision of the
Office of Supreme Leader. Since in Irans political structure, the Supreme
Leader is above all branches of the government, this setup allowed IKRF to
receive funding and assets from the government, while enjoying a high degree
of autonomy. The legislation establishing IKRF gives it a broad mission that
includes: designing and implementing strategies to eliminate different aspects
of poverty; providing the livelihood needs of the poor; enabling the poor to be
self-reliant; offering insurance, legal consulting, counseling, pension, credit,
education, and cultural services; and mobilizing private funds to support its
activities and to promote the culture of private donation. It was also put
in charge of the Rajaii Program, which was designed to offer pension to the
elderly poor. This program was initially meant to target those in rural areas,
but it was soon extended to urban areas as well. IKRF quickly expanded
its network all around the country. By the 1990s, it covered, directly or
indirectly, all cities, towns, and villages. In 2009, it operated 1365 units with
14,827 full-time employees and 117,957 part-time workers and volunteers.
The role of IKRF in Iran has been controversial (see Esfahani, 2005; Har-
ris, 2012a). Critiques have argued that its autonomy from the executive
makes it less accountable to the public. They have also claimed that it takes
a traditional charity approach to poverty alleviation. In particular, some
politicians and policy analysts in Irans Reformist movement used to view
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NGOs as more effective mechanisms for social protection and tried to shift
SWOs budget towards them, partly taking government funding away from
IKRF. In addition, IKRF has been accused of using its resources for political
purposes, mustering support for the conservative groups associated with its
leadership. However, others have pointed to IKRFs potentials for fulfilling
its mission. In particular, IKRFs autonomy gives it important institutional
advantages. First, IKRF can avoid the rigidity of the government bureau-
cracy and act flexibly in the face of complexities involved in dealing with
poverty cases. Second, it can act fast in response to unforeseen events and
natural disasters because it controls its own budget and has assets to use if
necessary. Third, IKRF can plan and invest in its activities on a long-term
basis because it is relatively insulated from the policy swings induced by the
political cycles in the executive and legislative branches. Finally, IKRF has
changed its approach to poverty alleviation since its earlier years, moving
towards enabling services that deal more comprehensively with the sources
of each households poverty. Despite these very contrasting views of IKRF
activities, there has been little quantitative research on its performance (see
Esfahani, 2005, for a first effort in this direction). The statistical analysis in
this paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
In addition to IKRF, I focus on two government-run organizations that
have major consequences for poverty alleviation and redistribution. The first
one, SWO, manages a host of social protection programs dealing with poverty
as well as disabilities, addiction, and personal and social traumas. As such,
SWOs responsibilities go beyond poverty alleviation, but all its activities
have clear consequences for reducing the risk of poverty for households in
adverse conditions. SWO was initially formed as part of the Ministry of
Health and then move to the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security. Its
budget is set annually as part of the supervising ministrys allocations. The
second organization, SSO, operates as an autonomous public corporation
and offers pension plans and medical and unemployment insurance. It was
initially attached to the Ministry of Labor and mostly covered formal sector
workers and fixed-term government employees. Overtime, it has expanded
its offering of optional insurance to many independent private-sector workers.
SSO operations do not target the poor. Rather, they provide insurance
and expenditure smoothing that should help a large part of the labor force
employed in the formal sector of the economy. For this reason, SSO is likely to
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have most impact lifting up the household welfare broadly, except perhaps at
the top and bottom of income distribution. [Harris (2012b) offers a detailed
discussion of the activities of SSO]. The question is how much SWO, SSO,
and IKRF activities contribute to the real incomes of various groups in the
population.
The relative coverage of IKRF, SWO, SSO, and NGOs can be seen in
Figure 3.1 along with the poverty rate in Iran. As the figure shows, the
poverty rates in the late 1980s were very high. In the early 1990s, as the
economy recovered from the war with Iraq, the poverty rate rapidly declined.
At the same time, all three main welfare organizations started to expand
quickly. SWOs coverage rate soon stabilized at the rate of 10 people per
100 households. The coverage rates of SSO and IKRF, on the other hand,
reached their plateaus in the late 1990s. In recent years, SSOs coverage
has begun to grow rapidly, while IKRFs has declined somewhat. It is clear
from Figure 3.1 that SSO is the largest among the three by the number of
individuals that it serves. Figure 3.1 further shows that IKRF has a much
larger coverage than SWO, by a factor of four. The data for the coverage
of NGOs starts in 2001, after SWO shifted part of its budget and some of
its tasks toward them, following the policies of the reformist government of
President Khatami. Indeed, as Figure 3.1 shows, the NGO coverage rate
basically matches the decline in SWO coverage rate after 2001. For this
reason, to assess the impact of SWO, it makes sense to include NGOs in its
coverage rate. This is what I do in the econometric analysis below. I will
also note the consequence of combining SWO and NGO coverage rates for
the results.
A major driver of real incomes and their distribution in Iran is government
expenditures and subsidies. In particular, food and fuel subsidies were large
and had major consequences for households, at least until 2011. However,
since these subsidies were in the form of price controls, they were not shown
in the government budget data.6 In this study, the role of such expenditures,
which were uniformly offered to all provinces, will be captured by the year and
province fixed effects. The same applies to other country-wide expenditures.
The remainder, which is the budget allocated to provinces, will be used in
the analysis to gauge how such public spending has shaped the distribution
6Esfahani and Taheripour (2002) show that during the 1980s and 1990s such implicit
subsidies were quite large, amounting to about 25-30 percent of GDP.
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of household expenditures. The data on province-level government spending
end in 2006, when the government restructured its budgeting system and
dismantled the Plan and Budget Organization to give the President a free
hand in managing the budget. The government even stopped publishing the
details of its budget data after 2008. For the period when data are available,
the size of province-level government spending has been about an order of
magnitude larger than that of IKRF (see Figure 3.2).
3.4 The Data
The main source of the data is the annual Household Expenditure and In-
come Surveys (HEIS) carried out by the Statistical Center of Iran. The data
is available from 1984 onward. However, for the statistical analysis, I focus
on the 1991-2006 period for four reasons. First, IKRF and SWO data are
not available for the years before 1991. Second, the process of establishment
of the revolutionary government and the war in the 1980s made the circum-
stances in those years very different from the post-1990 period. Third, the
quality of the data from the 1980s is lower than in the later years. Fourth,
government spending classifications changed substantially after 2006 when
the government reorganized the fiscal process.
HEIS collects data on household characteristics along the details of in-
come and expenditure information. The number of households included in
the 1991-2006 surveys has been generally increasing over time, ranging from
18,671 in 1992 to 32152 in 2002. The target population includes all pri-
vate and collective settled households in urban and rural areas. HEIS uses
a three-stage, cluster sampling method with strata. At the first stage, the
census areas are classified and selected. At the second stage, the urban and
rural blocks are selected, and at the final stage, households are sampled.
The number of samples is optimized to estimate average annual income and
expenditure of the sample household based on the aim of the survey. In
order to obtain samples that are more representative of the whole year, the
administration of the surveys is spread evenly over the twelve months.
I use the country-wide consumer price index (CPI) to estimate the real
values of all nominal expenditures. To correct for CPI differences across
provinces and between urban and rural areas, I employ province and ur-
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ban dummy variables in the regressions. I calculate the total household
expenditure of each household by summing up all expenditure items, except
investment spending.
The data regarding on IKRF’s activities and spending is available from
IKRF Statistical Report (various years). Part of this data is also included in
the Statistical Yearbook of Iran, published annually by the Statistical Center
of Iran and placed on its website, www.amar.org.ir. This Yearbook is also
the source of province-level data on SWO, NGO, and SSO activities and on
CPI and government current and development spending. For SWO, NGOs,
and SSO, the Yearbook provides only the number of people covered by the
activities of each in each province in each year. I scale all these province-
level variables by the number of households in each province to make them
comparable across provinces. The data on the number of households and
population in provinces is available from the General Census of Population
and Housing (various years), published by the Statistical Center of Iran.
There are two issues concerning the SSO data that need to be highlighted.
While the Yearbook offers information on a number of different insurance
schemes offered by the SSO, the extent of details and the categories reported
change over time. I deal with this issue by defining three broad categories of
beneficiaries that encompass all those covered: Mandatory coverage (those
whose employment by law requires them to be part of SSO pension and
healthcare plans), optional coverage (those who have the option to take ad-
vantage of the SSO insurance schemes, such as self-employed workers in fields
of activity specified by law), and unemployment coverage (those who benefit
from SSOs unemployment insurance).
The second issue regarding SSO data is that for 1993-1995, the Yearbook
gives the number of workers covered by unemployment insurance only at the
country level. I use the aggregate numbers and the shares of covered workers
in each province in 1992 and 1996 to interpolate the data for 1993-1995. I
will discuss the caveats concerning this interpolation in section 6. In 1990,
Iran had 24 provinces, including the capital district, Tehran. Overtime, some
provinces have been divided into smaller ones. Also, occasionally some coun-
ties have been separated from one province and attached to another one. To
deal with these shifts, I focused on the original 24 provinces and aggregated
and adjusted the data appropriately to produce a consistent and balanced
panel of province-level data during 1991-2006. These 384 province-year cells
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contain a total of 386,994 household observations. In the quantile regressions,
the starting year is 1993 and the number of observations declined to 349,651
households over 336 province-year cells because I instrument government and
welfare program spendings with their second lagged values.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the re-
gressions. Note that the average number of households per province-year is
1041, but its minimum is 36, which is quite small. However, there are only
four provinces that have sample sizes less than 100 they all belong to 1993.
Dropping the observations from those provinces or all of 1993 data does not
change the results in any tangible way.
3.5 Public Spending and Personal Expenditure
Growth and Distribution
In this section, I provide an overview of the key trends in the government and
welfare agency spending as well as in poverty rate and individual expenditure
patterns. For calculating poverty rates, I estimate individual expenditure
based on household spending, using the square root of household size as the
scale. (Using other scaling methods such as household size or its log does
not change the observed trends or the main conclusions here.)
Figure 3.2 shows the trend in the country-wide, real mean and median
individual expenditures, along with the real per capita spending of the gov-
ernment and IKRF at the province-level since 1984. IKRF spending at the
national level is essentially the sum of its province level spending plus its cen-
tral office expenses. The governments total expenditure is much larger than
the amounts that it allocates for province-level spending (about 5-6 times).
The difference is the cost of central administration, defense, national projects,
and subsidies. However, the trends in the national- and province-level public
expenditures are very similar.
Figure 3.3 presents the trends in some key quantiles of the individual ex-
penditure distribution. Figure 3.4 further highlights the way in which the
key bottom quantiles have been moving relative to the median. As the trends
in Figures 3.3 and 4 clearly show, Irans economic conditions were deterio-
rating fast during 1984-1989 period due to the destructive war with Iraq,
which ended in 1988. This was initially associated with deterioration in the
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relative position of the lower income groups during 1984-1986. However, as
the economy plunged further in 1987-1988, the governments rationing and
distribution policies protected the very poor at the cost of the richer house-
holds. After the war, the government launched a set of reconstruction and
liberalization policies that helped the economy quickly bounce back during
1989-1993 (Figure 3.3). Although the initial benefits went largely to the mid-
dle and upper income groups, this was reversed in 1992-1993 and the poor
regained their relative positions (Figure 3.4). However, in 1994, low oil rev-
enues and some difficulties encountered in the liberalization process led to a
foreign debt crisis, followed by severe a stagflation episode that was treated
through austerity measures. As a result, mean and median private consump-
tion stagnated until around 1997, when the government managed to address
the debt problem. After 1998, oil revenues began to rise. Also, the reformist
government that was in office during 1997-2005 lifted the austerity measures
adopted in 1994 and implemented a series of market-oriented policies. These
factors allowed the economy to expand steadily until 2007.
The growth rates of mean and median individual expenditures during 1990-
2007 were 3.5 percent and 3.4 percent per year, respectively. Real government
and IKRF grew even faster in those years, especially in the early 1990s, and
registered average growth rates of 6.4 percent and 15.0 percent, respectively.
Until 2003, this process, on the whole, favored the poor relative to the me-
dian and the rich. But, there was a significant reversal during 2003-2006.
Although expenditures grew across the spectrum, the relative positions of
the poor deteriorated, especially those in the second and third deciles. As
Figure 3.4 shows, the impact of these fluctuations on the relative expendi-
tures of those in the first decile was much milder, probably as a result of the
operation of the countrys social safety nets for the very low income groups.
The new administration that took office in 2005 engaged in a massive re-
distribution from the top deciles towards the bottom ones, while stimulating
the economy strongly to maintain the pace of growth. The redistribution
did raise the relative expenditures of the lower quantiles for a while (Figure
3.4), but the policy proved highly inflationary. The government then had to
adopt contractionary policies, causing a recession during 2008-2009 (Figure
3.3). A decline in oil revenues in those years may have also contributed to
the process, although it did not cause any depreciation of the exchange rate.
Indeed, the nominal exchange rate was kept constant and the real exchange
114
rate of the Iranian rial was allowed to appreciate significantly in those years.
The economy briefly recovered in 2010, but encountered a significant stagfla-
tion in 2011-2012 due to a combination of factors. One factor was the tight-
ening of international sanctions on Iran. However, domestic expansionary
policies were also responsible. In particular, the government had engaged
in a monumental housing project and in December 2010 launched a major
subsidy reform programs. Both projects contributed to huge budget deficits.
The subsidy reform was initially sold as program that could help government
finances by raising energy and food prices substantially, redistributing half
of the proceeds as cash across the entire population, and using the rest to
develop infrastructure and to support industries adjust to the energy price
shock. However, the realized proceeds fell far short of the cash transfers.
This miscalculation not only ruled out the planned support for industries
and infrastructure, it led to significant deficit spending and ultimately to
high inflation. The policy seems to have redistributed incomes in favor of
the poor for a while. But, the value of the cash transfer was quickly eroded
and the governments effort to contain inflation seems to have deepened the
recession and unemployment problems that particularly hurt the poor.
I are interested in assessing the impact of economic growth and various
forms of public spending on the level and distribution of household expen-
ditures. In particular, I would like to know how these factors have affected
the incomes of the poor in Iran. One way to perform this task is to estimate
a model that relates the mean and some benchmark quantiles of expendi-
ture to those variables. In essence, this approach is similar to the typical
growth models, with expenditure quantiles replacing per capita income. A
difficulty with this approach is that it makes no use of the available infor-
mation about the characteristics of households in shaping the distribution.
One can, of course, include summary measures of the distributions of house-
hold characteristics in the regression. But, that technique may not capture
the connections between the households characteristics and their places in
the distribution. This is important because those characteristics matter not
just for determining household expenditures, but they also influence the way
policies affect the expenditure distribution. Indeed, government programs
typically target households directly or indirectly based on their character-
istics. Quantile regression method, which I discuss and apply in the next
section, offers a way to deal with these concerns.
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3.6 A Quantile Model of Household Expenditure,
Growth, and Public Spending
In this section, I first describe the quantile regression that I use in the anal-
ysis. I then present the estimation results. The dependent variable of the
model is the real expenditure of household i in province p in year t, Eipt,
which is assumed to be distributed as FE(r) = Pr(Eipt ≤ r). The τ th quan-
tile of Eipt is given by QE(τ) = F
−1
E (τ) = inf{r : FE(r) ≥ τ}. The real
expenditure of household i depends on the vector of its characteristics, Xipt,
and the vector of province conditions, Ypt, including public spending and so-
cial protection programs. However, the relationship may vary depending on
the position of the household in the expenditure distribution. For example,
IKRF spending is expected to be consequential for the expenditures at the
lower tail of the distribution much more than elsewhere. If the relationships
can be treated as linear and if household i is at quantile τ , I can write
Eipt = X
′
ipt.α(τ) + Y
′
ipt.β(τ) + εipt(τ)
where εipt(τ) is a random variable whose τ
th quantile is zero: QE(ε) = 0.
This means that the τ th quantile of Eipt can be expressed as: QE(τ) =
X ′ipt.α(τ) + Y
′
ipt.β(τ). I use bootstrapping to calculate the standard errors.
Also, to take account of the possible interdependence of the observations,
especially within each province in each year, I use a cluster approach.
There are many household characteristics that can be included in Xipt.
Most obviously, expenditure should rise with the size of the household. To
take account of this factor, I first created a set of dummies for household
sizes 1, 2, , 12, and 13 and more and included them in the regressions.7
I then checked the coefficients of these dummies against various functions
of household size. The pattern of coefficients came closest to the log of
household size plus one, which I selected as a summary measure and used it
in the regressions to avoid the dimension of the parameter space getting too
big.
For other household characteristics, I selected a set of variables that I be-
lieved to be important and proved statistically significant inthe regressions.
7Household sizes above 13 are rare and having additional dummies for them does not
change the conclusion.
116
I carried out a number of experiments with larger sets of household variables
to check the sensitivity of the results with respect to this aspect of specifi-
cation. The main results regarding public policy variables proved robust to
such variations. In the end, I limited the number of household characteristics
to ensure estimation parsimony and to avoid multicollinearity and endogene-
ity as much as possible. The characteristics that I ultimately selected are as
follows:
Age of Head of Household: Household income and, therefore, its ex-
penditure are likely to be lower for households headed by very young
or very old individuals. Therefore, I included the age of head of house-
hold and its square on the right-hand side of the regression. I expect
the coefficient of the linear term to be positive and the coefficient of
the square term to be negative. Since higher income households are
typically in a better position to smooth their consumption over their
lifetimes, the age effect on expenditure should be weaker for them. In
other words, I should see much larger effects of the age variable and its
square for the lower quantiles of the distribution.
Female Headed Household: This is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the head of household i is female and it is 0 otherwise. Since women
generally tend to earn less than men of similar age and education,
the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative for the entire
distribution. However, it is likely to have a larger magnitude for the
households in lower quantiles because womens disadvantages are often
exacerbated when they are among lower income social strata.
Education of Non-Student Adults in the Household: Education is typ-
ically associated with higher earning and expenditure capabilities. As
a summery measure that takes account of the diminishing effect of the
earning potential of all household members education, I use the log of
the total years of education of non-students adults in the household.
The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive for the entire
distribution. The effect is likely to be larger for the lower expenditure
quantiles because they are likely to have fewer other assets and, thus,
can experience a bigger percentage change in their expenditures for a
given rise in their education.
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Young Children in Household: Log of one plus the number of children
aged less than 16 years in the household i. This variable has been
added to take account of the fact that, given household size, children
tend to have lower expenditures than adults. It is difficult to tell ex
ante how this effect changes among different expenditure quantiles.
Teenagers in Household: Log of one plus the number of persons aged
16 to 19 years in the household. The inclusion of this variable is meant
to take account of the possibly larger amounts that household may
spend for teenagers. This is a major consideration in Iran where many
households recruit tutors for their teenagers to prepare them for the
university entrance examinations. Based on this view, the effect is
likely to be larger among upper quantiles of expenditure.
Elderly in Household: Log of one plus the number of anyone aged 65
years or more living in the household, other than the head of household
and his/her spouse. The elderly may add to household expenditures
due to their higher support and healthcare needs. They may also own
some assets of their own to contribute to the household expenditures.
As a result, their presence is likely to raise expenditure. It is diffi-
cult to say a priori whether this effect rises or declines with household
expenditure quantiles.
Urban Dummy: Equals 1 if household i resides in urban areas and 0
otherwise. I expect the coefficient of this dummy to be positive and
higher for the lower quantiles of expenditure. The latter hypothesis is
based on the view that lower income households in rural areas face much
bigger obstacles taking advantage of income generating opportunities
in urban areas, while high income households are better connected with
urban areas and benefit more from trade with urban areas.
I account for the role of economic growth in household expenditures by
including in Ypt the per capita real expenditure in each province. To con-
trol for the initial conditions and the remaining fixed characteristics of each
province, I use province fixe effect. Also, to capture the role of countrywide
factors over time, I use year dummies.
Policy variables that potentially influence household expenditures a given
locality and year certainly include the activities of the government, IKRF,
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SWO, NGOs, and SSO. For government activity level, I use the log of per
household spending in the province. For IKRF, I have data on both spending
and coverage per household for its various activities. Experimenting with
various combinations of these measures, I found only the log of total spending
per household and the log of the number of Rajaii Program beneficiaries per
household in the province to be significant for some range of the household
expenditure distribution. In case of SWO and NGOs, I only have data on
total number of beneficiaries in each province. I combined the numbers for
SWO and NGOs and calculate the log of the ratio of the total to the number
of households as measure of the SWO+NGO coverage. Finally, for the SSO
I use the log of the number of beneficiaries of mandatory, optional, and
unemployment coverage scaled by the number of households in the province.
One key concern about public program activities is that they are endoge-
nous. For example, IKRF spending is supposed to rise when poverty rises,
thus inducing a positive correlation between the two. As a result, if I do
not address this issue, the estimated coefficients may seem to indicate that
IKRF spending reduces the economic conditions of the poor. The best way
to deal with this problem is to employ instrumental variables (IV). A com-
mon option for this purpose, which I adopt, is to use the lagged values of
endogenous variables.
IV quantile regression (IVQR) procedures are computationally very de-
manding and the statistical packages currently available for estimating IVQR
handle a only one endogenous variable.8 In fact, the packages often fail to
yield results when there is more than one endogenous variable and a few
exogenous ones. This limitation precluded the use of such packages for the
full model. Instead, I followed a two-pronged approach. For the main model,
I used a two-step method, first predicting the values of the endogenous vari-
ables based on their lagged values, and then including the predicted values
as regressors in quantile regressions. Although I calculated robust standard
errors, this procedure may yield inconsistent confidence intervals. Gauging
the extent of this potential bias is the second prong of the approach. To
this end, I experimented with abbreviated versions of the model, keeping one
8There are two Stata procedures that employ IV quantile regression. One of them,
ivqte, is strictly for a single endogenous treatment effect (0-1 variables). The other,
ivqreg, contributed by Do Wan Kwak, allows for two endogenous variables, but it
is still in the development process and has many limitations. It can be found at:
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.hansen/research/ivqrstata.zip.
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endogenous variable and a set of other regressors. For every endogenous vari-
able, I estimated the abbreviated model in two ways: (1) using the two-step
procedure as in the full model and (2) using the Stata code, ivqreg, which
yields consistent estimates. I trimmed the set of regressors until the ivqreg
procedure resulted in coefficient and standard error estimates. Comparing
the results obtained in these two ways helped me assess the extent of the
bias caused by the two step procedure. (The ivqreg results are not presented
here to keep the length of this paper manageable.) I found that the bias is
generally small such that the main conclusions are not affected. Based on
these results, I concluded that the bias in the full model estimates is likely
to be limited.
Another concern about the policy variables is that their role may have
changed over time. In particular, with the political turnover in the executive
and the legislature in 1997 and 1998, it is possible that the role of govern-
ment spending or the activities of IKRF, SSO, and SWO may have shifted.
Another possibility is that each programs effect may have changed as they
matured in the 1990s. For SWO unemployment coverage variable, there is
an additional concern that interpolation data for the 1993-1995 may affect
the results. To address these concerns, I entered economic growth and each
of the public program variables during the entire period along with their
interactions with a dummy for the 1993-1997 period to capture coefficient
differences that may have prevailed before 1998. I did the same for house-
hold characteristics. However, for the latter set of variables the differences
were virtually zero for the pre-1998 period. So, for the sake of parsimony, I
did not include the interaction terms for the household characteristics in the
results that I report below. I also examined the stability of the coefficients
of within each sub-period by shifting the start and end of the period by a
couple of years. (The length of each period could not be too short because I
use province and year fixed effects and the estimates of policy variables are
based on their variations across provinces and over time.) These experiments
showed that the estimates are reasonably robust. Hence, to ensure sufficient
degrees of freedom in estimating the effects of policy variables, I did not
breakdown the sub-periods further.
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3.7 Quantile Regression Results
The results of the quantile regressions are shown in Figures 3.5–3.14. Figure
3.5 shows the effect of economic growth on the distribution of household
expenditure. The left-hand-side panel is the graph of the marginal effect of
one percent increase in economic growth on the log of household expenditures
at different parts of the distribution. The estimates are quite precise and
steadily rise from 0.7 for the poorest 5th percentile to about 1 for the 95th
percentile. The right-hand-side graph shows that the unequalizing effect of
growth may have been stronger during 1993-1997, significantly so for the
bottom 10 percent and the top 20 percent. The differential effects on the
rich and the poor in both periods are indeed large and mean that while the
economic growth in Iran has been lifting all household expenditures, it has
had a strongly unequalizing effect. However, as I will see below, this gap
has been filled for the poor by economic policy and changes in household
characteristics.
Figure 3.6 shows that the marginal effect of province-level government
spending has been positive and strong on the bottom quintile, though only
after 1998. The effect for the rest of households is virtually zero both before
and after 1998. The effects of IKRFs expenditures, on the other hand, have
gone further and reached the bottom 70 percent of the population before 1998
and the bottom 60 percent afterwards (Figure 3.7). The estimated effects
of IKRF spending are quite high for the very poor and decline as income
rises. The finding that the effect for the middle 40 percent had been stronger
before 1998 is interesting because the Iranian economy had gone through
a crisis during 1993-1997 and it seems that IKRF had kept its net wider at
that time. In contrast, according to Figure 3.7, the marginal effects of IKRFs
Rajaii program have concentrated on the expenditure levels the middle three
quintiles, despite its mission to help the lower quintiles. Also, the effect
had been weaker before 1998. It is possible that the programs unconditional
benefits and possibly its general equilibrium consequences may have made it
beneficial mainly to the middle of the distribution.
Figure 3.8 indicates that SWO coverage has had significant positive effects
on most of the population. The effect had been quite even across the entire
distribution before 1988. But, it became somewhat smaller and lost its sig-
nificance for the bottom and top deciles after 1988. The result is particularly
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notable because SWO is a relatively small program. But, its diverse mission
seems to entail benefits for broad segments of the population. The change
after 1998 seems to be due to the reorientation of SWO to support modern
NGOs that mostly operated in major urban areas (Esfahani, 2005).
Turning to the role of SSO activities, Figure 3.9 shows that after 1998, the
mandatory and especially the optional SSO schemes have beneficial effects
for a wide range of the population, especially the middle class. These pro-
grams do not seem to have been reaching the lowest decile of the distribution
effectively. Furthermore, the optional insurance program does not appear
to make much of a difference for the top decile. SSOs unemployment insur-
ance, on the other hand, seems to have has positive effects for the bottom 60
percent of households, particularly the lowest three deciles.
The estimates of SSO variables for the pre-1998 period appear rather puz-
zling. In particular, the mandatory insurance program shows negative effects
on the real expenditures of all households. This could be because of the data
problems for 1993-1995 mentioned above in the discussion of data. It might
also reflect the consequences the economic crisis of 1994-1995, which caused a
sharp and unexpected rise in inflation, with little adjustment in the benefits
paid out by SSO. As a result, those who had expected to depend on SSOs
mandatory program found themselves worse off. For the optional program,
which began to expand in the 1990s, the initial benefits seem to have gone to
the top half of the distribution. This may be due to the fact that in the ear-
lier years, higher income groups had been in a position to take advantage of
the program. The unemployment insurance program was also limited before
1998 and, naturally, its effect was small, though still positive for the poor.
The effects grew stronger as these programs expanded after 1998.
The above results capture effects of public programs through their province-
level variations. The only set of variables that provides me with a glimpse of
the role of economy-wide factors is the year fixed effects, depicted in Figure
3.10. The pattern of these effects is indeed informative. The first four graphs
in this figure capture the impact of the economic crisis of 1994-1995. They
show that the episode drove down everyones real expenditure more or less
by the same percentage in 1994. However, soon its effects became strongly
regressive as the expenditures of bottom 70 percent declined further in 1995,
while the top decline experienced recovery. In 1996, the effect of the economy-
wide factors on the bottom deciles started to rise in 1997 it was much higher
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than the effects of the same factors for the middle quintiles. In 1998, the
effect of the economy-wide factors had more or less returned to their 1993
levels. In the following years, this effect started to drift down, especially for
the top deciles, though always remaining statistically insignificant.
I now turn to the effects of household characteristics on the pattern of
household expenditure in Iran. The marginal effects of being urban and
female-headed household are presented in Figure 3.11. Note that as expected,
urban households spend a lot more than the rural ones. Part of this is likely
to be due to differences in urban and rural price indices. However, that
effect alone cannot explain the large gap in expenditure and the downward
slope of the effect as quantiles rise. The latter pattern is consistent with the
relative mobility of upper income rural households compared to their lower
income counterparts. The right-hand side graph in Figure 3.11 reveals that
when the household is headed by a woman rather than a man, expenditure is
significantly lower, especially for the lower quantiles: by more than 35 lower
for the bottom decile and about 23 percent for upper decile. Disadvantages
of being a female head of household seem to be less pronounced when they
have other characteristics, such as innate abilities or other assets, that enable
them to enjoy higher expenditures compared to their male counterparts.
Figure 3.12 presents the results for household size and education variables.
Household size clearly matters a great deal for real expenditure. The effect
turns out to be substantially larger for the lower expenditure quantiles, pos-
sibly because they have relatively smaller fixed costs and the presence of an
additional person in the household raises expenditure by a larger percentage.
Education of non-student adults also raises household expenditure, as ex-
pected. Interestingly, the effect of education is lower among upper quantiles.
A plausible explanation for this finding is that in the upper ranges of the
distribution, households possess larger amounts of other assets, reducing the
marginal effect of education on their incomes and expenditures.
The estimated effects of age of head of household are shown in Figure 3.13.
Household expenditure has an inverted-U relationship with age that is much
more pronounced for lower quantiles than for the upper ones. Higher income
household heads seem to be able to smooth their consumption and possibly
their incomes over their life cycle. The peak of the overall age effect is also
rising with the expenditure quantile, ranging from about age 49 for the lowest
quantiles to about 54.6 for the top decline.
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Finally, Figure 3.14 presents the effects of the number of children, teenagers,
and elderly in the household. The results show that children are associated
with lower household expenditure, while teenagers and elderly tend to raise
it. The latter effects both turn out to be larger for the upper quantiles. As
pointed above, the pattern for the teenagers from high income households
may be due to the higher expenditures (e.g., for private education). For the
number of children, the effect has a much smaller magnitude for the rich, pos-
sibly because of the fixed costs mentioned above, or due to relatively more
resources that richer household can afford to allocate to their children.
3.8 Assessing the Model and Decomposing the Trends
in Household Expenditure Distribution
In this section, I first assess how well the fitted model represents the actual
trends in household expenditure distribution. I then analyze the role that
various factors have played in the past trends in the distribution. This is
important because the effects that I have measured may have positive or
negative consequences for each quantile depending on the direction and size
of changes in the determinants of expenditure. For example, while the re-
gression results show that the effect of SWO on a wide range of expenditures
has been positive, the consequences could be nil or negative due to the re-
duction in the activities of the organization. To make the assessment task
manageable and make the analysis more concrete, I focus on the 1998-2005
period when the reformist government of President Khatami stabilized the
economy while changing the structure of social protection programs.
To identifying the sources of shifts in expenditure distribution, I employ the
Machado-Mata technique, which is an extension of Oaxaca decomposition to
the case of distributional shifts. This technique requires simulating a sample
from the estimated conditional distribution and then performing experiments
with it by changing the distribution of various determinants. I start with the
distribution of household characteristics and conditions in 1998 and calculate
their predicted expenditures using the quantile regression results for every
five percentile (0.05, 0.10, , 0.95). For every household, I get 19 estimates,
depending on the segment of the distribution in which they may land. I then
draw a random value from the uniform distribution between 0 and 1 to select
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a quantile for that household. I do the same for the 2005 household sample.
Finally, I use the selected samples to analyze the simulated distributions.
Resampling changes the outcome somewhat, but the broad characteristics of
the simulated sample remain remarkably stable.
Figure 3.15 compares the actual shift in the distribution of household ex-
penditures between 1998 and 2005 with the one based on the simulated sam-
ples for those two years. The predicted values are remarkably close to the
actual shifts, giving me confidence that the model is a good estimate of the
underlying situation. (Note that the match between the predicted shift with
the actual one is much more stringent than getting a good fit for the levels
each year.) There are of course gaps between the two curves in the middle
and upper quantiles, but the overall shape of the shift is captured by the es-
timated coefficients and variable changes. Examining the factors that cause
the simulated distributional shift to slope downward toward in the upper
deciles and make it deviate from the actual distribution led me to notice
that the it is essentially driven by the shift in the year fixed effect, shown in
Figure 3.16. I cannot be sure what factors caused this deviation, but sub-
tracting the shift in the year fixed effect from the overall shift produces a
curve (benchmark shift) that follows the pattern of the actual distribution
more closely. This means that the variables included in the model seem to
be the main drivers of the shift in the actual distribution.
To decompose the benchmark shift, I The quantile regression method and
the household expenditure surveys that I have employed to assess the role
of policy and household characteristics in distributional shifts in Iran have
yielded novel and useful results. I find that economic growth in Iran has
been unequalizing, but province-level government expenditures, a key agency
providing social safety net (IKRF), and expansion of education have coun-
teracted with that effect and, on the whole, have helped lower inequality in
the 1990s and 2000s. This finding is important particularly because Iran has
experimented with new forms of institutions such as IKRF to provide social
protection. The success of these institutions makes it worthwhile to examine
them more closely and to derive general lessons from them that can be useful
in Iran and elsewhere. There is, of course, much more to be done to fully
understand the determinants of distributional shifts. Some important factors
have been captured in cross-sectional and time fixed effects. Much more data
with longer series is needed to discern those factors. Furthermore, some of
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the variables considered here are connected with each other and with other
factors. Determining those connections could lead to better measurement
of direct and indirect effects and to the identification of more fundamental
factors that drive income distribution. Also, more work and more powerful
statistical packages are required to deal with endogeneity and simultaneity
issues. Nevertheless, the approach is very useful because it opens up pos-
sibilities for examining many other distributional issues. For example, with
appropriate data, one may be able to assess the impact of infrastructure and
other large projects across household. Other important issues in the case
of Iran are: how and why those in the middle of the distribution were left
out between the early 1990s and mid-2000s, what roles they played in the
rise of populism and reactions to it after the mid-2000s? start with the 1998
simulated distribution and raise the per capita expenditure variable to its
2005 level in each province. Figure 3.17 shows that this causes a large shift
in the 1998 distribution, with a significant upward tilt. Comparing this curve
with the benchmark shift shows that growth explains the bulk of the shift.
However, growth is associated with considerably greater inequality, contrary
to the actual situation that has been far more favorable for the poor. To
understand how this gap has been filled, I begin with two exercises. First,
I calculate the shift in the simulated 1998 distribution if all policy variables
are set equal to their 2005 levels, keeping the distribution of household char-
acteristics constant. Second, I measure the shift in the distribution when
household characteristics are set equal to the 2005 sample, but policies and
per capita expenditure is kept the same as in 1998. The results of these two
exercises, shown in Figure 3.17, suggest that the two sets of factors have had
broadly similar roles in the distributional shift. However, household charac-
teristics have been more uplifting for the bottom deciles and policy variables
have helped the top decile somewhat more.
The next question is which policies account for the overall role that poli-
cies have played during 1998-2005. To address this question, I mapped the
shift from the simulated 1998 distribution when each policy variable was
updated to its 2005 level. Figures 3.18-3.20 present the results. It is clear
from Figure 3.18 that a large part of the expenditure and distributional con-
sequences of policies during the period can be attributed to province-level
government expenditures. The SWO+NGO combination, which had been
largely stagnant after 1998 had in fact had a small negative effect for the
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bottom 70 percent, while slightly helping the top quarter of the households!
Figure 3.19 further reveals that the mandatory and optional schemes of the
SSO had been beneficial to the population, but with opposite distributional
consequences. The benefits of the mandatory program had been rising with
quantiles, while the opposite is true for the optional program. This makes
sense because the mandatory program tends to focus on the employees of
large enterprises, especially the public and quasi-public ones, who happen
to be among the better off segments of the population. The optional plan,
on the other hand, has been creating options for household from other social
strata and, consequently, has benefitted them. Figure 3.19 further shows that
the unemployment insurances scheme of SSO has had virtually no effect on
the expenditure distribution. This could be because the economy was rapidly
expanding during 1998-2005 and few employed workers were losing their jobs
to take advantage of the scheme. Of course, there were many unemployed
young people in that period, but they had not found jobs to become eligible
for the unemployment insurance program.
The distributional shift attributable to IKRF spending, mapped in Figure
3.20, follows the effect I have observed in the previous section: It has had a
positive impact on the bottom half of the population, with the effect rising
and becoming quite tangible for the lower quantiles. The overall impact of
the Rajaii program, on the other hand, has been negative, except for the top
and bottom deciles. The reason for this surprising finding is that the coverage
and the pensions paid by the program were declining during 1998-2005, as
the government was taking away resources from IKRF. This factor did not
lead to negative outcome for the other IKRF programs because it could use
its own revenues for those purposes and had an incentive to support the poor
and elicit their loyalty to the system.
For decomposing the effects of household characteristics, I start with the
1998 joint distribution of all household characteristics and then shift the
each percentile of the distribution of each characteristic separately to make
it reach its 2005 level. This yields a new distribution for each variable that
can be used to measure its marginal effect. The procedure assumes that one
characteristic, say education, can be changed independently of other charac-
teristics, while in reality such a neat separation may not hold. However, the
exercise is still useful because one can combine the shifts in characteristics
as needed to arrive at patterns that may be more realistic. In any case, for
127
most household characteristics I found that they had not changed enough
to make a difference (urbanization, age of head of household, female-headed
households, and the number of teenagers and elderly in the household). The
variables that have sizable impact are education, household size, and the
number of children. The reduced household size has reduced household ex-
penditure across the board, but this has been almost entirely due to the
reduced number of children in the household, which has raised expenditure
for each given household size. Since these two factors are closely intercon-
nected, I shift them in tandem and report the net results in Figure 3.21. It
turns out that the reduce number of children and household size jointly have
reduced household expenditure with smaller effects for higher quantiles, ex-
cept for the bottom 5 percent. This leaves education to explain the positive
effect of household characteristics changes on expenditures and distribution.
This observation is clearly born by the simulated shift shown in Figure 3.21.
3.9 Conclusion
The quantile regression method and the household expenditure surveys that
I have employed to assess the role of policy and household characteristics
in distributional shifts in Iran have yielded novel and useful results. I find
that economic growth in Iran has been unequalizing, but province-level gov-
ernment expenditures, a key agency providing social safety net (IKRF), and
expansion of education have counteracted with that effect and, on the whole,
have helped lower inequality in the 1990s and 2000s. This finding is im-
portant particularly because Iran has experimented with new forms of in-
stitutions such as IKRF to provide social protection. The success of these
institutions makes it worthwhile to examine them more closely and to derive
general lessons from them that can be useful in Iran and elsewhere.
There is, of course, much more to be done to fully understand the determi-
nants of distributional shifts. Some important factors have been captured in
cross-sectional and time fixed effects. Much more data with longer series is
needed to discern those factors. Furthermore, some of the variables consid-
ered here are connected with each other and with other factors. Determining
those connections could lead to better measurement of direct and indirect
effects and to the identification of more fundamental factors that drive in-
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come distribution. Also, more work and more powerful statistical packages
are required to deal with endogeneity and simultaneity issues. Nevertheless,
the approach is very useful because it opens up possibilities for examining
many other distributional issues. For example, with appropriate data, one
may be able to assess the impact of infrastructure and other large projects
across household. Other important issues in the case of Iran are: how and
why those in the middle of the distribution were left out between the early
1990s and mid-2000s, what roles they played in the rise of populism and
reactions to it after the mid-2000s?
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Figure 3.1: Poverty Rate and the Coverage of the Main Social Protection
Programs in Iran
Source: Calculated based on data from IKRF Statistical Reports, the Statistical Yearbook
of Iran, and the Household Expenditure and Income Survey Dataset.
Figure 3.2: Mean and Median Individual Expenditure and per Capita
Government and IKRF Spending in Iran
Source: Calculated based on data from IKRF Statistical Reports, the Statistical Yearbook
of Iran, and the Household Expenditure and Income Survey Dataset.
130
Figure 3.3: Evolution of Quantiles of Individual Expenditure Distribution
in Iran
Source: Calculated based the Household Expenditure and Income Survey Dataset.
Figure 3.4: The Bottom Quantiles of Individual Expenditure Distribution
Relative to the Median
Source: Calculated based the Household Expenditure and Income Survey Dataset.
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Figure 3.5: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Per Capita Expenditure
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard er-
rors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3.6: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Government Spending per Household
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.7: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of the IKRF Activity Measures
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3.8: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of the Social Welfare Organization and NGO
Coverage Rates
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.9: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of the Social Security Organization Coverage
Measures
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.10: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Year Effect Relative to 1993
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.11: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Residence Location and Gender of Head of
Household
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard er-
rors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3.12: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Household Size and Education
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.13: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of the Age of Head of Household
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard er-
rors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3.14: Quantile Regression Results:
Estimated Coefficients of Household Structure Indicators
Note: Shaded areas are the 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard
errors. Dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.15: Predicted vs. Actual Change in Quantiles of Household Real
Expenditure Between 1998 and 2005
Figure 3.16: Year Effect vs. All Other Factor Effects on Quantiles of
Household Real Expenditure Between 1998 and 2005
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Figure 3.17: The Effects of Growth vs. Changes in Policy and Household
Characteristics on Quantiles of Household Real Expenditure Between 1998
and 2005
Figure 3.18: The Effects of Province-Level Government Spending and
SWO/NGO Activity on Quantiles of Household Real Expenditure Between
1998 and 2005
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Figure 3.19: The Effects of SSO Activities on Quantiles of Household Real
Expenditure Between 1998 and 2005
Figure 3.20: The Effects of IKRF Activities on Quantiles of Household Real
Expenditure Between 1998 and 2005
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Figure 3.21: The Effects of Household Size and Education on Household
Real Expenditure Between 1998 and 2005
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Regressions
Std. Min- Maxi-
Mean Dev. imum imum
Province-Level Variables:
Log of Real Per Capita Expenditure in 1997 Rials 11.02 0.31 10.28 11.86
Log of Real Government Expenditure per
Household in 1000s of 1997 Rials -3.03 0.45 -4.28 -1.56
Log of Real IKRF Expenditure per Household
in 1000s of 1997 Rials -5.52 0.81 -7.8 -2.6
Log of Number of Individuals Covered by
Rajaii Program per Household -2.27 0.85 -5.19 -0.53
Log of Number of Individuals Covered by
SWO per Household -2.27 0.58 -5.71 -0.87
Log of Number of Individuals Covered by
SSO Mandatory Program per Household -1.23 0.47 -2.65 2.23
Log of Number of Individuals Covered by
SSO Optional Program per Household -3.4 0.93 -8.35 -2.09
Log of Number of Individuals Covered by
SSO Unemployment Program per Household -5.41 0.78 -9.79 -3.75
Number of Households per Province 1041 822 35 5372
Household-Level Variables:
Log of Real Household Expenditure in 1997 Rials 12.34 0.27 11.67 13.04
Log of 1 + Household Size 1.47 0.54 0 3.69
Log of Education of Non-Student Adults in Household 1.38 0.88 0 3.09
Age of Head of Household 4.74 1.54 0.8 9.9
Female Headed Household Dummy 0.09 0.29 0 1
Log of 1 + Number of Young Child in Household 0.73 0.44 0 1
Log of 1 + Number of Teenager in Household 0.42 0.49 0 1
Log of 1 + Number of Household Members Aged 65+ 0.09 0.22 0 1
Urban Residence Dummy 0.49 0.5 0 1
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